Problems of Communism

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1988



Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline

Stephen Sestanovich

Europe in US-USSR Relations
Vojtech Mastny

Moscow's Party Organization
Timothy J. Colton

Checklist of CP's in 1987
Richard F. Staar

Communist Fronts in 1987
Wallace Spaulding

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

1

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1988 VOL XXXVII

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all Sections), Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline
by Stephen Sestanovich

16 Europe in US-USSR Relations: A Topical Legacy
by Vojtech Mastny

30 Moscow's Party Organization
by Timothy J. Colton

NOTES

60 Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987
by Richard F. Staar

82 Communist Fronts in 1987
by Wallace Spaulding

Cover: Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force agreement in Washington on December 8, 1987. Photo by UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

EDITOR
Wayne Hall

EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Sophia Sluzar

MANAGING EDITOR
Maria O. Pryshlak

CONTRIBUTING EDITOR
Susan Williams O'Sullivan

PRODUCTION COORDINATOR
Lynn Albracht

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Kim Taylor

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline

Stephen Sestanovich

There is considerable evidence that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who appears so impressive at innovative diplomacy, is in fact practicing a diplomacy of the unexpected to mask the Soviet Union's decline. His foreign policy has been decisively shaped by a dual legacy—an extremely daunting domestic policy agenda and a record of diplomatic reverses over the past decade. He is dealing with the Soviet Union's diminished effectiveness by recasting Soviet goals to make them more modest and therefore more attainable, and by carefully reinterpreting the international environment so as to make it appear less threatening. Such a policy course poses a dilemma: reversing a decline in the long term may mean accepting setbacks over the short term.

Europe in US-USSR Relations: A Topical Legacy

Vojtech Mastny

The years 1945–50 witnessed the shaping of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the heart of the conflict lay Europe, where Stalin's quest for absolute security, implying the absolute insecurity of the continent's states, generated a US commitment to defend Europe against Soviet domination. Yet, the Soviet-American conflict never erupted into an outright war. Instead, the two superpowers have learned to manage crises. Reversing the effects of the policies that shaped the cold war seems more possible today than before for several reasons, among the more important being Gorbachev's willingness to re-examine the Stalin legacy, the signing of the INF agreement, and the existence of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe framework.

Moscow's Party Organization

Timothy J. Colton

Since 1917, the prominence of the Moscow party organization has been a given in Soviet politics. Its size, quality, and, above all, its centrality have guaranteed that it could never be just another local. If, however, one side of the centrality coin has been unique visibility and access, the flip side has been vulnerability—as the recent dramatic demotion of Moscow party leader Boris Yel'tsin has demonstrated. Historically, then, the prominence of the Moscow party organization was a constant factor, and crisis a recurrent one. Recently another and, perhaps, final pattern of secular decline appears to be emerging: Moscow does not pull the weight it used to. The reasons for this are many and varied. Demographics and territorial organization play a role, but to a large extent the erosion of the Moscow party organization's position is a consequence of the modernization of the Soviet political system.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987

Richard F. Staar

1987 was a year of sober reassessment for many of the world's communist movements. In the Soviet Union, major economic reforms were targeted as Mikhail Gorbachev pursued his goal of restructuring Soviet society. With respect to the world communist movement, the Soviet leader seemed to be calling for caution and self-reliance by local parties at a time when major new Soviet aid was unlikely to be forthcoming. In democratic societies, communist parties continued to decline in electoral appeal, in part as a result of sharp factionalism within party ranks. This listing of parties and account of developments in communist parties is published in conjunction with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA).

Communist Fronts in 1987

Wallace Spaulding

Mikhail Gorbachev's rule seems to have resulted in a more open and cost-conscious Soviet manipulation of the major communist internation front organizations during 1987. This was seen most clearly in the sharp switch in propaganda emphasis of these front in early 1987 from opposition to nuclear testing and the US Strategic Defense Initiative to support for US-Soviet negotiations. Less than a month after Gorbachev dropped SDI as an obstacle to negotiation of an intermediate-range nuclear force aggrement with the United Stated, a major front meeting reflected the shifted Soviet priorities. An increasing number of front gatherings were held in Moscow, where the Soviet did not have to spend precious hard currency and could arrange for appearances by the charismatic General Secretary Gorbachev.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline

Stephen Sestanovich

Mikhail Gorbachev practices the diplomacy of the unexpected. His international maneuvering and high-pressure negotiating style put him in a long tradition of leaders who have pursued innovative foreign policies. Although, for example, Gorbachev would not ordinarily be compared with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, there are striking similarities between the two:

[Sadat's method was] to cut through trivia to the essential, to make major, even breathtaking, tactical concessions in return for an irreversible psychological momentum . . . . [T]he improvement he might have achieved by haggling would have been cosmetic or a bow to vanity. Wise statesmen know they will be measured by the historical process they set in motion, not by the debating points they score.[1]

Sadat's ploys seemed exceptionally skillful in their time, and the adulation he enjoyed in the West is very similar to the Gorbachev phenomenon today. Sadat was seen as a decisive statesman able—at a stroke—to change the terms of diplomatic debate, to push negotiating partners toward agreement, and to overcome old and fruitless animosities.

In retrospect, however, Sadat's achievements look a little different. What stands out most is not his ability to produce victory but to orchestrate retreat. The results of his diplomacy were politically sustainable at home primarily because, after more than two decades of overly ambitious, extremely costly, and largely failed foreign policy undertakings, Egyptian opinion was ready for a more modest international and even regional role.

Egypt, in other words, was in decline, and Sadat's policy was both a recognition of and a response to this reality. He seemed so successful in large part because he wanted so much less. There were, to be sure, concessions that he could not make: in sacrificing long-standing Egyptian goals, he had to be careful not to inflame domestic controversy or tempt foreign adversaries to exploit his interest in accommodation. In principle, these constraints were real. In practice, however, they did not materially slow Sadat's drive for retrenchment. Nor did they oblige his successor to restore the earlier activism and futile ambition of Egyptian foreign policy.[2]

Other leaders have taken a similar route, even when adapting to much more transient downturns in national fortunes. Certainly, Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's policies—withdrawal from Vietnam, plus détente with both China and the Soviet Union—followed roughly the same strategic outline. Their aim was to make diplomatic maneuvering carry more of the weight of American strategy, because domestic support for other instruments of foreign policy (above all, military force and covert action) was waning. On balance, Nixon and Kissinger were less successful than Sadat had been, both in preserving a consensus at home and in discouraging others from trying to take advantage of US weakness.[3]

Is Gorbachev also practicing a diplomacy of decline?

Stephen Sestanovich is Director of Soviet Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC). *An earlier version of this article was presented at the Aspen Institute's conference on US-Soviet relations, January 12–16, 1988.*

[1]Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1982, pp. 642–43. Admittedly Gorbachev's recent performances (especially with the Western media) show him eager to score debating points too.

[2]It was widely argued after Sadat's assassination in 1981 that he had enjoyed little real popular support. His foreign policy, however, obviously had strong roots and remains largely in place under Hosni Mubarak—even though Mubarak shuns the global showmanship that served as an additional prop for Sadat's diplomacy.

[3]I have elaborated the comparison between Gorbachev's and Nixon's strategies more fully in "What Gorbachev Wants," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), May 25, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, US President Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at Camp David in September 1978.

—Gamma-Liaison.

It may seem odd even to ask this question about a leader who has evoked such worldwide acclaim and whose manipulative gifts (whether in public or in private) are hardly open to doubt. Yet decline is not the same thing as collapse, nor does it have to mean one sharp setback after another. And, as the example of Sadat suggests, it is not inconsistent with major policy innovations. The pace of decline can be slow and irregular, and clever policies can do a great deal to conceal its extent—from adversaries, from allies and clients, and from domestic audiences alike. Beneath the best camouflage tactics, however, the features of decline will be visible: a deterioration in the elements of national strength, diminished effectiveness in applying that strength to the pursuit of national goals, a recasting of those goals to make them more modest and attainable, and a careful reinterpretation of the international environment to make it appear less threatening.[4]

Soviet Criticisms of Past Policy

There is considerable evidence that Gorbachev views his own predicament in these terms—as a search for ways of dealing with decline. His foreign policy has been decisively shaped by the fact that he inherited both an extremely daunting domestic agenda and a record of recent diplomatic reverses. It was the combination of the two that mattered: neither half of this inheritance would by itself have required the same kind of policy review.

Gorbachev is not alone in his reading of the Soviet Union's situation; it appears to be shared by the entire group of leaders that came to power with the passing of the Brezhnev generation. The members of this group have given unprecedented public expression to the pessimistic frame of mind in which they approach their foreign policy dilemmas. In a pair of speeches in mid-1987, for example, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told officials of his own ministry:

Beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, you and I represent a great country that in the last 15 years has more and more been losing its position as one of the leading industrially developed nations.[5]

Unless the decay of its power base is reversed, he observed, the Soviet Union will be:

[4]The theme of great-power "decline" has been made especially current by Paul Kennedy's new work, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York, Random House, 1987. Kennedy, who treats American policy in far greater depth than Soviet policy, measures decline in somewhat narrower terms than are used in this essay. He focuses on military power and its economic base, giving less attention to the nature of a state's diplomatic goals and to the overall effectiveness of its policy in attaining them.

[5]"At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: Speech by E.A. Shevardnadze, June 27, 1987," in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del SSSR* (Moscow—hereafter, *VMID*), No. 2, Aug. 26, 1987, p. 31.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unable to participate on equal terms in the competitive political struggle over the attractiveness of our social-economic model of development.[6]

The Politburo's "second secretary," Yegor Ligachev, has sometimes tried to rein in his colleagues' criticisms of past internal policies, but in the realm of foreign policy, he too has acknowledged that under Leonid Brezhnev "the USSR's international prestige declined."[7]

What Shevardnadze called "the backwardness of our power and gradual loss of position" has not been ascribed by him or other members of the leadership exclusively to the weakness of the Soviet domestic economy. He has in fact made precisely the opposite connection as well: the wasteful use of scarce resources in foreign policy undertakings has become a burden at home.

[W]e frequently cooperated in and at times even provoked enormous material investments in hopeless foreign policy projects and tacitly encouraged actions that in a direct and indirect sense have cost the people dearly even to this day.[8]

Shevardnadze's most scathing charge has been that Soviet foreign policy was conducted "out of touch with the fundamental vital interests of the country."[9] Similarly, in his November 2, 1987, speech on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Gorbachev himself (while clearly tilting in Ligachev's direction on many domestic questions) spoke of Soviet foreign policy "errors," of failures "to make use of opportunities that were opening up," of reactions to Western policy that were "not always adequate."[10]

These complaints are admittedly very general. Lower-ranking officials have zeroed in on specific instances of poor policy. Among military and diplomatic issues, some have implied that the decision to deploy SS-20 missiles against Western Europe was counterproductive; others, that the subsequent Soviet "war-scare" campaign to prevent NATO missile deployments was a mistake; still others, that past Soviet policy toward Japan and China was unnecessarily rigid.[11] Similar errors have been identified in international economic policy—in particular, the failure to increase exports of items other than raw materials. One high-level official has recently complained about the Soviet Union's standing in the global economy at the start of the 1980's:

We were in no way able to exceed 4 percent of world trade. That is to say, we had become a great industrial power and accounted for 20 percent of world output, and yet in this sphere, we have been unable to become a big foreign trade power.[12]

Such statements by members of the new leadership show that they came to office with a very critical appraisal of the Soviet Union's recent international record. Optimism—or even complacency—had no strong advocates within the Politburo. Yet a negative assessment did not by itself require immediate or radical adjustments in Soviet policy. Nor was it self-evident that adjustments, if made, would involve any narrowing of Soviet horizons. A new leadership might instead have been expected to fight decline through the infusion of additional resources, through better planning and coordination, through the reaffirmation of traditional goals, or even through mindless self-assertion. (This last possibility, in particular, was the forecast of those Western analysts who speculated that a "wounded Soviet bear" might lash out in the face of repeated failures.)[13]

---

[6]"An Unconditional Requirement—Turn to Face the Economy," Shevardnadze speech of July 4, 1987, in *VMID*, No. 3, Sept. 10, 1987.

[7]*Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 27, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Aug. 28, 1987, p. 23. In the same passage, Ligachev also quoted a remark by Lenin that Gorbachev has frequently used, that in the past revolutionary parties have perished because they were afraid to confront their weaknesses. Unwillingness to do so, said Ligachev, meant that "danger loomed over" the CPSU.

[8]*VMID*, No. 2, 1987, p. 31.

[9]Ibid.

[10]*Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 2, 1987, p. 2.

[11]For the views of Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, see *New Times* (Moscow), No. 46, Nov. 23, 1987; also "Moscow Aide Doubts SS-20 Decision," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 21, 1987. For comments by Valentin Falin, head of Novosti press agency, see *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 22, 1987, p. 11. See also the comments by arms control negotiator V. Karpov and *Izvestiya* political observer A. Bovin in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 12, 1988, pp 6–13.

[12]Comment by Chairman of the State Economic Commission Ivan Ivanov during a Moscow Television roundtable program on Feb. 10, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 18, 1988, p. 82. Ivanov may have put the case too positively. Paul Kennedy, while pointing out the obstacles to precise measurement, records the Soviet 1980 share of Gross World Product as 11.4 percent (down from 12.4 percent a decade earlier). See Kennedy, op. cit., p. 436. For other comparisons, see Herbert Stein's analysis, "America Is Rich Enough to Be Strong," *The AEI Economist* (Washington, DC), February 1988, pp. 2–3.

Some Soviet analysts seem to believe that economic noncompetitiveness puts Soviet great-power status at stake. One economist, for example, has argued as follows: "Now that a military strategic equilibrium exists between East and West and encouraging progress has taken shape in disarmament, economic and technological forces will increasingly determine world status, the degree of influence of any country or region of the world on the development of international relations. The socialist countries, and first and foremost the Soviet Union, cannot stand aloof from the objective process of the international division of labor, whether within or outside the framework of the socialist community." See "Not by Oil Alone," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 10, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1988, p. 70.

[13]See, for example, Edward Luttwak: "[W]hen leaders are pessimistic about the long-term future of their regimes and at the same time have high confidence in the strength and ability of their armed forces, then all that

(fn. continued on p. 4)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trying harder, making more efficient use of one's strengths—this is one way of reacting to the threat of decline; and some Soviet initiatives, in foreign and domestic policy alike, can be read as efforts of this kind. Wholesale changes of personnel, for example, may have been made in the belief that better management could ease Soviet difficulties.[14] Similarly, in trying to exploit diplomatic openings that were either ignored or bungled by Brezhnev and his foreign minister, Andrey Gromyko, Gorbachev may have believed that the Soviet Union's situation could be improved by merely reversing certain obviously mistaken decisions.

Such approaches represent the foreign policy analogues to the internal program often associated with Brezhnev's immediate successor, Yuriy Andropov: install new people, impose greater discipline, exploit underutilized "reserves." In individual instances, such measures can yield good results. As a broad response to crisis, however, they are likely to be inadequate. In coping with both domestic and foreign policy difficulties, the Soviet leadership confronts this dilemma: experimenting with halfway measures may only prolong decline. Averting deeper problems in the long term may be possible only by accepting setbacks in the short. The domestic version of this dilemma is familiar enough from Western—and Soviet—analyses of economic reforms: *perestroyka*'s success depends on taking steps whose initial results will be worse economic performance. An overhaul of enterprise management, introduction of up-to-date technology, reduction of the labor force—all these are likely to mean widespread confusion and poor results at the outset. To an economist, in fact, the absence of such turmoil would mean that serious changes were not really under way.[15]

Applied to relations with the outside world, this analogy suggests a choice between policy changes that minimize immediate disruptions and those that accept short-term setbacks. As will be argued below, this choice—and sometimes the inability to make it—is evident in both the conceptual and practical adjustments that Gorbachev has made in Soviet foreign policy.

Pessimism about the Future

The negative reading of the Soviet Union's position shared by Gorbachev and his colleagues is most vividly demonstrated by the extreme conceptual conclusions they have drawn from it. The "new thinking" that ostensibly guides today's policy does not openly call for a smaller Soviet role in the world, but it does incorporate the core elements of a strategy of retrenchment as it might be pursued by almost any great power. These include: a devaluation of ideological precepts, a more complacent assessment of outside threats, a re-examination of national interests and a heavier stress on global "common" interests, a cap on resource commitments, a search for less expensive policy instruments, a more flexible and less demanding stance in negotiations, an arms-length attitude toward friends in need and an insistence that they do more to help themselves, avoidance of actions that adversaries can treat as provocations, and so forth.

For Gorbachev, these elements of "new thinking" doubtless have several different purposes apart from coping with decline. They have served the new general secretary's need to put a personal stamp on policy; they

they know and all that they fear will conspire to induce them to use their military power while it still retains its presumed superiority." *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 40.

[14]To a new leadership team, the conduct of Soviet foreign policy (again, like domestic) perhaps appeared so unproductive that the mere shift to coherent, conscientious stewardship would yield better results. In exploring this possibility, Gorbachev and those who had risen to the top with him—all of whom had had little foreign policy experience—apparently believed that it would be a very large task to reorient the institutions of Soviet foreign and defense policy. It is hard to see any other explanation for the fact that, since 1985, outsiders of one sort or another have been appointed to head four of the five principal institutions that handle relations with the outside world: the ministries of foreign affairs, defense, and foreign trade; the Central Committee's International Department; and the KGB. This pattern contrasts with Gorbachev's restaffing of state institutions that handle domestic affairs, where he has usually promoted from within. (See Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's Next Gamble," *Problems of Communism* [Washington, DC], July-August 1987, p. 18.) In putting the foreign ministry under Eduard Shevardnadze's control, Gorbachev turned not to a diplomatic specialist but to a party official from outside Moscow, with a police background and a strong anti-corruption reputation. Ten of 12 deputy foreign ministers, more or less equivalent to American assistant secretaries of state, have also been replaced since 1985. Only one of these new appointees is an outsider like Shevardnadze, but he occupies the key post of deputy minister for personnel. In assigning Anatoliy Dobrynin to head the Central Committee's International Department, Gorbachev put the party's ideologues and Third World activists under a professional diplomat who does not possess the usual credentials in Marxism-Leninism. The top defense ministry posts went to relatively junior generals who are still outranked by many of their subordinates; and the foreign trade apparatus went to a party official. (See Dale Herspring "Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1987; Philip Hanson, "Foreign Trade: The Restructuring of the Restructuring," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* [Munich], RL 58/88, Feb. 9, 1988). Interestingly, only the KGB has retained control over its own personnel. Its top officials continue to come from within, and it has apparently prevented a change in oversight by the party apparatus: the only Central Committee department head not replaced under Gorbachev is Nikolay Savinkin, who, as head of the Administrative Organs department, has overseen military and police personnel since 1968. (I am indebted to Myron Rush for pointing this out as a measure of KGB autonomy.)

[15]For analyses along these lines, see Ed A. Hewett, *Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1988; also Jan Vanous, "Why Gorbachev Isn't Producing," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 3, 1988; and Richard E. Ericson, "The State Enterprise Law," *Harriman Institute Forum* (New York, Columbia University), Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1988.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have also increased his freedom of action in dealing with particular matters under international negotiation.[16] And, not least, they have had undeniable propaganda value in projecting a new face to the West. Yet none of these motives is as important as the broad substantive meaning of the themes of "new thinking" as described above: together, they rationalize lower expectations. They announce an "era of limits."

Perhaps the most significant part of the new leadership's efforts to impose such limits has been to question the principles on which past policy has been based. For example, Shevardnadze has said:

We are people of ideas, but their power should not be put above considerations of common sense. Otherwise, in being completely subordinate to them, you lose many things, among them the ability to improve the economic condition of your own country and, in that manner, to increase the degree of its political influence in the world.[17]

To do better, in short, means freeing Soviet policy from ideological preconceptions and constraints.

The most pointed reshaping of dogma has been the move to revise the official view of capitalism, a shift that Gorbachev himself authorized in his speech observing the 70th anniversary of the revolution and then repeated in remarks to the Central Committee plenum on February 18, 1988. He posed the following "fundamental question":

Is it possible at the present stage, given the interdependence and unity of the world at the end of the 20th century, to exert the kind of influence on the nature of imperialism that would block its most dangerous manifestations?[18]

In a bow to ideological orthodoxy, Gorbachev granted that capitalism could not "become 'good'," but he nevertheless made it clear that he envisioned the checks on imperialist policies as coming from within. By suggesting that imperialism was not incorrigibly aggressive, he implied that the Soviet Union might be able to devote less effort to the East-West competition. (To paraphrase another leader who wanted to cut the costs of competing, Gorbachev appeared to mean that the Soviet Union can safely consider putting aside its "inordinate fear of capitalism.")[19] One important adviser, Yevgeniy Primakov, has put this same point slightly differently:

Comparatively recently we considered peaceful coexistence a respite that would be cut short by those who again would try to strangle the first country of victorious socialism. This situation also insistently dictated the requirement for an increase in military effectiveness, once again as virtually the only means of ensuring the country's security . . . . Today such assessments and interpretations are clearly insufficient and inaccurate.[20]

This conclusion, like Gorbachev's, nicely served the main practical goal of the "new thinking" as stated by Shevardnadze: belt-tightening to limit the burden of achieving Soviet external goals. "The main thing," the foreign minister annnounced last year, "is that the country not bear additional expenses in connection with the need to maintain its defense capability and protect its legitimate foreign policy interests."[21] To announce budget austerity is one thing; to enforce it on an unenthusiastic bureaucracy, quite another. Doing so is obviously far easier if these "legitimate foreign policy interests" are themselves subjected to closer scrutiny, and

[16]Gorbachev seems to approach politics a little pedantically—for him, solving a problem means identifying the one or two key concepts that are the root of the trouble and need to be changed. Once this is done, a program of practical measures can more easily be put in place. With regard to the Soviet economic downturn, for example, Gorbachev worked slowly to bring his colleagues to a common analysis of the problem's scope. Before joining the battle over the details of governmental decrees on questions like price reform, he first pushed the Central Committee to embrace the broad principles on which reform would be based.

Interestingly, in one of his speeches to the foreign ministry, Shevardnadze indicated that *glasnost'* was meant to have a similar effect in easing the shift to a new foreign policy. He complained that, in contrast to the bold exploration of Soviet domestic failures, the media had not paid enough attention to past foreign policy mistakes. See *VMID*, No. 2, 1987, p. 33.

[17]*VMID*, No. 3, 1987, p. 4. The traditional claim that Soviet policies derive from "scientific analysis" meant that Marxist-Leninist ideology provided a way of avoiding mistakes; by contrasting it with common sense, Shevardnadze implied that ideology leads to mistakes.

[18]*Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 3.

[19]*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, Vol. 1, 1977, p. 956.

[20]*Pravda*, July 10, 1987. This claim was not much different, of course, from Khrushchev's assertion that nuclear war is not inevitable. Primakov virtually conceded that Gorbachev is trying to resell the same goods. In explaining why "new thinking" appeared only when Gorbachev became general secretary, he acknowledged that the East-West nuclear balance could not really explain its timing. The real explanation for its emergence was this: "Over the decade (1976-85) preceding the April plenary session, the gap in national income between the USSR and the USA not only did not decrease, it increased." In other words, the discovery that the Soviet Union was less likely to be attacked followed a period of growing American strength relative to the USSR. Earlier Soviet theoreticians, it seems safe to say, would have derided this idea.

Jack Snyder has made the interesting point that Gorbachev does not rely on the idea that a changing "correlation of forces" imposes restraint on capitalism ("The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* [Cambridge, MA], Winter 1987-88, p. 120). Primakov's analysis suggests that the "correlation" is still relevant—but that it is seen to be turning against the Soviet Union.

[21]*VMID*, No. 2, 1987, p. 31.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet statements have begun to suggest such a re-examination. (American analysts of what Samuel Huntington has called the "Lippmann gap" have launched a similar effort.)[22] The now-familiar phrase that Gorbachev has put forward to describe how nations should deal with each other—by seeking a "balance of interests"—connotes more than just being, as he puts it, "ready for compromise."[23] Beyond new bargaining tactics and a less rigid style, setting a "balance of interests" as a goal raises the more fundamental possibility that some traditional Soviet interests can be sacrificed. In discussing the need to make concessions, for example, Aleksandr Bovin has claimed that even the most vital international interests are essentially arbitrary:

Compromise is the air without which constructive policy will choke . . . . Of course, each partner has a limit for concessions determined by the supreme interests of state security and commitments to allies. But to a significant extent ***this limit is subjective.*** *It is determined not by interest "in itself," but by precisely how a given interest is understood and formulated.*[24]

Viewed in this way, "state security and commitments to allies" lose their status as near-absolutes. Other, more authoritative, statements than Bovin's have suggested that these objectives are to be treated more flexibly in the future. Soviet doctrinal discussions aimed at limiting, among other things, military costs have been well studied by Western analysts.[25] The same pattern can be seen in Soviet discussions of the needs of allies, whose claims to assistance are for the most part judged quite harshly—even by once-sympathetic writers.[26] Statements by members of the top party leadership do not formulate dissatisfaction with imperial burdens quite so bluntly. Nevertheless, while expressing support for Third World regimes under pressure, Gorbachev has chosen to do so in a thoroughly conservative phrase—what he calls the right to the "social status quo."[27]



Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze addresses the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 1987.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Certain Soviet officials have pushed "new thinking" outlandishly far. One should keep in mind that in the age of *glasnost'*, many statements, even by those in high positions, are probably not authoritative. Embellishing the idea that competing national interests can be reconciled, for example, Georgiy Shakhnazarov (since 1986, first deputy chief of the Central Committee department for bloc relations) has written about the possibility of "world government."[28] But in this he has gone only slightly farther than

[22]See Samuel P. Huntington, "Coping with the Lippmann Gap," *Foreign Affairs—America and the World 1987/88* (New York), Vol. 66, No. 3, 1988; also James Chace, "A New Grand Strategy," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1988.

[23]Gorbachev and others have spoken frequently about the need to reconcile class interests with universal "human" interests, such as avoiding nuclear war and ecological disaster. (See, for example, the Feb. 25, 1988, *Pravda* editorial, "Hope Reborn.") By suggesting the subordination of proletarian goals, this theme may indicate the continuing downgrading of ideology. Such a process is not unimportant, but Gorbachev's formulation dodges (probably intentionally) the more pointed political issue: the other interests that the Soviets must come to terms with are not in fact those of all humanity but those of other nations. The phrase "balance of interests" comes closer to recognizing this fact, and therefore has more practical significance for Soviet policy than the theme of common "human" interests.

[24]A. Bovin, "From the Art of War to the Art of Negotiations," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), June 4, 1987, p. 5. Emphasis added.

[25]See Robert Legvold, "Gorbachev's New Approach to Conventional Arms Control," *Harriman Institute Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1988; also Andrew C. Goldberg, "The Present Turbulence in Soviet Military Doctrine," and Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1988 (forthcoming).

[26]Two widely noticed examples are Aleksandr Prokhanov, "A Writer's Opinion: Afghan Questions," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Feb. 17, 1988; and Boris Asoyan, "Africa: Not so Far Away," ibid., Oct. 7, 1987, p. 14. Both articles derided Soviet radical clients and past Soviet indulgence of them. The Prokhanov piece was especially significant, not only because it addressed the immediate and very sensitive Afghanistan policy issue, but because it (1) specified the Soviet groups and institutions responsible for the mistaken decision to invade, (2) said the Afghan communists themselves have abandoned their goals, thus freeing the Soviet Union from any obligation to help them, and (3) warned of a bitter public debate on the matter in the future.

[27]"Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World," *Pravda*, Sept. 17, 1987. Admittedly, the Brezhnev Doctrine had a similar meaning, but it did not announce a general right to the status quo shared by non-socialist and socialist nations alike.

[28]*Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1988, p. 3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his superiors. At the United Nations General Assembly session last September, Shevardnadze himself made the extraordinary statement that the Soviet Union sought a world in which peace was ensured "exclusively" by the UN and its Security Council.[29]

It is hard to take seriously formulations that announce the virtual "demobilization" of Soviet foreign policy. But to dismiss them is to miss their deeper function: the "new thinking" explains the reverses and costs incurred in the course of innovation and experimentation. It provides evidence, moreover, that in foreign policy as in domestic, Gorbachev believes that the only way to improve long-term Soviet prospects is to weather reverses in the short term. Of course, radical adjustments are only a part of the story. In implementing them, Soviet policymakers may be continually tempted to try to minimize the practical costs of a full break with past policy.[30] As with economic reform, the reluctance to make such a break is one among many reasons why performance may simply continue to decline. A review of Gorbachev's innovations in the most important areas of policy—relations with the United States, with US friends and allies, with Soviet Third World clients—reveals the difficulties he faces in trying to put Soviet foreign policy on a sounder long-term footing.

Afghanistan

The Soviet war effort in Afghanistan has emerged as the outstanding example of failure and retreat under Gorbachev. At the February 1988 Central Committee plenum, he declared that the leadership had in April 1985, at the very outset of his tenure, conducted a review of the problem and put policy on a new course.[31] Despite this claim of a slowly unfolding strategy, the available evidence suggests something different. The policies that followed this alleged review indicate that the Politburo really wanted to explore whether better results could be obtained by more sophisticated and active management. The leadership appeared, in particular, to hope for three kinds of improvement: first, that new figures at the top would invigorate the Afghan communist party and increase its popular appeal; second, that better military tactics would obviate the need to deploy more Soviet combat troops; and third, that internal pressures in Pakistan and divisions among Pakistan, the United States, and the Afghan resistance would permit a negotiated solution on terms advantageous to the Soviet Union.[32]

Like other Soviet efforts to squeeze better results from previously unused "reserves," Gorbachev's attempt to do so in Afghanistan failed. The replacement of Babrak Karmal by Najibullah in May 1986 only increased the number of factions vying to control the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA); it did little to "broaden the base" of the regime. Greater emphasis on small-unit military operations could not match the effect of increased Western aid to the resistance. Soviet forces began to do worse, not better, and it became harder than ever to envision a military turnaround. Finally, the underlying unity of purpose between the United States and Pakistan was preserved despite occasional public differences over how to respond to Soviet overtures.

Against this background of failed halfway measures, Gorbachev's declaration of February 8, 1988, in which he announced Soviet willingness to begin troop withdrawals on May 15, was an ingenious attempt to seize the diplomatic initiative.[33] It showed obvious parallels to his handling of the INF negotiations in 1987: in both instances, a rapid pace was designed to carry the other parties along despite hesitations. His move succeeded briefly in casting Pakistan as an obstacle to a political solution, and won an official US acknowledgment (from Secretary of State George Shultz) that Gorbachev sincerely wanted to end the war.[34]

These were fleeting advantages, however. Soviet pressure tactics did not succeed in changing the underlying bargaining situation. Neither the US or Pakistani governments, nor the resistance appeared to believe that the February 8th statement represented Moscow's final offer. In fact, all were so confident of Soviet weakness that over the next two months they raised rather than lowered their demands.[35] When, on April 6, 1988, Gorbachev traveled to Tashkent to meet with Najibullah, it was to announce withdrawal of Soviet troops without the proviso that the flow of American military materiel to the Afghan resistance be stemmed—a demand that Soviet spokesmen had for years identified as the essential precondition for withdrawal.

[29]See TASS International Service in Russian, Sept. 23, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 24, 1987 p. 8.

[30]Shevardnadze has said, for example, that "the transitional period will abound in difficulties . . . ." Citing Gorbachev, he added that the goal must be to get through this period "as fast as possible and with the fewest losses." *VMID*, No. 3, 1987, p. 4.

[31]*Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 56.

[32]The evolution of Soviet diplomatic and military policies is surveyed by Don Oberdorfer, "Afghanistan: The Soviet Decision to Pull Out," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 17, 1988, p. A30.

[33]*Pravda*, Feb. 9, 1988.

[34]*The New York Times*, Feb 24, 1988, p. A14.

[35]For a discussion of Soviet efforts to limit the broader repercussions of withdrawal from Afghanistan, see "Kabul Crunch: Can Gorbachev Survive Defeat?" *The New Republic*, Apr. 18, 1988.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Restoring Détente with the US

It is not surprising that Gorbachev has sought to limit the damage from the retreat in Afghanistan by creating a broad improvement in East-West relations. Since the beginning of the cold war, periods of high East-West tension (and of policy failure by one side or the other) have invariably been followed by a decompression in political and military relations. The Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, and the Korean War were followed in the mid-1950's by a renewal of Big Four summitry, agreement on the partition of Vietnam, the neutralization of Austria, and the first significant arms control negotiations. Another period of tension over Berlin and then over Cuba was followed by the conclusion of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and Khrushchev's pursuit (before his ouster) of a bargain on Germany. With the winding down of the Vietnam war came the détente of the early 1970's, which yielded the SALT I agreements and a partial stabilization of the Central European order (as reflected in the Berlin agreement of 1971, recognition of the two German states, and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975).

These precedents suggest that Gorbachev, coming to power against the very difficult background of NATO's INF deployments and the war in Afghanistan, was highly likely to pursue a détente with the United States. The real issue was less whether he would do so, than how and on what terms. How would he seek to create a calmer environment without provoking an escalation of Western demands, particularly as the Soviets' estimate of their own weakness (and their domestic preoccupations) became clear?

Two factors simplified Gorbachev's task: the snarling style of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Gromyko in the early 1980's made him seem less menacing abroad, and crucial Soviet policy decisions—to call off the "war-scare" propaganda campaign and to end the boycott of arms talks with the United States—had been made before he even took office.[36] But if the Soviet leadership had decided under Konstantin Chernenko to resume negotiations, it fell to Gorbachev to decide *how* to negotiate. In doing so, he elaborated two different approaches, which might be called the "Reykjavik" and "Geneva" styles. He experimented with diplomatic brinkmanship—the pattern made famous at Reykjavik—in which the Soviet side pushes to the edge of a dramatic deal, either to extract American concessions that would otherwise be unthinkable or to cast the United States as the obstacle to arms control. At other times, however, Gorbachev put into practice a more conciliatory, business-as-usual style, in which differences between the two sides are fudged and big disagreements are put to one side for the sake of incremental progress.[37]

Reykjavik-style brinkmanship frames a large, stark choice—forcing the United States to choose either a big breakthrough or a tense stalemate; the Geneva style nurtures the diplomatic momentum that can put a deal over the top. Soviet alternation between the two approaches reflects the inadequacies of each. The Reykjavik style has sometimes left Soviet positions looking extortionist and unreasonable; as such it risks a return to Brezhnev-era isolation. The Geneva style runs a different risk: its steady backtracking conveys an impression of exploitable weakness.

Given these limitations, the most striking feature of recent Soviet policy has been the near-total dominance of the Geneva style. This was clearest in the stream of Soviet concessions on INF during the first half of 1987, and after that in the steady weakening of demands for restrictions on US strategic defense programs.[38] The Geneva style was also evident in Soviet handling of lesser arms control issues. In early 1987 Gorbachev called off his long, futile nuclear-testing moratorium (a Reykjavik-style ploy that Western governments had more or less ignored), and accepted an American formula to discuss verification measures that would permit ratification of the treaties on a threshold test ban and on peaceful nuclear explosions that had been negotiated in the 1970's. Gorbachev also made incrementalism his watchword on issues other than arms control. The Washington summit of December 1987 was preceded by a new round of releases of political prisoners and refuseniks, by increased Jewish emigration, and by small concessions on Afghanistan—steps designed to soften Gorbachev's reception in the United States by showing steady movement on issues where Soviet policy was most damagingly on the defensive.

[36]The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in January 1985 to resume negotiations on reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and on strategic defense. The return to a more businesslike tone with the United States reflected Moscow's failure not only to prevent the INF deployments, but to derail US defense policies by inciting public pressure against them—rather than by negotiating. Soviet policy in the first half of the 1980's relied heavily on the Western peace movements as a potential substitute for real bargaining. The propaganda and pressure campaign against INF in 1983 was followed, for example, by a similar 1984 drive against testing anti-satellite weapons—and, more generally, against "the militarization of space." In the end, Moscow gained almost nothing from this approach.

[37]This was the animating idea of the 1985 Geneva summit communiqué. In it, after having previously claimed that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was an obstacle to other agreements, Gorbachev waived insistence on linkage between separate arms control issues, and agreed to push forward in those areas where the two sides had already established "common ground."

[38]Michael Gordon, "INF: A Hollow Victory?" *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1987, pp. 159–79.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Delegations from Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United Nations, and the United States assemble in Geneva on April 14, 1988, to finalize an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

—Wide World.

This innovative and flexible style was part of a broader effort to change the Soviet Union's image and standing in world affairs. Gorbachev has frequently said that he aims to erase the Western image of a "Soviet threat," which he claims has sustained the entire repertoire of anti-Soviet policies since the days of the cold war.[39] Successfully casting the Soviet Union as a "normal" participant in international politics would certainly reduce demands made on the Soviet Union by other states, and the Soviets themselves now treat progress toward this goal as a mark of the practical success of "new thinking." In this spirit, Primakov has written:

The situation today is far from what it was two or three years ago. It is becoming more and more difficult for anti-Sovieteers in the West to maintain their artificially created image of the USSR as a bellicose, undemocratic state that threatens the West and thinks about nothing but expansion.[40]

The practical meaning of this change, however, remains in doubt. While the old image of the Soviet Union softens, what has come to be called the "agenda" of US-Soviet relations is essentially unaltered: it is a list of American demands for change in Soviet policies and conduct across the board.[41] The constant repetition of these demands on two issues in particular—human rights and Afghanistan—was one of the hallmarks of Gorbachev's meetings with representatives of the American elite.[42] Moreover, in responding to US demands, Soviet officials have betrayed some anxiety about the impression left by their conciliatory approach as a whole. For this reason they have tried to deflect attention from their concessions and even to deny that they made any in the first place. Yuliy Vorontsov, the first deputy foreign minister, insisted, for example, that letting Americans observers visit the Krasnoyarsk radar site was nothing more than a "concession to reason and

[39]Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, pp. 148–49.

[40]*Pravda*, July 10, 1987.

[41]Soviet officials have increasingly sought to leave the impression that they have their own "agenda" of demands, but the effort has been somewhat unconvincing. A recent example is Shevardnadze's statement after his Moscow meeting with Shultz in late February 1988, in which he claimed that he had raised not only the familiar issues of homelessness and treatment of Indians but also the problem of wage discrimination: "In particular we spoke about the fact that men and women are not paid the same for their work when they do identical jobs, and we cited statistics." *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 24, 1988, p. 10.

[42]Michael Mandelbaum analyzed this issue after the summit as follows: the general secretary's "angry response to a human-rights question during a meeting with American publishers, a response he later characterized as 'perhaps overemotional,' indicates that he is tired of hearing about it from Americans. But the summit should have made clear to him that, like it or not, he will continue to hear about human rights, and will need to make some concessions if he wants to make headway in his new dealings with the United States." *U.S. News & World Report* (Washington, DC), Dec. 21, 1987, p. 24.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logic."[43] When Gorbachev changed the Soviet position by cutting Soviet INF missiles in Asia to zero, Georgiy Arbatov declared: "We did not give in to the United States—we gave in to common sense."[44] Shevardnadze himself, after his quickly scheduled October trip to Washington, in which he had to undo Gorbachev's refusal to hold a summit, claimed that "everybody has won."[45] And at the signing of the INF treaty, Gorbachev repeated that Soviet concessions had been made only to "reason."[46] These protestations suggest that Soviet officials feel their reputation for bargaining toughness has suffered.[47]

Gorbachev has successfully created the détente that his own negative assessment of the Soviet Union's situation clearly required. This more tranquil relationship, however, continues to be built around a set of American demands for Soviet concessions. In this sense, Gorbachev has not yet managed to "restructure" US-Soviet relations.

Openings to US Allies: Europe

The principal benefits to the Soviet Union of détente with the United States may, of course, be reaped elsewhere in the world rather than in relations between the superpowers themselves. It has been a long-standing Soviet objective to weaken the American presence in Europe and Asia, and the writings of Gorbachev's advisers (in particular those of Aleksandr Yakovlev) express strong interest in exploiting what they see as latent conflicts between the United States and its allies over political, economic, and military issues. Gorbachev's own statements suggest that he subscribes to this view—with the crucial stipulation that such fissures can best be widened in an atmosphere of low US-Soviet tensions. He has paid particular rhetorical attention to the theme of a European "common home"—a formula that inevitably casts the United States as an outsider in European affairs.[48] Similarly, his July 1986 speech in Vladivostok portrayed the Soviet Union as an Asian power sharing many interests in economic development with its neighbors in the Far East.[49]

One Central Committee foreign policy specialist recently looked back on 1987 as the "Year of Europe" in Soviet diplomacy.[50] The label makes some sense, given the prominence of the INF issue in the last year. The debate over this treaty—together with the aftershocks of the Reykjavik summit—led to a debate about the reliability and desirability of Western Europe's American connection. Successive Soviet proposals sought to follow this first step of nuclear reduction with others intended to lead to the complete "denuclearization" of Europe—in other words, to the removal of the weapons that are at the heart of the US guarantee of West European security.[51]

It was unquestionably a large Soviet achievement to place this issue on the agenda, but doing so had the simultaneous effect of reintroducing new difficulties into relations with those West European states that feel Gorbachev's program is aimed against them. Britain and France (admittedly, each with a distinctive emphasis and not always in agreement with each other) have now aligned themselves as the likely opposition to Soviet initiatives. It was Mrs. Thatcher who said during Gorbachev's stopover on his way to the Washington summit that "there is no scope for further [nuclear] reductions in Europe" until Western concerns about the existing imbalances in conventional and chemical weapons are addressed; President Reagan repeated the same formula a week later after the conclusion of the summit.[52] British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe followed up

[43]See *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 27, 1987, p. 31.

[44]Interview on Tokyo Television (NHK), Sept. 18, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 21, 1987, p. 1.

[45]*Pravda*, Nov. 1, 1987.

[46]*Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1987, p. 4.

[47]When Gorbachev (in a brief outburst of the Reykjavik style) refused to set a summit date during his meeting with Secretary Shultz on October 23, 1987, the only question on the minds of American officials was reportedly how quickly the Soviets would back down.

[48]The Soviets disclaim any thought of excluding the United States, and when it comes to European political-military negotiations, this would clearly be futile. Yet Gorbachev's rhetoric does aim to isolate the US by casting it at least as an alien cultural force in European affairs. "Sometimes," he writes, "one has the impression that the independent policies of West European nations have been abducted, that they are being carried off across the ocean; that national security interests are farmed out under the pretense of protecting security. A serious threat is hovering over European culture, too. The threat emanates from an onslaught of 'mass culture' from across the Atlantic. We understand pretty well the concern of West European intellectuals. Indeed, one can only wonder that a deep, profoundly intelligent and inherently humane European culture is retreating to the background before the primitive revelry of violence and pornography and the flood of cheap feelings and low thoughts." *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, p. 208.

[49]*Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev in Vladivostok*, July 28, 1986, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986.

[50]The speaker was Nikolay Shishlin. See *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1987, p. 20. Apparently no reference to Henry Kissinger's own failed "Year of Europe" was intended.

[51]The Soviet campaign for "denuclearization" represents the application of the Reykjavik style to Europe. Yet Gorbachev appears to have miscalculated about European reactions to this style in the past. Having most likely assumed that West Europeans would condemn the US for rejecting his package of proposals at Reykjavik, Gorbachev found that instead they condemned President Reagan for considering it at all. The West Europeans prefer the Geneva style—incremental Soviet backtracking—and that is what conditional Western endorsements of his "denuclearization" proposals amount to: a demand for his other style.

[52]Mrs. Thatcher's comments are reported in *The Washington Post*, Dec. 8, 1987; the President's speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in *The New York Times*, Dec. 15, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with an unusually blunt (and doubtless somewhat ill-received) message during his visit to Moscow in February 1988. "It is easy to see," he said to his hosts, "why you should want *perestroyka* to succeed. It is not so obvious why the West should want it to work."[53] Small wonder, then, that Great Britain has been described in *Pravda* as "the pacesetter in a buildup of tensions."[54]

The cost for Soviet policy in this trend is not the discomfort of a frank toast at a Kremlin dinner. It is the reassertion of a diplomatic pattern in which the West sets stiff preconditions for better relations—preconditions that can only be met by continuing Soviet concessions. The potential exception to this pattern is, of course, the Federal Republic of Germany. After several years in which Soviet relations with the FRG were worse than with any major Western power, the second half of 1987 brought many signs of improvement between Bonn and Moscow. The long-deferred homecoming visit by Erich Honecker, head of the East German party, was held at last; a West German credit of one billion deutsche mark for the Soviet Union was announced; Chancellor Kohl offered a key INF concession (on dismantlement of Pershing IA's), for which the Soviets effusively expressed their thanks; visits to Moscow by Franz-Josef Strauss (Chancellor Kohl's most formidable conservative critic) and Lothar Spaeth (a possible successor) provided firm approval from the right for a bilateral rapprochement; and, finally, Shevardnadze visited Bonn in January 1988, and left the expectation that Gorbachev would not be far behind.

Soviet attention to West Germany, which aims to kindle neutralism in the most important European member of NATO, clearly has hope of paying real dividends. In the foreseeable future the Federal Republic will not, like Britain and France, put itself to the right of the United States on East-West security issues. During Shevardnadze's visit, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher expressed an apparent national consensus in saying that he hoped to "turn a new page in Soviet-West German relations and fill it with a qualitatively new content."[55]

Yet the hope of putting distance between Germany and the United States remains far from realized.[56] And one element in the new détente as it has taken shape with the Federal Republic is plainly undesirable from Moscow's point of view. The new open and accommodating Soviet style seems to encourage Western governments to make demands of Moscow that at an earlier time would have seemed pointlessly farfetched. In West Germany, for example, there is increased attention to the underlying and unresolved division of Europe, an issue that the 1970's détente was supposed to have made less contentious (and certainly less salient). In today's improved atmosphere, the issue of the division of Europe has received more prominence than it has in many years. As one sign of this, both Kohl and Reagan made the Berlin Wall a significant rhetorical theme in 1987. And even Genscher, while greeting the visiting Shevardnadze with hopes for better relations, referred to the division of Europe:

We must not look at the partition of Europe as an immutable fact but must overcome it . . . . [The common European home] must be a home in which doors do not bar but open up the way to each other.[57]

It would have been easy to embrace this sentiment, but Shevardnadze did not do so. His reply showed that the détente sought by the Soviet Union is one that supports the status quo, not one that transforms it. "Everything,"

Eduard Shevardnadze and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, after the signing of cooperation agreements on January 19, 1988, in Bonn.

—R. Bossu/SYGMA.

[53] *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 16, 1988, p. 56.
[54] *Pravda*, Feb. 19, 1988, p. 7.
[55] *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 19, 1988, p. 41.
[56] Viewed from Moscow, the portents must seem evenly balanced: on the one hand, Genscher's support for further nuclear cuts in Central Europe; on the other, the unprecedented election of a West German hard-liner, Manfred Wörner, as secretary general of NATO.
[57] *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 19, 1988, p. 44.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he said, "can and should stay as it is."[58] Whether a European détente can be constructed on these terms remains open to question.

Openings to US Friends: East Asia

In East Asia, a more flexible and experimental approach to Japan would appear to be one of the most obvious innovations to be explored by a bold new Soviet leadership. Instead, Soviet policy toward Japan has remained in extremely old grooves. A much-rumored Gorbachev visit to Tokyo in 1987 was postponed, no progress was made in finding a way around the issue of the disputed "Northern Territories," Japanese reservations continued to obstruct major investment in Siberian development (an area of special interest to the Soviet leadership, as Gorbachev had underscored at Vladivostok), and although imports from Japan dropped by over 20 percent, the Soviet bilateral trade deficit remained (along with the imbalance in trade with the US) the largest deficit with any country of the West.[59] For now, Gorbachev's strategy is based on a hope that if Japan sees a broad East-West détente taking shape, it will drop its most extreme demands for Soviet concessions. This hope has so far proven unfounded and, as a policy position, it is hardly innovative. It is the same approach taken (unsuccessfully) by Gorbachev's predecessors.

By contrast, Soviet officials have begun to depict policy toward China as a major success. Certainly, there have been more superficial signs of change in Sino-Soviet relations than in relations with Japan. Trade has increased—reportedly tenfold since the early 1980's—and an agreement has been signed to refurbish some of the plants and equipment provided to China by the Soviet Union in the 1950's. On political issues, border talks have been spurred forward by a key Soviet concession in 1986; and technical teams have been meeting in 1988 to develop a common map of the border. The Soviets also showed their responsiveness to Chinese security concerns by making a small reduction in their forces stationed in Mongolia. Soviet statements about China now manifest exceptional respect, emphasizing how much the world's future depends on the two giants of socialism. And Gorbachev has repeatedly expressed a personal desire for a Sino-Soviet summit meeting, presumably intended as vivid proof that the great schism is over.[60]

Soviet policy toward China is perhaps the supreme example of the incremental Geneva style. What is not clear is how much progress can be made without addressing the core issues of Sino-Soviet discord, and whether Gorbachev and his colleagues will be willing to extend the accommodating Geneva approach to questions like Cambodia. After political consultations in Beijing in October 1987, Soviet spokesmen acknowledged that there had been sharp disagreement on this issue.[61] They claim, moreover, that what the Chinese call "obstacles" to normal relations need not block progress in other areas. Gorbachev, for example, argued in his *Liaowang* interview against setting preconditions for a summit; some problems, he said, can only be solved at a summit, not before.[62]

The same Soviet official who spoke of the "Year of Europe" has boldly forecast that 1988 will be in effect the "Year of Asia."[63] Nevertheless, on neither continent can one see major breakthroughs as a result of Gorbachev's diplomacy. His focus on China, as on Germany, means a pursuit of benefits within the confines of the Geneva style, and an evasion of the more substantive demands that these governments continue to press upon him.

The Third World

It is now a familiar claim, for which there is no shortage of evidence, that the Soviet Union has reassessed the diplomatic and political opportunities available to it in the Third World.[64] Even before the advent of "new thinking," the leadership appeared dissatisfied with both the risks to be run and the resources to be committed in the name of preserving the client network acquired in the late 1970's, the heyday of Soviet Third-World activism. Accordingly, Soviet clients have been assigned a lower ideological status; Soviet complaints about the clients' use of aid have become routine; and Soviet diplomats are more aware that exploiting every possible opening in the Third World means paying a price in East-West relations.

As in other areas of policy, a negative diagnosis hardly means Soviet passivity in the Third World. Aid to most radical clients has remained at high levels; and to Leninist regimes under acute insurgent pressure, it has increased steadily. While trying to protect clients from being overthrown, the Soviets have also opened a second

[58]Ibid.

[59]"See *PlanEcon Report* (Washington, DC), Vol. IV, No. 1-2, Jan. 15, 1988, p. 6. The Soviet claim is that this trade drop is only "temporary." *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1988, p. 5.

[60]E.g., see *Liaowang* interview, published in *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1988, p. 1.

[61]*FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1987, p. 30.

[62]*Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1988, p. 1.

[63]*FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1987, p. 20.

[64]This change is put in historical context by Francis Fukuyama in "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

front in the Third World: closer relations have been actively pursued with many states once written off as American lackeys.

One sign of this new interest was Gorbachev's praise in his 70th anniversary speech of regional organizations like ASEAN and even of the Islamic Conference—groupings that have not been notably friendly to the Soviet Union and that in Marxist terms could best be described as "bourgeois" and "feudal" respectively.[65] (The reference in Gorbachev's speech was especially striking in light of his failure to make any mention at all of "socialist" allies in the Third World.) This courtship goes beyond mere talk. The Soviets have, for example, used small but well-timed trade deals to make a political point, offering to make commodity purchases at above-market prices from states whose access to the US market has been cut (rice from Thailand, sugar from Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic).[66] With Thailand, there is also talk of possible "military cooperation."[67]

Most significant, the Soviet Union has experimented with developing good ties to both sides of certain Third-World regional conflicts—potentially a very formidable innovation in Soviet diplomacy, which has generally been limited to cooperative relations with one side only. Moscow has launched diplomatic probes of Israeli and Iranian interest in putting aside past hostility. With both states, diplomatic channels have been activated. Although the nominal agenda has usually been narrow (with Israel, emigration and other "consular" matters; with Iran, trade), the Soviet role as the largest military backer of their respective enemies has given the exchanges added importance. Soviet success in blocking a UN Security Council call for an arms embargo of Iran has been a further source of potential influence.

Despite such experimentation, however, crucial difficulties have continued to dog Soviet Third World policy. First, being on both sides of conflicts has so far produced more new problems than new leverage. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Arab governments protested that the Soviet Union had abandoned their cause in favor of Zionism and Iranian fundamentalism.[68] And both Israel and Iran have recently delivered rebuffs to Soviet overtures: Israel, by scuttling plans for an international peace conference; Iran, by besieging Soviet diplomatic establishments.[69] In Southeast Asia, even while exploring new formulas for talks on Cambodia, the governments that make up ASEAN have maintained a strong common position against Vietnam and have reined in members that stray from it.

Second, although the United States has applied the "Reagan Doctrine" very unevenly, a few Soviet clients face severe and growing military troubles. Apart from Afghanistan (discussed above), both the Vietnamese and Angolan regimes also appear unable to achieve military victories over the insurgencies they face. One Soviet diplomat has been quoted as saying that Vietnam's burden in Cambodia is "simply intolerable."[70] As for Angola, a large and costly offensive by the Soviet-backed Luanda government in the fall of 1987 again failed to break through UNITA positions.[71]

Soviet Third-World policy has also become stalled in the economic area. Despite pressures from Moscow to use aid more efficiently, both Cuba and Vietnam remain a large drain on Soviet resources. Soviet policy-makers may have hoped that expanded trade with more successful developing economies might somehow counter this drain, but the results have been very meager.[72]

---

[65]Gorbachev has attracted a stream of visiting leaders, some of whom would never have thought to visit the Soviet Union—or, in some cases, been invited—under his predecessors. Among ASEAN figures, for example, President Suharto of Indonesia and Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda of Thailand are expected to call this year; Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia visited the Soviet Union in 1987. See Sophie Quinn-Judge, "A Bear Hug for ASEAN," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Mar. 3, 1988.

[66]Such Soviet purchases are, of course, far from unprecedented. In 1954, the Soviet Union bought Burma's rice crop when it found no buyers in the West; in 1960, when Cuba's sugar import quota was cut by the US, the Soviets quickly offered to buy the crop. See J. M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 303.

[67]*FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 3, 1988, p. 16.

[68]Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was obliged to describe claims of Soviet betrayal of the Arabs as "utterly fictitious," at a Washington press conference (*Pravda*, Oct. 25, 1987). Other Soviet officials are incessantly questioned on this subject. (See, for example, the interview given by Karen Brutents, one of Anatoliy Dobrynin's deputies, in *Al-Majallah* [London], Jan. 27–Feb. 2, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 5, 1988, p. 25.) Questioning of Soviet reliability will only increase as a result of a recent claim by an Afghan resistance leader that the Soviets made an offer to Iran to reduce Soviet aid to Iraq in return for Iranian concessions on the Afghan issue (see *The Washington Post*, Mar. 23, 1987).

[69]In this light, the Soviets are no better positioned than in the past to put together a "double-Tashkent" formula in which they would be at the center of regional diplomacy. For a contrary view, see Robert Neumann, "Moscow's New Role as Mideast Broker," *The Washington Post*, "Outlook," Oct. 25, 1987.

[70]Agence France Presse report by Pierre-Antoine Donnet in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 18, 1988, p. 30.

[71]See Bernard E. Trainor, "Angola Drive on the Rebels is Said to Fail," *The New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1987. Elsewhere in the region, officials of the African National Congress have reportedly complained of the steady negative advice they receive from Soviet officials. See Michael Parks, "Soviets Urging ANC to Seek South Africa Political Accord," *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 5, 1988.

[72]Shevardnadze has said that "a certain portion of our foreign economic activity will be, so to speak, 'subsidized,' but only a certain portion." (*VMID*, No. 3, 1987, p. 5). As evidence that this portion may in fact be falling, Cuban documents reportedly show a slight drop in Soviet exports to Cuba in 1987. (*The New York Times*, Mar. 16, 1988, p. A13.) It is not clear, however, that the Soviets will be able to build up their trade elsewhere in the Third World. Despite heavy promotion, trade with ASEAN has fallen; with Latin America, it has almost collapsed—from 3.2 billion rubles in 1985 to 920 million rubles in 1986. See analyses by Paul Wolfowitz and Ilya Prizel in *The National Interest* (Washington, DC), Summer 1988 (forthcoming).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet commercial relations with Third World states are likely to add little or nothing to the success of Gorbachev's economic reforms. Indeed, the link between these two may be exactly opposite: trade will not expand by much until the Soviets have more to sell abroad—that is, until economic reform succeeds at home.

Soviet policy in the Third World is obviously becoming more diversified, but as yet not more successful. Moreover, in contrast to the 1970's, these efforts seem unlikely to contribute very much toward improving the Soviet position in the East-West balance of power.

Defeat or Decline?

The same analysis made here of difficulties in Soviet policy toward the West, China, and the Third World could be extended to other areas. The Soviet position in the international economy, for example, has steadily deteriorated in recent years; energy prices fell during the mid-1980's, and imports from the West contracted.[73] In the process, an important Soviet policy tool—not only for economic reconstruction at home but also for the pursuit of more "normal" relations with both Western and Third World states—was blunted.

Relations with the bloc states of Eastern Europe have also become more difficult. Gorbachev and his colleagues are in the odd position of urging *perestroyka*-style reforms on bloc governments, while at the same time proclaiming the right of all socialist states to make

[73]See *PlanEcon Report*, Vol. III, No. 39-40, Oct. 1, 1987, pp. 21–22. Soviet economists show a heightened awareness of the price paid by what they now frequently call a "colonial" position in the world economy. Gorbachev has made it a high priority to improve Soviet trade relations, and this represents innovation. Yet as policy in other areas has shown, innovation can lead to turmoil and even to worse results in the short term. Reform of the institutions that conduct trade has been one source of trouble: the ministry of trade first gave way to a state committee for foreign economic relations, then to a new ministry of foreign economic relations (as part of this reform, Vneshtorgbank was abolished). Changes in bureaucratic structure may prove less disruptive than the transfer of authority for trading decisions to enterprises. See Terence Roth, "Soviet Union's Bureaucrats, Secret Police Slow Gorbachev's Drive to Expand Trade," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Mar. 9, 1988, p. 23.

Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati (second from left) arrives for an official visit in Moscow in February 1987. He is greeted by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their own choices. The latter message has to date helped Eastern European leaderships to defy Gorbachev.[74] In time, however, the former message may encourage the peoples of Eastern Europe to defy their leaderships, with less fear of Soviet intervention.[75] In any event, Moscow's control over political developments within its own bloc will have been eroded.

In these, as in the other areas of policy that have been examined here, the extent of decline obviously depends on the goals against which Soviet policy is to be measured. The more it is measured against the goals that guided it in the 1970's and early 1980's, the more easily one can say that it has fallen short of the mark. Pursuit of military encirclement of China, for example, has done little to make Beijing—or other governments of East Asia—more responsive to Soviet preferences or open to specific Soviet intiatives. And the cost of sticking to old policies may actually be increasing. In the case of China, the goal of military encirclement probably argues for protecting the Soviet relationship with Vietnam at almost any cost; yet, doing so stunts relations with the new Chinese leadership at the very moment when its policies are most open to re-examination. By the same token, trying to continue business-as-usual in Eastern Europe may defer a real restructuring of East-West relations in an area—NATO's Central Front—where competing is most expensive for the USSR.

Only in relation to new goals does Soviet policy seem likely to do better, and it is for this reason that Gorbachev—like Sadat—has experimented with innovative approaches. Yet, asserting different goals hardly averts all the problems of decline, for the transition to new policies involves heavy costs, and in some instances even major defeats. Serious setbacks, and the turmoil that goes with them, are inherent in truly changing Soviet relations with the outside world. "New thinking" tries to make these setbacks more bearable; it cannot wish them out of existence.

If the Soviet leadership has to choose between defeats and decline, many of its members will be reluctant to make the choice cleanly, or soon. They will almost certainly seek to blur it, and will be able to adduce seemingly good reasons for doing so. They will doubtless acknowledge the need to correct the worst errors of the past, while trying to minimize the negative impact of a new course on Soviet standing in the world. They will argue—correctly—that Soviet flexibility has simply encouraged some adversaries to make more demands.

If this line of thought prevails within the Soviet leadership over the next several years, it will often be extremely difficult to say with confidence where Soviet policy is heading. Yet Gorbachev has demonstrated a preference for clean breaks so often that a more radical foreign policy line—one that accepts the heavy costs of a new course—can hardly be ruled out. In defending such a line, Gorbachev will presumably argue that much of the weakness of Soviet diplomacy stems from the desire to have it both ways and that only the retrenchment he advocates can mark out a path to future success. Once a new course is fully implemented, however, his position will be different—and more exposed. Gorbachev will then have to show that the "new thinking" and the diplomacy he has practiced with such skill do not merely point the way to continuing decline.

Mikhail Gorbachev, right, is welcomed by Yugoslav President Lazar Mojsov upon arriving in Yugoslavia on March 14, 1988.

—Christian Vioujard/Gamma-Liaison.

[74]Erich Honecker has been especially firm in insisting that East Germany has no need to emulate Soviet reforms. There is also some reason to think that Miloš Jakeš was not Moscow's first choice to replace Gustáv Husák as leader of the Czechoslovak party.

[75]If this happens, the declaration issued by Gorbachev and the Yugoslav government during his visit to Yugoslavia in March 1988 (widely interpreted as a repudiation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine") will very likely be seen to have played a part in emboldening popular opposition. For the joint communiqué, see *Pravda*, Mar. 19, 1988, p. 1.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe in US-USSR Relations: A Topical Legacy

Vojtech Mastny

The five years that followed World War II, 1945–50, witnessed the shaping of the cold war—the struggle for power and prestige between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc that originated in Europe and ultimately led to its division. At the beginning of that period, Europe mattered much less to the Americans than to the Russians; by its end, the American stake in that continent had risen enormously and, one may argue, at Soviet expense.

This essay will examine the American and Soviet policies toward Europe in the early postwar years, focusing on how that continent came to assume a pivotal role in US-Soviet relations and on the impact of those relations on Europe's future order. Today, when the effects of the cold war seem to be dissipating and relations between the superpowers are being redefined, how these relations were originally shaped is not merely of academic interest but of considerable relevance to understanding the presently evolving superpower relations and their effect on the destiny of Europe. The record of American policy during that crucial postwar period is largely open to scrutiny, and thus the motivations of American policymakers can be well-documented. By contrast, the Soviet Union has been reluctant to grant access to its diplomatic records. As a result, some motives for Soviet behavior at that time have to remain conjectural until and unless *glasnost'* penetrates the arcana of Moscow's archives.

Vojtech Mastny is Professor of International Relations at Boston University and author of Helsinki, Human Rights, and European Security *(1986) and* Russia's Road to the Cold War *(1979).* *This essay is a revised version of a paper presented at a conference on Soviet-American relations in 1945–50 held in Moscow in June 1987.*

The Visions of Europe

Americans have always had close ties with Europe, of which their country is historically an extension. But these ties have been peculiarly ambivalent in a nation of immigrants, so many of whom came to America because they repudiated Europe. Moreover, after attaining independence, the United States did not need Europe for its well-being and even feared involvement in European affairs as a detriment to that well-being. George Washington's injunction against entangling alliances went to the heart of this unique historical experience that limited America's involvement in European affairs until the present century.

Only then did far-sighted individuals and eventually the public at large perceive that in a world made smaller by rapid communications and expanding trade, Americans had a vital interest in Europe, whether they wanted it or not. The interest consisted in preventing the continent from being dominated by a single power—the reason why the United States entered the two world wars. On neither occasion, however, did Washington elaborate a specific European policy; instead, the policy was subsumed within a larger global concept.

During World War II, that American concept still rested on Woodrow Wilson's grand vision of a just international order based on collective security, but it had been qualified in two important respects by the chastening interwar experience. First, it was now recognized that such an order ought not to contravene the interests of any of the great powers who would have the special privileges and responsibilities of "world policemen," to use President Franklin D. Roosevelt's imagery. Second, Americans believed that the future order ought not to be preordained by any agreements concluded over the heads of the peoples concerned as long as the war was in progress. The American vision presupposed, even if

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American policies did not specifically foster, a pluralistic system of self-governing states, on the assumption that such a system is more conducive to peace and stability than the hegemonic and authoritarian alternative.

While Europe has been important to the Russians much longer than to the Americans, Russian attitudes have also been ambivalent. This ambivalence has stemmed from Russia's affinities with Asia and from the rejection of the West evident in so much of Russian culture, a rejection only superficially reminiscent of American condescension toward the Old World. Though Russia is geographically a part of Europe, the Russians have tended to regard themselves as somehow apart from it and to use Europe as a standard against which to measure their country's relative backwardness—an inclination Americans have seldom displayed.

Unlike the United States, Russia has a long history of active participation in European power politics, albeit with significant discontinuities. When the Soviet state came into being, its leaders sought security for it first by trying to revolutionize capitalist Europe through Germany, then by trying to uphold Europe's integrity against the threat of Germany, and finally by linking security to imperial expansion in collusion with Germany. The last strategy was Stalin's most distinctive contribution to Soviet foreign policy; its culmination was the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 1939 dividing eastern Europe into spheres of influence.

In all of these schemes, Germany played a crucial yet singularly unreliable role—demonstrated most notably when Hitler's treacherous attack almost cost the Soviet Union its existence in 1941. Even that experience did not discredit the concept of security by empire in Stalin's eyes although it did lead him to try to reduce Germany's importance in any future European settlement. He sought a settlement contingent less on a solution of the German question—which would have required the cooperation of his Western allies—than on a solution of the Polish question, which he could better hope to produce on his own. The settlement envisaged a subservient Poland, weakened by its territorial losses to the Soviet Union in the east and dependent on Moscow's protection of its territorial gains from Germany in the west.

Stalin's vision of postwar Europe was more subtle than the crude deal on spheres of influence he proposed to the British in December 1941 would suggest. Without differentiating between the eastern and western parts of the continent, Stalin envisaged the establishment everywhere of "democratic" coalition governments in which local communists would participate. In striking a balance between the desirable and the feasible, Stalin evidently preferred pliable regimes in which indigenous communist parties responsive to Moscow's orders would play a crucial role by holding the key to the balance of power rather than the power itself. Depending on the degree of influence he wanted, one could distinguish "outer," "middle," "inner," and "absolute" spheres.[1] In the end, the geographic limits and nature of the influence depended on military developments as well as on Stalin's current and anticipated relations with his indispensable Western allies.

Though Stalin was not at all shy about using force to achieve his goals or exploiting military opportunities to expand his influence, he assigned a higher priority to winning the war at an acceptable cost and without needlessly straining the alliance. He sought a European order dependent less on the vagaries of war than on the emergence of a congenial political environment. In bringing this about, the Red Army's conquest of much of eastern and central Europe was less significant than the collapse of Europe as a whole, which opened up the enticing prospect of the Soviet Union as the sole great power remaining on the continent. In particular, Stalin seems to have been convinced that France's decline was irreversible.

Moscow accordingly sought to hinder anything that might enable the smaller European states to pool their resources and gain strength. Having vetoed confederation plans in Eastern Europe, it also tried to frustrate those promoted by Britain in Western Europe. In Stalin's eyes, Europe's permanent weakness and fragmentation were a prerequisite for Soviet security. His thinking about Europe's future was thus very different from that of the Americans. However, that divergence in views, so obvious in retrospect, was far from obvious to contemporaries.

When the Big Three convened at Yalta in February 1945, they were not concerned with resolving any crisis arising from conflicting visions of the postwar order. Confident of their ability to maintain a manageable, if not necessarily cordial, relationship in the foreseeable future, they concentrated instead on short-term issues. Contrary to Yalta's later reputation, an agreement to partition Europe was not reached there. It was rather the deplorable lack of any clear consensus on this and other matters that explains the summit's notoriety.

Although the Big Three did not address the European settlement, their manner of doing business predetermined it. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that the Soviet Union had the right to exact reparations from the defeated Germany but left the amount undetermined and liable to misunderstanding. The three admitted France as

[1]Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe: Universalism in an Area Not of Essential Interest to the United States*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1978, pp. 435–55.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a co-equal occupation power, but gave little thought to the implications that particular French anxieties might have for the future of Germany and Europe. They exaggerated the effect of their consensus to create the United Nations Organization on their cooperation in Europe. Above all, their ostensible agreements on the government and elections in Poland and on the right to self-determination of other Soviet-controlled countries imprudently papered over profound disagreements, thus ensuring the ultimate failure of the accord.

Eastern Europe Breeds Conflict

How could Eastern Europe, where the United States had no vital interests, emerge as the catalyst of its conflict with the Soviet Union? Already at the December 1943 Teheran conference, if not before, both Washington and London had signaled their acquiescence to paramount Soviet influence in the region. They did not seek to clarify the extent of the sphere and the nature of the influence, nor did Stalin volunteer to do so—if, indeed, the answers were sufficiently clear even in his own mind. Instead, he tried to make his allies sanction and preferably underwrite in advance whatever order he eventually found desirable to impose in Eastern Europe.

The Americans preferred to believe that Stalin would find it in his interest to abstain from imposing any order in the region that was incompatible with their preferences and those of the peoples concerned. To be sure, Washington was not blind to the incompatibility between Stalin's quest for security and his neighbors' desire to shape their own destiny. However, viewed from far across the Atlantic, it seemed that the impending common victory might foster such a profusion of good will in Europe that the Soviet leader would be generous enough to allow free elections in Poland and elsewhere in the region, whose inhabitants would reciprocate by electing governments to his liking. The comparable long-distance view from Moscow presupposed that nothing Stalin did in Eastern Europe could possibly deprive him of American support or at least acquiescence. The extent to which both sides indulged in such wishful thinking suggests just how much they valued their collaboration for securing the postwar settlement they sought.

By the time of Yalta, enough had already happened in Eastern Europe to cast doubt on the plausibility of either scenario. In his dispatches to Washington, Ambassa-



A session of the Yalta Conference of February 1945: at left (with cigarette), Josef Stalin; at the fifth position clockwise from Stalin, US President Franklin Roosevelt; and at far right, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

—Sovfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dor to Moscow W. Averell Harriman wondered openly where, if anywhere, the limits of Soviet security were to be found.[2] In a private letter written shortly before the conference, American chargé d'affaires George Kennan advocated the delimitation of spheres of influence that Yalta was later wrongly believed to have sanctioned.[3] The growing doubts did not alter policies, however, but merely generated a greater urge for reassurance about the other's intentions.

Lacking any specific interests in Eastern Europe, the United States tended to approach Stalin's conduct in this part of the world as a gauge of his overall intentions. In a larger sense, Soviet behavior there was also a test of his fitness to be a desirable peacetime participant in an equitable European settlement. By contrast, it was the inordinate importance of this region in Stalin's scheme that made him regard his allies' attitude toward his aspirations as the litmus test of their good will.

Yalta provided an opportunity for just such a test. The Soviet leader was looking for assurances that the United States, despite clear indications to the contrary, would accept his imposing an unrepresentative government and rigging elections in Poland. For their part, the Western allies tried to convince themselves that if only they could pin Stalin down to a written agreement, he would not proceed to do what he had unmistakably signaled he would do. In the discussions of the fine points of wording in the agreement on Poland and Declaration of Liberated Europe, Stalin was searching for loopholes that would enable him to do as he wished without being technically liable for any violations.

This mutual deception as well as self-deception was what really went wrong at Yalta, yet the blame was not shared equally. But for Stalin's extreme concept of security, the conflict over Eastern Europe would not have arisen in the first place. As his former Foreign Commissar, Maxim Litvinov, pertinently suggested in a private conversation, the Soviet drive for security without any reassuring limitations was the primary cause of trouble, but American reluctance to oppose it early and firmly enough was an important secondary factor.[4]

But even after Eastern Europe had bred the conflict, the further course and severity of the struggle remained undecided, as both sides showed some willingness to be accommodating—even in ways detrimental to their long-term interests. In the summer of 1945, the United States overruled British opposition to exchanging the extensive parts of the Soviet zone in Germany that the Western powers had captured toward the end of the war for Moscow's permission to take possession of their sectors in Berlin. This concesssion determined the later course of East-West confrontation by making the Soviet zone large enough to become a viable nucleus of a rival German state and by making Berlin a lasting bone of contention. Washington's grudging legitimation of Soviet dominance in parts of Eastern Europe also did not help matters.

To generate good will for the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam, the United States extended recognition in June 1945 to the Soviet-made Warsaw government even in advance of the rigged election staged to confirm its power. In December 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes exceeded his instructions by hastily consenting to American diplomatic recognition of the governments in Romania and Bulgaria after changes in their makeup that merely attached "some fig leaves of democratic procedure to hide the nakedness of Stalinist dictatorship."[5] In return, Moscow professed to respect pre-eminent American influence in areas more vital to US interests, particularly Japan.

Stalin's promotion of subservient regimes did not necessarily entail putting communists in power throughout Eastern Europe. Even by early 1947, "the only immediate, clearly identifiable, specific Soviet commitment was to the formation of broadly based coalition governments" in the region.[6] In 1945, Moscow could have let the communists take power in Czechoslovakia, where they were particularly strong; instead, free elections were allowed the following year, which the communists won. Free elections were also permitted by Moscow in Hungary and the Soviet zone of Austria—where the communists lost. Yet, Stalin's inability to achieve the kind of exaggerated security he craved in his nascent sphere of influence eventually drove him to take measures bound to aggravate conflict with the United States. With the Nazi experience fresh in their minds, Americans were sensitive to the potentially crucial connection between a regime's conduct in its own sphere and its international posture.

After the war, the Soviet Union did not keep as much territory in Europe as it could have. It withdrew its troops from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, northern Norway, and

[2] Harriman to Hopkins, September 10, 1944, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944*, Vol. 4, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 989.

[3] Cited in Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1965*, New York, Norton, 1973, p. 175.

[4] Vojtech Mastny, "The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 54, 1975–76, pp. 371–72.

[5] Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War*, Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1982, pp. 149–55; quote on p. 155.

[6] Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986, p. 78.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A general view of the delegates of 21 nations at the Paris Conference in the summer of 1946.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

the Danish island of Bornholm, as well as from the Western zones of Berlin, and it never insisted on their presence in defeated Finland, except for one base near Helsinki. However, Stalin's pressure on Turkey to grant him bases in the Black Sea Straits and to cede territory in the Caucasus, along with fleeting attempts to gain footholds on Norway's Arctic islands and in the former Italian colonies in Africa, indicated ever-growing expansionist ambitions.[7] The question was whether a line had to be drawn, and if so where.

In July 1946, the last opportunity to prevent the partition of Europe may have been lost at the conference convened in Paris to conclude peace treaties with the five former European allies of Germany, of which all but Italy were now in the Soviet orbit. Prior to the meeting, two high officials in the State Department, Dean Acheson and Will Clayton, implored their superiors to use it as an opportunity to lay the framework for a general European settlement, thereby affirming America's commitment to the whole of Europe.[8] Instead, the ostensibly more pragmatic approach of proceeding in stages was adopted. Issues most conducive to agreement were addressed first, and although the negotiations proved anything but easy, Soviet readiness to make concessions after hard bargaining seemed to vindicate this piecemeal alternative.[9]

The Paris success, however, was deceptive. The peace treaties with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland in effect formalized the armistice terms already imposed on them by the Soviet Union, while American primacy in Italy was confirmed. Was such a partial European settlement along the lines of spheres of influence better than none? Or did it encourage the trend toward a more rigid division of the continent? Certainly, American-Soviet relations did not improve. Instead, they continued to deteriorate because of what happened in Western Europe, particularly Germany.

Western Europe Forces Partition

Germany was not the original cause of conflict. Having been the cause of the extraordinary American-Soviet rapprochement during the war, it did not immediately cease to perform this function even after the wartime allies had begun to fall out for other reasons. Nevertheless, once they did, discord over Germany became the most important symptom of conflict, as well as a source of further aggravation.

At the war's end, neither Washington nor Moscow had a clear and consistent concept of Germany's long-term future. In spite of this, both expected that there would be a resolution of the German question. Moreover, they envisaged solving it together, not separately, and keeping the country united rather than divided. With the notable exception of the French, all the occupation powers were originally agreed that a divided Germany would be a prescription for disaster because of the vengeful nationalism it would breed.

Unlike Washington, which toyed with the bizarre idea of transforming Germany into an isolated pastoral enclave in the middle of industrialized Europe, Moscow saw the country very much as a part of Europe. Weakened decisively by defeat and reduced drastically in size, Germany could be particularly susceptible to Soviet influence. In June 1945, while the United States was still improvising, the Soviet Union embarked on policies calculated to institutionalize its influence there. It launched four political parties in East Berlin, one of which was the Communist Party, as well as rudimentary

[7]Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 232, 288–90.

[8]W. W. Rostow, *The Division of Europe after World War II: 1946*, Austin, TX, University of Texas Press, 1981, pp. 3–9, 94–119.

[9]Stephen D. Kertesz, *Between Russia and the West: Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945–1947*, Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, pp. 174–81.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

central administrative agencies designed to operate eventually in the entire country.

Moscow's insistence on massive reparations from all four occupation zones and its demand for special access to the Ruhr industrial district reaffirmed in a sense the notion of a single Germany, for their fulfillment presupposed collaboration by all the occupying powers. France, however, frustrated Stalin's bid for influence in all of Germany by vetoing both Soviet designs on the Ruhr and the Soviet-sponsored central agencies—which Washington was initially prepared to accept. The United States kept supplying Moscow with reparations from its own zone until May 1946. The cooperation collapsed not because of the impossibility of a compromise on the high reparations figure the Americans had carelessly conceded to Stalin as a "basis for discussion" at Yalta but because the overall deterioration of relations reduced the willingness to compromise on both sides.[10] This drew the United States into a deeper involvement in Germany than Stalin—and most Americans—had anticipated or wished.

Washington's concern about Europe's economic prosperity, social harmony, and political stability not only contrasted with Moscow's treatment of Germany and Eastern Europe as unrestricted sources of supplies for Soviet reconstruction, but also with Stalin's indifference—or worse—to the condition of Western Europe. While attending a conference of foreign ministers in Moscow in March 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall expressed shock at what he perceived to be the Soviet leader's callousness toward the plight of West Europeans during the most severe winter in memory.[11] Several other Western visitors to Moscow, notably Senator Harold Stassen of Minnesota and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, noted the eagerness with which Stalin quizzed them about the severity of the presumably incipient economic crisis in their countries.[12]

The "general crisis of capitalism" became the topic of an official Soviet debate. Its central political question for Moscow was the extent to which internal constraints might inhibit US resistance to Soviet pressure. As tension between East and West mounted, Stalin's use of Marxist categories was less likely to invite caution than to provide the rationalization that the adversary was growing weaker. In any case; he overestimated American readiness to make concessions on Germany, thus ensuring the fiasco he had evidently hoped to avoid at the foreign ministers' conference.

By the spring of 1947, Washington had already begun a major policy reorientation: hereafter the integrity of Western Europe was to be a higher priority than cooperation with Moscow. Under France's influence, the United States made Germany's recovery a part of its larger commitment to the recovery of Western Europe.[13] Like London, Washington finally concluded that a European settlement in which the Soviet Union was involved was neither possible nor desirable.[14] This position was still ahead of the mainstream of American public opinion, but it was in step with the nation's increasingly anti-Soviet mood and served to reinforce it.

George Kennan, the State Department's foremost Soviet expert, provided the conceptual underpinning of the historic transformation of American policy. He argued for strengthening Western Europe as one of the five key regions vital to American interests. Kennan did not fear an imminent Soviet military attack on Western Europe, nor did he equate the threat of Soviet power with the spread of communism, which he considered far less menacing. His main concern was that Western Europe's economic weakness and political malaise left it vulnerable to Soviet domination. Hence, rather than encourage an anticommunist crusade, he urged the United States to contain the Soviet threat by supplying the material aid and moral encouragement necessary for the political recovery of Western Europe. His belief in the basic soundness of its condition challenged Stalin's belief that the region's illness was terminal.[15]

Thus was born containment—the most original, subtle, and durable foreign policy concept the United States has ever devised. Its debut in the form of the Truman doctrine, invoked in March 1947 in response to the perceived Soviet threat to Greece and Turkey, was not, however, shaped by Kennan's categories. The ringing, vague, and sweeping assertion of American readiness to defend any nation threatened by communist subversion was primarily calculated to win domestic support for an action deemed necessary to redress Europe's tottering balance of power.

Despite the sweeping rhetoric, American intervention was both limited and specific. The modest number of weapons and advisers dispatched to countries of

[10]Bruce Kuklick, *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia Over Reparations*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1972, pp. 76–83.

[11]Bohlen, *Witness to History*, pp. 262–63.

[12]William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War*, New York, NY, Norton, 1982, pp. 136–39.

[13]John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1976, pp. 247–59.

[14]Terry H. Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944–1947*, Columbia, MO, University of Missouri Press, 1981, pp, 118–43.

[15]John L. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 27–53.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fugitives and government troops meet on a road near Seres during the Greek civil war in 1948.

—FPG.

peripheral importance to both Washington and Moscow did not alter the still overwhelmingly non-military character of the East-West confrontation. Although the Soviet Union protested, American behavior was not such as to prompt belligerent action by Moscow. Since Washington had decided (although it did not publicly announce it) to exempt the countries of Eastern Europe that Stalin already controlled from the stipulations of the Truman Doctrine, Soviet security interests were not affected.[16]

The Marshall Plan that followed later in 1947 was more restrained and precise than the loosely worded Truman Doctrine and as such was more substantive. The issue was no longer merely that of shoring up the governments in Greece and Turkey, but of the long-term stabilization of an economic, social, political, and moral order in the heartland of Western Europe. The success of the plan was as crucial to American security, as its failure was to Soviet security.

Stalin's quest for absolute security for the Soviet Union required a weak and fragmented Europe; deriving its security from international pluralism, the United States worked toward a strong and united Europe. To be sure, the United States exercised a vigorous leadership, further accentuated by the contrast between its power and Europe's impotence. However, far from imposing an alien system on unwilling peoples, it was building on indigenous foundations that Europeans had laid themselves.

A model of modernized capitalism, in which the government, business, and labor would work together to insure minimum standards of prosperity and social justice, stood ready to be implemented, as did a new model of European cooperation transcending the historic divisions but preserving sovereign national identities. Neither model conformed entirely with the American preference for a more free-wheeling capitalist system and something approximating a United States of Europe. Yet, the extent to which Americans were nevertheless willing and able to tolerate, conciliate, and overcome the differences among West European nations while pursuing their own self-interest was extraordinary. This ability proved to be an asset that ultimately helped the United States to win its contest with the Soviet Union in Europe.

By formally offering the Marshall Plan to any European nation, Eastern or Western, the United States forced Stalin to decide how much pluralism *he* was prepared to tolerate. By insisting that the recipient countries take the initiative, muster their own resources, and insure the most effective utilization of the aid they received, the

[16]Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York, NY, Norton, 1969, p. 225.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States implicitly challenged the principles on which Soviet domination of Eastern Europe rested. In doing so, the United States took a calculated risk: had Moscow's dependencies accepted the plan, its use as an instrument of Western integration would have been greatly complicated. And Poland, Czechoslovakia, even the Soviet Union, did show signs of interest.

Moscow's initial interest in the plan is more tantalizing than its eventual rejection of it. Did Stalin hope that the large and high-powered delegation he had dispatched to the preliminary talks in Paris would help him gain sufficient control over the distribution of prospective aid to make it work for his own economic and political benefit? Or was he concerned about the consequences for Soviet security of Europe's ultimate division? Whatever his reasons, and only the release of Soviet documents can tell for certain, he soon changed his position. In Paris, his representatives denounced the Marshall Plan both as a tool of American imperialism and as a prospectus for Europe's partition, and proceeded to break up the talks.

Soviet denunciations were not so much false as they were irrelevant. Whatever the proper word for America's inevitable dominance in Western Europe, its presence there met with measurable popular approval; Soviet domination in Eastern Europe did not. Ultimately, the partition of the continent was ultimately predetermined by Western Europe's ability to recover, a process that the United States merely brought to fruition. It was Stalin who chose to regard that recovery as incompatible with his notion of security. Once Western Europe recovered, he indeed had reason to feel threatened. Even so, the threat was more in the eye of the beholder and had in any case been of Stalin's own making.

To counter the threat, Stalin invoked the forces of international communism—more powerful, united, and responsive to Soviet guidance in 1947 than ever before or after. In September 1947, the Cominform—a coordinating body of communist parties—was created in reply to the Marshall Plan. Only now did Moscow discard Stalin's earlier coalition strategy. The task at last became to install full-fledged communist regimes in Eastern Europe while seeking to undermine the pro-American governments of Western Europe by political agitation and economic subversion.[17]

The net effect was to strengthen the West's willingness to look for support to the United States. As a consequence, Stalin had to write off Western Europe much as Washington had previously written off Eastern Europe. The final separation of the two parts of Europe made the American-Soviet conflict irreversible for the foreseeable future. This conflict became the gist of the Cominform doctrine positing an irreconcilable struggle between the camps of capitalism and socialism. Yet, despite growing ferocity, the struggle between the two camps still lacked a military dimension: the question was whether this would continue. The battlefield rhetoric in Moscow's pronouncements, however, was a bad omen.

Militarization of the Cold War

While the United States reaped the benefits of its strategy in Western Europe, where recovery proceeded at a steady pace, the Soviet Union suffered a series of setbacks in Eastern Europe in 1948–49 which were all the more painful because they were largely avoidable. It was not that Stalin's East European strategy was reckless; it was simply badly calculated. In accelerating the build-up of his empire, Stalin lost part of it. In conjuring up the specter of communism, he bolstered resistance against it. In trying to avert war, he nearly precipitated it.

In early 1948, the Soviet leader gratuitously provoked a confrontation with Tito's Yugoslavia, a loyal ally. He berated the Yugoslavs for trying to incorporate Albania, even though he had previously sanctioned the action. He torpedoed their plan for a Balkan confederation, even though he had earlier condoned it.[18] He accused them of disloyalty, even though he had granted them a leading role within the Cominform. Clearly, his criticism did not derive from what the Yugoslavs had or had not done, but was the product of events that had forced him to change his policies on the delimitation and integration of spheres of influence in Europe.

American assistance had already turned the tide of the Greek civil war against the communists. At that point, a Yugoslav takeover of neighboring Albania would have only led to the escalation of a war that the communists could no longer win, with the Soviet Union bearing the blame for it. Stalin, therefore, withheld support from the insurgents, allowing the United States to incorporate Greece into its sphere of influence. At the same time, he used the occasion to humiliate the Yugoslavs as an object lesson to all East European communists that loyalty without prostration was not sufficient. While his actions ultimately facilitated the Soviet-style integration of Eastern Europe, they did so at the cost of Yugoslavia's defection from the Soviet bloc.

In February 1948, communists seized power in

[17]Lilly Marcou, *Le Kominform: Le communisme de guerre froide* (The Cominform: The Communism of the Cold War), Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977, pp. 34–73.

[18]Vojtech Mastny, "Stalin and the Militarization of the Cold War," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), No. 3, 1984–85, pp. 112–15.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finnish Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala (at the microphone) arrives in Moscow in March 1948 for negotiation of a treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union.

—Sovfoto.

Czechoslovakia, in this case with Moscow's wholehearted blessing. Unlike in Greece, the demoralization of anticommunist forces in Czechoslovakia and the government's tendency to identify with Soviet interests made the outcome a foregone conclusion. This final step in the Sovietization of Eastern Europe—the subjugation of a country so accommodating to the Soviets—was nevertheless widely regarded in the West as the first step toward the Sovietization of Western Europe. It increasingly inclined Western Europeans to vote pro-American governments into office, as was the case, for example, in Italy.

These unintended consequences in Western Europe of the Sovietization of Eastern Europe coincided with a mounting crisis in Finland, where communists publicly suggested that they wished to emulate the Prague events.[19] Shortly before the Prague coup, Stalin had announced his intention of imposing the same type of "friendship" treaty on Helsinki that he had used to formalize the subjugation of his East European dependencies. Wary of the now apparent consequences, the Finns used delaying tactics to postpone the treaty's finalization. By the time they went to Moscow for negotiations, the Soviet leader was no longer insistent about duplicating the terms of the other treaties. Was Stalin loath to risk further damage to his interests in Western Europe? Or was he impressed by the tenacity with which the Finns, unlike the Czechs, stood ready to defend their democracy while reassuring him that Finland was not a threat? Whatever the reason, this time Stalin calculated his costs and benefits well, allowing Finland to evolve into the Soviet Union's least troublesome neighbor.

The impression in the West of a relentless Soviet drive to spread communism in Europe either by force or by the threat of force was thus neither entirely correct nor entirely incorrect. Stalin's exploitation of various situations to promote communism inclined the United States to exaggerate Soviet aggressiveness and discount Soviet restraint. Increasingly, Moscow's conduct seemed to vindicate the cruder suppositions of the Truman Doctrine rather than George Kennan's more subtle interpretation of the Soviet threat. Moreover, while Washington still had not developed a sense of military urgency, enough influential Europeans had.

In March 1948, Moscow signed a series of military treaties with its East European dependencies, forming an elaborate network of military alliances which had no counterpart in the West. That same month, Great Britain moved to expand its Dunkirk treaty with France, concluded the year before for the purpose of mutual security against future acts of German aggression. As a result of British efforts, a new treaty was signed in Brussels, establishing a West European Union which included the Low Countries. Though still aimed primarily at Germany, the treaty of Brussels signaled a growing West European readiness to counter the Soviet threat.[20]

[19]A.F. Upton, *Communism in Scandinavia and Finland: Politics of Opportunity*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1973, p. 290.

[20]David Dilks, "The British View of Security: Europe and a Wider World, 1945–1948," in Olar Riste, Ed., *Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence 1947–1953*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1985, pp. 47–55.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After prodding from Britain, the United States initiated integration of the three Western occupation zones in Germany to form the nucleus of a new West German state. While America's rationale for such a move was mainly economic, that of Britain and France was military. According to them, Europe's security required Germany's thorough integration with the West—a task left unaccomplished with disastrous consequences by past statesmen. While integration with the West did not preclude Germany's reunification, Western occupation forces found the latter goal to be less important than denying the Soviets the western part of Germany. In 1948, London and Paris still entertained lingering anxieties lest the Germans join forces with the Soviets to create a power on the continent that no one would be able to resist.[21]

Moscow's struggle to win the soul of Germany proved to be a losing battle. As democracy surged in Germany, surprising many sceptics, the Soviet Union suffered a precipitous loss of credibility among the Germans, a nation that once boasted Europe's largest communist party. Besides the vivid memory of World War II atrocities committed against ordinary German citizens by the advancing Red Army, the subsequent spoliation of German wealth and the plight of millions of prisoners of war still behind barbed wires also tarnished Moscow's image. In view of this, the prospective restoration of a German state in the West was a matter of justifiable concern to Stalin, whose respect for German prowess was as inordinate as his dread of its consequences.

Events in West Germany, coupled with other Soviet setbacks in Europe, created the setting for the Berlin blockade in June 1948. At the same time, Stalin's confrontation with Tito was nearing a dénouement. The coincidence of these events accentuated how high the stakes were for which Stalin was gambling in both parts of Europe. In Berlin, a defeat inflicted on the United States would have reversed US ascendancy in Western Europe; in Belgrade, a victory for Stalin would have ensured him the position of undisputed master of Eastern Europe.

Stalin sought to turn his local strategic advantage in Berlin into a larger political triumph. Whether he intended merely to eject Western powers from the divided city or to force them to accept a comprehensive European settlement on *his* terms can only be determined with certainty once Soviet documents are opened to researchers. However, recently discovered evidence of a communist plan to seize power in Austria, regardless of the presence there of Western armed forces, seems to suggest that Moscow's expectations at the time were anything but modest.[22] And Stalin was taking a considerable military risks when he dared the United States to break the Berlin blockade by force.

The ingenious American solution of supplying the city entirely by air averted a clash of arms in Germany, but did not prevent the militarization of the larger conflict. The Berlin experience strengthened Washington's conviction that the Soviet threat was not only political and ideological but military as well, and it dispelled American reluctance to participate in a European defense organization. Stalin had unintentionally achieved something that neither Hitler nor the Kaiser could—a permanent American commitment to the defense of Europe, a commitment stronger than to any other part of the world, and one secured by the kind of entangling alliance that George Washington had warned his countrymen to avoid.

Yet, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in April 1949, its political significance exceeded its military value. Spearheaded by Europeans, the NATO alliance served more to reassure them than to deter, much less to defend them against, Soviet attack. Although the US monopoly on the atomic bomb provided the basis of reassurance,[23] the modesty of the US nuclear arsenal and the sharply reduced numbers of conventional forces in Western Europe led Americans to doubt their ability to defend Europe. Their contingency plans in case of war envisaged a rapid withdrawal of troops to North Africa to gather strength for the eventual liberation of Europe, along the lines of World War II strategy.[24] Even a year later, the NSC-68 memorandum, which posited the containment of Soviet expansionism wherever it might occur and by whatever means necessary, still assumed that a strategic retreat of Western forces from the European arena would be necessary.[25]

Since Moscow had spies in high positions in Western governments, Stalin had to be cognizant of the true state of European defenses. Yet, judging from the prodigious effort he expended to prevent the formation of NATO, he

---

[21]Rolf Steininger, "European-American Relations: Developments after 1945," in Werner J. Feld, Ed., *New Directions in Economic and Security Policy: US–West European Relations in a Period of Crisis and Indecision*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1985, pp. 65–70.

[22]Günter Bischof, "1948: Prague Is West of Vienna: A Plan for a Coup by the Austrian Communist Party Discovered in the Paris Archives," *Die Furche* (Vienna), June 19, 1987.

[23]John L. Gaddis, "The United States and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe, 1945–1949," in Riste, op. cit., pp. 70–79.

[24]Christian Greiner, "The Defence of Western Europe and the Rearmament of Western Germany, 1947–1950," in ibid., pp. 151–52.

[25]"A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950," April 7, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, Vol. 1, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 235–92.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



US C–47's lining up to unload food and supplies to the citizens of Berlin during the Soviet blockade in 1948.

—FPG.

was genuinely worried about Soviet security. He pressed for negotiations to abolish all nuclear weapons; he proposed a nonaggression pact between the great powers; he even masterminded a gigantic "peace" campaign throughout Europe. He attempted to intimidate the Scandinavians into desisting from a relatively innocuous military union under Swedish leadership—only to have Norway, Denmark, and Iceland join with the United States in the far more consequential NATO.

Stalin's concern about the threat from the NATO alliance did not reach sufficient proportions to spark a Soviet military reaction. Similarly, the Soviet response to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) founded under the Marshall Plan was to belatedly announce the formation of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in January 1949. Several years would have to pass, however, before the structure was given any substance. The Soviet reaction to the founding of a West German state was to proclaim the formation of an East German state in the Soviet occupation zone. This act finalized the division of Germany.

The Soviet sense of insecurity was no less intense for being political rather than military. Whereas Americans presided over their part of Europe by invitation, Stalin had to rely on force in Eastern Europe. Moreover, NATO underlined the Western ability and will to muster its superior potential when necessary, an ominous portent even if the ultimate test of war could be avoided. Moscow's obsessive theorizing about the inevitability of war among the capitalist states rather than between East

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and West was only too indicative of its innermost hopes.[26]

Facing each other across a divided Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States each perceived itself to be the weaker party, the former in political terms, the latter in military terms. They convinced themselves that each was more of a threat to the other than was actually true, and that each needed greater military power to meet the threat. Of the two, the USSR spent more on defense than the United States, although until mid-1950 neither country undertook extraordinary increases in military spending. Of greater importance was the difference in how the two parties related military power to their foreign policy and their own national security to the security of Europe.

The Catalyst of Insecurity

Though controversial, American policy toward Europe was consistent with the premises upon which the United States had decided to build its own security and that of Europe. A response to the US perception of a growing Soviet military threat, this policy attempted to advance the political and economic strength of Western Europe, while rearming West Germany as the cornerstone of NATO's defense system.

In contrast, the course of Soviet policy seemed devoid of any correlation with the military balance. Stalin had launched his boldest challenge in Europe, the Berlin blockade, at a time when the United States was the sole possessor of the atomic bomb. He lifted the blockade when the creation of NATO had confirmed the US commitment to the defense of Western Europe but no change in US military capability was evident. Moreover, Moscow did not change its policy once it had redressed the nuclear imbalance by successfully testing its first atomic device in August 1949.

Interestingly, the Soviets had tried to keep the testing a secret, and when that failed, attempted to downplay the significance of the event. However, as no averse reaction came from the United States, the Soviet posture began to change. The authoritative speeches delivered in Moscow on the occasion of the November 1949 anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution reflected a new sense of Soviet self-confidence. Besides celebrating the end of the US monopoly on nuclear weapons, the speeches dwelt on the security that the Soviet Union enjoyed after World War II as a result of its enviable strategic position in Eastern Europe and the presence of congenial communist regimes in that region.[27]

Yet, even as it congratulated itself on its external security, Moscow sounded the alarm about the internal insecurity of the Soviet bloc. Having resurrected Stalin's specious theory that the approaching victory of socialism made class struggle more, rather than less, imperative, the Cominform issued an urgent call in November 1949 for vigilance against the numerous enemy agents who supposedly infested the communist lands.[28] The sense of urgency projected by Moscow seemed unwarranted at a time when all political opposition had been effectively liquidated and the local communist parties had proven remarkably immune to the heresy of Titoism. Nevertheless, a veritable hysteria gripped Eastern Europe as alleged American agents were uncovered by the hundreds and, when tried, proceeded to publicly confess to unbelievable crimes.

The extent of US covert operations in Eastern Europe cannot be reliably estimated without access to still-classified American documents. It is nonetheless clear that by 1949 the region had assumed new international importance as the area where Soviet power could be undermined most successfully without resorting to war—or at least so it seemed to Washington at the time. Albania was singled out by the American and British secret services as supposedly the weakest link in the chain of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, and agents from both secret services infiltrated the country in an effort to overthrow its government. The operation failed mainly because Soviet double agent Kim Philby happened to be installed at their intelligence command center and conveniently reported the progress of the operation via Moscow to Tirana.[29] However, Stalin could not count on the same good luck in other countries targeted for American subversion.

In a perverse way, the American effort to subvert Eastern Europe was eminently successful—certainly more so than Soviet efforts to do the same in Western Europe. To Stalin's pathologically suspicious mind, the effort alone sufficed to generate a monstrous and self-defeating fear that constantly needed to be substantiated. Driven by his fears to purge scores of faithful East European disciples on imaginary charges of treason, Stalin undermined the foundations of Soviet power more effectively than any American scheme could have hoped to do.

[26]Frederic S. Burin, "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitability of War," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, WI), No. 57, 1963, pp. 334–54.

[27]Speech by Georgiy Malenkov, Nov. 6, 1949, in *For Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (Bucharest), Nov. 11, 1949.

[28]"Defense of Peace and the Struggle against Warmongers," ibid., Nov. 29, 1949.

[29]Nicholas Bethell, *The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Kim Philby's Biggest Coup*, London, Rodder & Stoughton, 1984.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whether Western intelligence services used this opportunity to plant incriminating evidence on certain individuals is an intriguing but so far unanswerable question.[30] What is certain, however, is that the atmosphere of acute mistrust created by the purges increased the Soviet Union's sense of vulnerability, especially in the dreaded event of a crisis. Yet, the most lasting damage caused by the criminal legacy of this period of purges was the negative impact it had on the legitimacy and self-esteem of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, a region critical to Moscow's security.

In June 1950, Stalin aggravated matters further by abetting the aggression against South Korea. Whatever the origins of the conflict, the North Koreans could not have launched an invasion without his approval, which would not have been forthcoming if an easy victory had not been expected. The swift American intervention in Korea took Moscow by surprise. Did Moscow hope that the anticipated victory in Korea, an area of secondary importance for Soviet security, would offset Soviet insecurity in the area of primary importance? Or did the attack on Korea indicate that Stalin's self-confidence was growing, despite the situation in Europe? Certainly, the net effect of the Korean war was to make both superpowers more insecure in Europe than at any time since the onset of the cold war.

In the West, the Korean war was widely regarded as a prelude to a Soviet attack in Europe. It appeared to confirm the NSC-68 assumption that Moscow was bent on world conquest. It helped to persuade Americans, including President Truman, that Stalin was another Hitler, whose appeasement would only bring catastrophic consequences.[31] The war in the Far East buttressed this "Munich analogy," and clinched the decision to rearm West Germany and initiate the massive military build-up that gave NATO the military substance that it had previously lacked.[32]

A very real fear of imminent war accounted also for the concurrent military build-up in the Soviet bloc. As many, possibly most, ordinary Eastern Europeans indulged in a war euphoria, entertaining wishful thinking about their forthcoming liberation by American troops, local regimes, thoroughly alienated from their subjects, increasingly dreaded the war as the beginning of their demise. In December 1950, the East European armies received secret orders to be ready for war by December 31, 1952.[33]

In January 1951, Stalin alerted a secret gathering of East European party and military officials to prepare for offensive operations against Western Europe. According to him, such operations had to take place within the next three to four years, while conditions for a victory were still presumably favorable.[34] While reminiscent of Hitler's talk at the notorious "Hossbach meeting" in November 1937, Stalin's speech had no follow-up. Could Stalin have believed that the United States would be the first to attack and therefore attempted to prepare his subordinates for the onslaught without creating panic?

As the United States and the Soviet Union entered the second half of the century, even their diplomatic intercourse came to a standstill, and their public dialogue consisted of little more than an exchange of insults. What was missing was a mutual capacity to manage crises. The Soviet-American relationship shaped in Europe five years earlier amid such exalted, if unwarranted, hopes for its future had, by 1951, reached an impasse. This left both superpowers more vulnerable than before and heading toward an arms race that would only make each feel even more vulnerable.

1945–50 in Perspective

At the end of World War II, the seeming agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the postwar order in Europe initially cemented Soviet-American relations. However, as the real disagreements on that order could not be papered over, the relationship started to unravel soon after the Yalta meeting. The catalyst for the East-West conflict was Eastern Europe, where Stalin's quest for absolute security (implying the absolute insecurity of all other states) generated American concern about the limits of Soviet aspirations.

The conflict was mitigated when the United States resigned itself to the role of bystander in Eastern Europe. However, Western Europe soon replaced Eastern Europe as an source of further friction when Stalin chose to regard Europe's fragmentation and weakness as a prerequisite for Soviet security, while the United States opted to promote that region's political stability and economic prosperity, and became fully committed to

[30]It is answered in the affirmative, but without the necessary evidence, in Stewart Steven, *Operation Splinter Factor*, Philadelphia, PA, Lippincott, 1974.

[31]Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 53–86.

[32]Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "The First Cold War Buildup: Europe in United States Strategy and Policy, 1950–1953," in Riste, op. cit., pp. 181–97.

[33]Karel Kaplan, *Die politischen Prozesse in der Tschechoslowakei, 1948–1954* (The Political Trials in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1954), Munich, Oldenbourg, 1986, p. 118.

[34]Karel Kaplan, *Dans les archives du comité central: Trente ans de secrets du bloc soviétique* (In the Central Committee Archives: Thirty Years of Soviet-Bloc Secrets), Paris, Michel, 1978, pp. 164–66.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preventing Soviet domination of the entire continent. The importance of Western Europe in US policy made the US-Soviet conflict irreversible in the short run.

As Soviet insecurity grew, it was compounded by the unexpected outcome of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which Stalin had provoked gratuitously. The confrontation, triggered by Soviet efforts to delimit and consolidate the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe, accelerated Sovietization in the other countries of Europe that Moscow had been able to claim as falling exclusively into its domain. Stalin added a military dimension to the mounting ideological and political strife between his country and the United States by precipitating two avoidable confrontations: the 1948 blockade of Berlin and the 1950 war in Korea.

Forty years later, the anticipated war in Europe has not materialized; the two superpowers have learned to manage their conflicts. Today, reversing the effects of the policies that shaped the cold war and the destiny of Europe seems more possible than before because of the confluence of several factors. First, the Soviet Union is finally addressing the issue of such a reversal by promoting greater reliance on political and economic than on military safeguards of security. Second, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force agreement (INF), signed in 1987, has already become a first step to reducing the importance of the military dimensions of European security that have fed the East-West conflict and have helped maintain the division of the continent. Third, an international forum has been created for resolving nonmilitary problems of security—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Further changes in the international environment have contributed to the inevitability of a European rapprochement as well. For one, the dynamics of economic development have put into question the permanent division of Europe. West Germany, whose sorry state in 1947 spurred the United States to initiate a plan for West European recovery, now holds the technological key to East Europe's recovery from the ill effects of the region's adoption of the Soviet economic model.

In the Soviet Union, ideological preconceptions no longer distort political judgment as much they did before. The cold war was in full swing when Stalin ruled that "national roads to socialism" in Eastern Europe were impermissible; his successors have reluctantly conceded —in effect if not in so many words—the inevitability of "national roads away from socialism." Although this has not caused the Soviet Union to cease being the repressive hegemonial power in the region, its ability and willingness to impose its will there have diminished. The more frequently decisions of substance are made in the various East European capitals rather than in Moscow, the greater can be the input of East European citizens into, and influence of Western powers on, the politics of those countries. This opens up further opportunity for a drawing closer of both parts of Europe.

As a "general crisis" of communism has superseded that of capitalism amid an accelerating rapprochement in Europe, what lessons can both the United States and the Soviet Union learn from the past that could benefit their future relations with each other and with Europe? While a crisis of communism would seem good news for the West, the United States could learn from Stalin's mistakes, namely his failed attempts to extract advantages from his enemies at a time of their perceived weakness. For its part, the Soviet Union could draw a lesson from the American experience in Europe. The flexible and dynamic concept of international pluralism that inspired the American conduct in Europe in 1945–50 has withstood the test of time demonstrably better than the inflexible and static concept of an empire bequeathed by Stalin to his successors. Indeed, this lesson remains the one enduring legacy of those years, otherwise irrevocably past.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow's Party Organization

Timothy J. Colton

In stunning succession in 1985 and 1987, two first secretaries of the Moscow party committee were yanked from office and politically discredited. Yet V. V. Grishin and his short-lived replacement, B. N. Yel'tsin, could not have been more unalike in outlook and style. What they shared was a location that made them players on the national stage and the not uncommon misfortune of being swept from it.

The present article aims less at an authoritative account of these dramas than at setting them in historical context. Moscow, the political capital of the USSR and of the Russian republic (RSFSR), is also the country's biggest city and the center of Soviet culture and science. The past glories of Moscow's party machine, recurrent patterns in its relations with other institutions, and its recent diminution of significance have been little examined by Western scholars.

Structure

The Moscow organization, like all local branches of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, comprises a mass membership, primary party organizations (about 10,000), and a set of internestled territorial committees. From a mere 600 Bolsheviks in March 1917, party rolls in Moscow have swelled to 1,134,000 (members and candidates) by January 1, 1987. This figure is the largest in any locality and exceeds membership in every non-Russian republic except Ukraine.[1]

Timothy J. Colton is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto (Toronto, Canada). He is the author of several works on Soviet politics, including The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union *(rev. ed., 1986).* *He wishes to thank Seweryn Bialer, Thane Gustafson, and Jerry Hough for advice and criticism, and Gennady Ozornoy for research assistance.*

The Bolsheviks' first "Moscow committee," colloquially the MK (short for *Moskovskiy komitet*), was organized in March 1905, shortly after the schism with the Mensheviks.[2] A convoluted chain of descent joins that first MK to today's Moscow city committee, or *gorkom*. The MK, reconstituted in 1916 after a six-year hiatus, restricted itself as before to the city of Moscow, which was decreed the capital of the new Soviet state in March 1918. The surrounding province (*guberniya*) had a separate *gubkom*.[3] Still another body, a "regional (*oblastnoye*) bureau," aspired to coordinate all party work in the 14 neighboring *gubernii,* but its writ was never accepted by the MK and it was dissolved in January 1919.[4] In May 1920, as in many parts of the country, the city and *guberniya* committees were fused into a single, city-dominated Moscow *gubkom* (still abbreviated to MK).

[1]Party membership up to 1971 is given in *Moskovskaya gorodskaya i Moskovskaya oblastnaya organizatsiya KPSS v tsifrakh* (The Moscow City and Moscow *Oblast'* CPSU Organization in Numbers), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1972. Figures for 1987 are in "CPSU in Numbers," *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 21, November 1987, p. 7.

[2]The best Soviet survey of the evolution of the Moscow organization is a work written in the Khrushchev era, *Ocherki istorii Moskovskoy organizatsii KPSS, 1883-1965 gg.* (History of the Moscow Organization of the CPSU, 1883–1965), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1966. Two volumes of a revised, multi-volume study have appeared: *Ocherki istorii Moskovskoy organizatsii KPSS, Kniga I, 1883–noyabr' 1917* (History of the Moscow Organization of the CPSU, Book I, 1883–November 1917), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1979, and *Ocherki istorii Moskovskoy organizatsii KPSS, Kniga II, noyabr' 1917–1945* (History of the Moscow Organization of the CPSU, Book II, November 1917–1945), 1983. They are informative on some details, but reflect the conservative approach to history under Brezhnev.

[3]Because many Bolsheviks disliked the tsarist term *guberniya*, it was often designated the "circuit committee" (*okruzhkom*).

[4]The Central Committee voted to liquidate the regional bureau as early as September 1918, but its leaders stalled, partly by renaming it an "*oblast'* committee." A useful summary is M. A. Kitayev, "From the History of Party Construction in the Moscow *Oblast'* Organization (November 1917–January 1919)," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), No. 6, June 1971, pp. 84–93.

The regional secretary in 1917–18 wrote later that, despite her best efforts, the MK "existed alongside the regional bureau rather than . . . subordinate to it." See V. Yakovleva, "Party Work in Moscow *Oblast'* during February–October 1917," *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya* (Moscow), No. 3 (15), March 1923, p. 196.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A decade later the Soviets merged most *gubernii* into much larger regions (*oblasti*) thought to be more conducive to industrialization. The Moscow *oblast'* committee (*obkom*) formed in 1929 held sway over Moscow, its traditional hinterland, three adjoining *gubernii* (Ryazan', Tula, and Tver), and much of Kaluga *guberniya*. In February 1931, concern over the city's whirlwind growth prompted the re-establishment of a committee for Moscow proper. But the *gorkom* was still subject to *obkom* authority, even when Moscow *oblast'* was pared in 1930–37 to roughly the limits of the old Moscow *guberniya*.[5] In February 1956, the Moscow *gorkom*, without fanfare, was severed from the *obkom*.[6] The arrangement, unaltered since, is unique: Moscow's is the only city-level party committee to report directly to the CPSU Central Committee.[7]

Party governance in Moscow fits the standard Soviet mold. The *gorkom* as such is unwieldy (172 members as of February 1988, plus 55 candidate members), and its three or four plenums a year by and large ratify and publicize, rather than initiate, decisions. Most matters of substance are under the purview of the *gorkom* bureau (currently 12 members and two candidate members), which meets weekly. The *gorkom*'s secretaries (six at present) all belong to the bureau and are empowered to execute local and national party policy through a staff organized into specialized departments (19 in 1988). Moscow is subdivided for party (and municipal) purposes into weak urban districts (*rayony*), each with a district party committee (*raykom*) and bureau. Six at their low point in 1922, the *raykomy* number 33 today.

Immediately after the revolution, the main power broker in Moscow was not a party official but L.B. Kamenev, the chairman of the Moscow soviet from September 1918 to May 1926. "Mayor" Kamenev was a full member of the party Politburo from its inception in 1919 and, when Lenin took ill in 1922, became a senior government functionary as well.[8] Since 1926, it has been the first secretary of the local party apparatus who commands the scene. Table 1 lists the 27 individuals who have held the ranking position in the MK (1917–29), *obkom* (1929–56), and *gorkom* (1956 and thereafter), as well as the one man who, in the years of *obkom* primacy, was *gorkom* first secretary only.[9]

Moscow's leader has always tended to rank high in the Soviet pantheon. Since the early 1920's, its first secretaries have routinely sat on the CPSU Central Committee.[10] Much more telling is that six have been full members of the Politburo and four have been candidate members. For 39 years (46 if Kamenev is counted), Moscow bosses have been on the Politburo in some capacity. Eleven have served concurrently on the party Secretariat, logging 25 years there.[11] Before it was dissolved in 1952, six sat on the Organization Bureau (Orgburo).

Another index of Moscow's weight within the CPSU is the upward and outward mobility of its officials below the level of first secretary. Data on this are collated in Table 2. It tracks 386 men and women, mostly party workers, who have to my knowledge left the Moscow apparatus to take up 557 positions in other Soviet organizations. I will make reference to their experiences throughout this article.

Early Development

The biography of the Moscow organization has been marked both by gradual trends and by break points, of which the spectacular falls of Grishin and Yel'tsin are but the latest. It is best to deal with these in chronological sequence and to leave summary analysis to the end.

Legacy of the underground. As the empire's second city and its communications hub before 1917, Moscow was vital to the plans of the future ruling party. Lenin,

[5]A separate Kalinin (Tver) *oblast'* was formed in 1935. In 1937, Ryazan' and Tula *oblasti* were separated out and most of the territory previously taken from Kaluga was returned to that *oblast'*.

[6]Only retrospective accounts (for example, *Moskovskaya . . . v tsifrakh*, p. 32) date the decision to February of 1956. It must have been made toward the end of the month, for delegates to the 20th CPSU Congress, which convened on February 14, were selected from the combined organization.

[7]Since 1976, the Kiev *gorkom* has also had "the rights of an *obkom*," but it reports to the Kremlin through the Ukrainian central committee.

[8]Without relinquishing his Moscow position, Kamenev was appointed deputy chairman of both the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense in September 1922. He routinely chaired sessions of the Politburo in Lenin's absence and was still doing so at the end of 1925. See *XIV s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy partii(b): Stenograficheskiy otchet* (14th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [B]: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Gosizdat, 1926, p. 397.

[9]As can be seen in Table 1, Rumyantsev in 1950–52 was the only one of the *gorkom* first secretaries after 1931 who was not at one time or another also ranking secretary. Before his appointment, the positions of *obkom* and *gorkom* first secretary were held by the same person, with the single exception of the 14 months in 1934–35 when Kaganovich headed the *obkom* and Khrushchev the *gorkom*. After Rumyantsev, Kapitonov was *gorkom* boss first, *obkom* boss later. Furtseva was *gorkom* boss both before and after the 1956 separation from the *obkom*. Two of the 27 ranking secretaries (Zelenskiy in the MK and Khrushchev in the *obkom*) served two separate terms.

[10]After 1922, only one *obkom* first secretary (Ugarov) and two from the *gorkom* (Rumyantsev and Ustinov) were not full members of the Central Committee. Ugarov was a candidate member. All three were appointed well after a national party congress, and the next congress promptly elected each of their successors to the CC.

[11]Three who became full members of the Politburo as Moscow first secretary were also for a time candidate members (Kaganovich, Furtseva, and Grishin). For seats on the CC Secretariat, I exclude the transient cross-appointments of Mikhaylov (1953) and Yel'tsin (1985–86) but include Zaykov (1987–88).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Moscow Party First Secretaries[1]

Secretary	Term of office	National party standing[2]	Subsequent career
A. MK (MOSCOW COMMITTEE, CITY ONLY), OCTOBER 1917–MAY 1920			
V. M. Likhachev	Oct.–Nov. 1917	None	Demoted for factional reasons (too moderate in revolution) to district-level position, then economic management in Moscow, head MK propaganda department (d. 1924)
R. S. Zemlyachka	Nov. 1917–May 1918	None	Transferred to army, then local party work (incl. *raykom* in Moscow), later in government inspectorate (d. 1947)
D. I. Yefremov	May–Sept. 1918	None	Transferred to army, returned as second-ranking MK secretary, then army, local party work, head of government insurance board (d. 1925)
V. M. Zagorskiy	Sept. 1918–Sept. 1919	None	None (assassinated)
A. F. Myasnikov	Sept. 1919–May 1920	None	Transferred to head of Armenian government, chairman of Transcaucasus federation, secretary of Transcaucasus *kraykom* (d. 1925)
B. *GUBKOM* (GUBERNIYA COMMITTEE), MAY 1920–SEPTEMBER 1929			
I. A. Zelenskiy	May–Aug. 1920	None	Transferred to Siberian branch of national food commissariat
I. A. Pyatnitskiy	Aug.–Nov. 1920	Already CCC	Demoted for factional reasons (support of Democratic Centralists) to position in Comintern, later in CC apparatus, then purged (d. 1938)
F. A. Artem	Nov. 1920–Jan. 1921	Already CC	Transferred to chairman of miners' union (d. 1921)
V. N. Yakovleva	Jan.–Apr. 1921	None[3]	Demoted for factional reasons (support of Trotskiy platform) to party position in Siberia, then in RSFSR education commissariat, head of RSFSR finance commissariat, purged (d. 1944)
I. A. Zelenskiy	Apr. 1921–Oct. 1924	Already CCC; CC and OC in Apr. 1922; S in Apr. 1923; O in May 1924	Demoted for factional reasons (support of Kamenev) to secretary of CC's Central Asian bureau, then head of consumer cooperatives, purged (d. 1938)
N. A. Uglanov	Oct. 1924–Nov. 1928	Already CC; PC, S, and O in Dec. 1925	Demoted for factional reasons (support of Right Opposition) to people's commissar of labor, then minor positions, purged (d. 1938)
V. M. Molotov	Nov. 1928–Apr. 1929	Already CC, P, S, and O	Returned to full-time work as CC secretary, later many high posts until 1957 retirement (d. 1987)
K. Ya. Bauman	Apr.–Sept. 1929	Already CC; S and PC in Apr. 1929	Transferred to first secretary of *obkom*
C. *OBKOM* (OBLAST COMMITTEE), SEPTEMBER 1929–FEBRUARY 1956 (* = Simultaneously first secretary of *gorkom* after February 1931)			
K. Ya. Bauman	Sept. 1929–Apr. 1930	(See above)	Demoted for mismanagement of collectivization, remained briefly as CC secretary, then secretary of CC's Central Asian bureau, head of CC science department, purged (d. 1937)
L. M. Kaganovich*	Apr. 1930–Mar. 1935 (on *gorkom*, Feb. 1931–Jan. 1934)	Already CC, PC, S, and O; P in July 1930	Transferred to high government positions, but remained CC secretary until 1939, retired 1957
N. S. Khrushchev*	Mar. 1935–Jan. 1938; (on *gorkom* from Jan. 1934)	CC in Feb. 1934	Promoted to first secretary of Ukrainian party
A. I. Ugarov*	Feb.–Oct. 1938	Already CCC	Purged and disappeared (d. 1939)
A. S. Shcherbakov*	Oct. 1938–May 1945	CC in Mar. 1939; PC in Feb. 1941; S and O in Sept. 1941	Died in office
G. M. Popov*	June 1945–Dec. 1949	Already CC; S and O in Mar. 1946	Demoted to head minor government ministries, ambassador to Poland, economic manager (d. 1968)
N. S. Khrushchev	Dec. 1949–Mar. 1953	Already CC and P; S in Dec. 1949	Promoted to first secretary of CC, later chairman of Council of Ministers, deposed 1964 (d. 1971)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

N. A. Mikhaylov	Mar. 1953–Mar. 1954	Already CC[4]	Demoted to ambassador to Poland, later minister of culture, head of government press committee (d. 1982)
I. V. Kapitonov	Mar. 1954–Mar. 1959	Already CC	Demoted to first secretary of Ivanovo *obkom*, promoted to head of CC department in 1964, CC secretary in 1965, demoted to chairman of the party's Central Auditing Commission in 1986

D. *GORKOM* (CITY COMMITTEE), SUBORDINATE TO *OBKOM*, FEB. 1931–FEB. 1956

I. I. Rumyantsev	Jan. 1950–Sept.1952	None	Demoted to first secretary of Velikiye Luki *obkom*, then director of defense plant in Moscow
I. V. Kapitonov	Sept. 1952–Mar. 1954	CC in Oct. 1952	Promoted to first secretary of Moscow *obkom* (see above)
Ye. A. Furtseva	Mar. 1954–Feb. 1956	Already CCC	(See below)

E. INDEPENDENT *GORKOM*, FEB. 1956 TO PRESENT

Ye. A. Furtseva	Feb. 1956–Dec. 1957	CC, PC, and S in Feb. 1956; P in June 1957	Promoted to full-time work as CC secretary, demoted to minister of culture in 1960 (d. 1974)
V. I. Ustinov	Dec. 1957–July 1960	None	Demoted to ambassador to Hungary, head of department of CEMA Secretariat (d. 1971)
P. N. Demichev	July 1960–Nov. 1962	CC and S in Oct. 1961	Promoted to full-time work as CC secretary, demoted to minister of culture in 1974, first deputy head of state in 1986
N. G. Yegorychev	Nov. 1962–June 1967	Already CC	Demoted to deputy head of industrial ministry, ambassador to Denmark, deputy minister again, then ambassador to Afghanistan
V. V. Grishin	June 1967–Dec. 1985	Already CC and PC; P in Mar. 1971	Retired
B. N. Yel'tsin	Dec. 1985–Nov. 1987	Already CC; S (until Feb. 1986); PC in Feb. 1986	Demoted to first deputy chairman of State Construction Committee
L. N. Zaykov	Nov. 1987–	Already CC, P, and S	Not applicable

[1]Except for four months in 1918, there was only one secretary of the Moscow party committee at a time until August 1920, when another secretary was added. The top-ranking official was designated the "first secretary" in August 1922. Three or more secretaries became the rule in the 1930's.

[2]CC = Central Committee; CCC = candidate member of Central Committee; P = full member of Politburo (or Presidium, in 1952–66); PC = candidate member of Politburo (or Presidium); S = Central Committee secretary; O = member of Orgburo (1919–52 only); and OC = candidate member of Orgburo.

[3]Yakovleva had been a candidate CC member in 1917–18.

[4]When made first secretary of the *obkom*, Mikhaylov was a CC secretary, but he was removed from the latter post a week later.

whose brother and two sisters lived in Moscow, was well briefed on revolutionary activity there.[12] One-fifth of the Bolshevik delegates to the Social Democrats' Fifth Congress in 1907 were from Moscow, as were three out of five Bolsheviks on the combined Central Committee (CC) of 1907, a ratio said to "reflect its [Moscow's] weight in the party."[13] The 1910 suppression of the MK by the police was thus bad news to the entire party.

The badge of the Moscow Bolsheviks was their "individualism and disunity."[14] To be sure, there were unwavering Lenin loyalists such as V. K. Taratuta, the MK's secretary during 1906–07 and Lenin's financial aide for several years after 1907.[15] But they never did get a firm grip on the organization. Many Bolsheviks in Moscow were well to Lenin's right. In 1904–05, for instance, the chief Moscow organizer was A. I. Rykov, one of the most gradualist and least rigidly centralist of the party's leaders. V. P. Nogin, a trade unionist, was a leading "reconciliationist" before the war, advocating entente with the Mensheviks.[16] Moscow was also the home base of Bolshevism's syndicalist wing, led by A. A. Bogdanov,

[12]Lenin "constantly asked relatives, friends, and acquaintances to send him Moscow newspapers, magazines, and statistical materials. . . . He was able to carry on regular correspondence with Moscow Bolsheviks . . . [and] was personally acquainted with many." *Ocherki istorii* (1979), pp. 212–13.

[13]Ibid., p. 197.

[14]Robert C. Williams, *The Other Bolsheviks: Lenin and His Critics, 1909–1914*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1986, p. 68. Williams makes this comment with respect to the lecture group of the MK, founded in 1905, but it applies to the whole organization.

[15]Taratuta "was deeply involved in the shadier side of Bolshevik fund raising," handling money from "expropriations" (mostly bank robberies) and using an affair with the sister of a rich industrialist to gain control of a legacy. See ibid., p. 117.

[16]One of the two leaders of the reconciliationists at the peak of their influence was A. I. Lyubimov, an ex-MK secretary.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which blended moderation on organizational questions with philosophical unorthodoxy (seeing Marxism as a secular religion) and social radicalism. The Muscovites V. L. Shantser, A. V. Lunacharskiy, M. N. Lyadov, and M. N. Pokrovskiy were fervent Bogdanovites, and Moscow was their richest source of funds.[17] Another notch to the left were the youthful radicals who flourished at Moscow University and in the Zamoskvorech'ye district after 1905: N. I. Bukharin, V. V. Osinskiy, V. M. Smirnov, V. N. Yakovleva, and others.[18]

The many voices of Moscow Bolshevism corresponded to the city's size, multi-branch economy, and social complexity. These fed strong *rayon* organizations, which augmented the competition already posed by distinct *guberniya* and regional leaderships. As Russia's main railroad junction, Moscow also attracted visitors from across the entire spectrum of the revolutionary movement, including exiles returning from Siberia or abroad who stayed to seek work. Detrimental to unity in a different way were the police sentinels who were probably more pervasive here than anywhere else in the party. The Moscow man on the 1912 CC, R. V. Malinovskiy, was later exposed as an Okhrana informer, along with a half-dozen other members of party committees during the war and assorted small fry.[19] Police penetration hampered communication and the forging of mutual trust. When the MK was finally revived on the eve of the revolution, it was under such extreme secrecy that members did not so much as know one another's names until they met.[20]

A house divided but prominent. The Bolshevik insurrection in Moscow, more tenuous and bloody than that in Petrograd, aggravated tensions among party activists even as many of them were converted overnight into functionaries of the new regime.[21] Moderates set the tone in the Moscow soviet, where Nogin was the first Bolshevik chairman, and in the MK, where V. M. Likhachev was secretary. The regional bureau, meantime, was a preserve of intellectuals long active on the party left, such as Bukharin, Osinskiy, Smirnov, Yakovleva, G. I. Lomov, and I. N. Stukov. The less important *guberniya* committee vacillated in the middle.[22]

The Left Communists who fought Lenin on the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty in the spring of 1918 had their stronghold in Moscow. Lenin, denouncing them and their tribune, Bukharin, at the 7th Party Congress, spoke disparagingly of them as "our young Moscow friends."[23] From March to June 1918, they infuriated Lenin and his constitutional expert, Stalin, by trying to organize a "Council of People's Commissars of Moscow *oblast',*" a subnational government for central Russia. Aside from a few moderates like Nogin and Rykov, its roster read like a "Who's Who" of the Left.[24]

Likewise, Muscovites were integral to most of the other groupings that protested one party policy or another until the 10th Party Congress in 1921 outlawed organized factions.[25] T. V. Sapronov, chairman in 1917–19 of the *guberniya* soviet, led the Democratic Centralists in their crusade against the dictatorial excesses of War Communism. At his side were S. I. Polidorov (his successor in the *guberniya*), Osinskiy, Smirnov, and the head of the Moscow school department, R. B. Rafail. The "Workers' Opposition" of 1920–21 had many converts in the capital, among them Osinskiy, Sapronov, V. N. Maksimovskiy (a former secretary of the regional bureau), M. S. Boguslavskiy and Ye. N. Ignatov (leaders in the Moscow soviet), and A. S. Bubnov

[17]See especially Williams, op. cit., pp. 32–33, 68–70, 150–51.

[18]A sharp portrait of this group is in Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1973, pp. 9–16.

[19]*Ocherki istorii* (1979), p. 317, gives the names of the "most dangerous" police agents. See also Ralph Carter Elwood, *Roman Malinovsky: A Life Without a Cause*, Newtonville, MA, Oriental Research Partners, 1977.

[20]K. V. Ostrovityanov, "How I Joined the Revolution," in P. N. Pospelov, Ed., *Moskovskiye bol'sheviki v ogne revolyutsionnykh boyev (Vospominaniya)* (Moscow Bolsheviks in the Heat of Revolutionary Battles [Memoirs]), Moscow, Mysl', 1976, pp. 83–84.

[21]The best study is Diane Koenker, *Moscow Workers and the 1917 Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1981, which concentrates on social factors. A good account of party politics is B'Ann Bowman, "The Moscow Bolsheviks, February–November 1918," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Indiana University, 1973). The main Soviet study is A. Ya. Grunt, *Moskva 1917-iy: Revolyutsiya i kontrrevolyutsiya* (Moscow 1917: Revolution and Counter-revolution), Moscow, Nauka, 1976.

[22]See V. Yakovleva, "Preparation of the October Uprising in Moscow Oblast'," *Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya*, No. 10, October 1922, p. 304; and O. Pyatnitskiy, "From the History of the October Uprising in Moscow," *Istorik-marksist* (Moscow), No. 4 (44), 1935, p. 9.

[23]*Sed'moy s"yezd Rossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy partii: Stenograficheskiy otchet* (7th Congress of the Russian Communist Party: Stenographic Report), Moscow and Petrograd, Gosizdat, 1923, p. 4. As Cohen writes (op. cit., p. 64), Left Communism "was a native Moscow movement."

[24]Pokrovskiy, who as chairman of the Moscow soviet had been one of the most strident of the Left Communists, was head of this body. Among his associates were Lomov, Smirnov, Yakovleva, V. N. Maksimovskiy, A. P. Rozengol'ts, and L. P. Serebryakov. See the lists in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 20, 1918, p. 2, and Mar. 21, p. 3. The main Left Communist excluded was Bukharin, who remained on the presidium of the Moscow soviet until May 1918.

Stalin's critique of the new council (as people's commissar of nationalities) is in ibid., Apr. 3, 1918, p. 3. There is a useful discussion in N. M. Aleshchenko, *Moskovskiy sovet v 1917–1941 gg.* (The Moscow Soviet in the Years 1917–1941), Moscow, Nauka, 1976, pp. 86–88, and in G. S. Ignat'yev, *Moskva v pervyy god proletarskoy diktatury* (Moscow in the First Year of Proletarian Dictatorship), Moscow, Nauka, 1975, pp. 85–87.

[25]The best summary source is still Robert V. Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1960, which focuses on Moscow at pp. 138–43.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lev Kamenev chairing a meeting of the Moscow soviet.

—FPG.

(a senior economic administrator with a seat on the MK bureau).

The MK leadership, loosely guided by no less than nine secretaries by April 1921, was drawn into the fray. Factionalism unseated Likhachev in 1917 (for having been too timid during the October showdown), I. A. Pyatnitskiy in 1920 (for sympathizing with the Democratic Centralists), and Yakovleva in 1921 (for endorsing Lev Trotskiy's platform). It may also have speeded the transfer of several others, although the record is unclear.

Kamenev, Lenin's Moscow lieutenant, held the line against insurgency, yet often barely so. As Bukharin, now a mainstream politician and editor of *Pravda*, put it in late 1920: "In the Moscow organization, businesslike discussion of issues often gives way to preposterous squabbling, the kind of beating around the bush appropriate to market women but not to the proletariat."[26] In the climactic 1921 debate over the trade unions, the Lenin-Kamenev platform got the votes of only 54 percent of the delegates to *rayon* party conferences, and fewer than half in three of seven *rayony* (Gorodskoy, Zamoskvorech'ye, and Sokol'niki). At the *guberniya* conference, the 66 percent majority suggested a large disaffected minority.[27] The election of the MK was "as a result of negotiations among groups."[28]

Party factionalism was particularly rampant in Moscow in part because it was the first to feel the sting of some of the regime's most contentious policies—the hypercentralism of War Communism, in particular.[29] With its concentration of students, artists, and trade unionists, Moscow was also a ready-made seedbed of noncomformity, and it was here that dissidents could hope to win the maximum publicity for their cause. "The Moscow organization," Kamenev explained in 1921, "occupies a special position within the party . . . because all shades of party thought, which tend to arise at the center, are able to appeal directly to it."[30]

There were also structural factors. The pre-1917 Moscow tradition of *rayon* autonomy—the MK was composed solely of delegates from the *raykomy*—was not overcome until November 1920. When a centralist MK secretary, A. F. Myasnikov, first challenged the convention, he was told that the city executive was "merely a staff for communication among the *rayony*."[31] Kamenev, a native of Moscow yet untutored in its party affairs and fixated on the Kremlin, proved unwilling or unable to mediate among cliques.

Fractiousness notwithstanding, there were many hints that the Moscow organization enjoyed privileged status during the formative years of the regime. To take one example: shortly after the move of the seat of government from Petrograd, *Pravda*, the CC's official organ, became a joint publication of the CC and the MK; *Izvestiya* was the publication of Lenin's government

[26]*Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 16, 1920, p. 1.
[27]Ibid., Feb. 2, 1921, p. 3, and Feb. 20, p. 2.
[28]*Kommunisticheskiy Trud* (Moscow), Feb. 22, 1921, p. 3.

[29]See the autobiographical note by Sapronov referring to his experience in the Moscow *guberniya* soviet: "Due to the quite specific conditions of work in proximity to the central offices of the state, already in 1918, I came across the negative aspects of *glavkizm* and I was one of the first to be forced to begin the struggle against *glavkist* bureaucracy." *Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' Granat* (The Granat Encyclopedic Dictionary—hereafter *Granat*), Moscow, Granat, 1910–1940, Annex to Vol. 41, pt. 3, p. 12.
[30]*Kommunisticheskiy Trud*, Jan. 21, 1921, p. 2.
[31]*Pravda*, Jan. 13, 1920, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Number of Moscow Officials Appointed to Other Positions[1]

Position to which appointed[2]	Period when appointed: 1917–27	1928–36	1937–38	1939–Mar. 1953	Mar. 1953–Oct. 1964	Oct. 1964–Nov. 1982	Nov. 1982–Feb. 1988
Central Committee secretary	6	3[3]	0	4	2	0	1[4]
Central Committee department head	7	4	0	1	12[5]	1	0
Other central party position	19	9	4	22	29	11	3
Provincial party first secretary	11	6	12	11	5	0	0
Other provincial position	17	7	8	19	4	2	1
Member, USSR Council of Ministers[6]	14	5	2	4	7	3	2
Member, RSFSR Council of Ministers[6]	0[7]	4	4	10	6	3	0
Other government position	33	12	7	28	31	50	3
Political police	3	0	0	2	3	0	0
Military[8]	12	0	1	10	0	0	0
Trade unions	10	5	1	2	5	4	2
Miscellaneous[9]	9	1	2	5	5	6	1

[1]The great majority of officials worked primarily in party administration in Moscow. A small number served only or mainly in the municipal bureaucracy. For the first decade, a handful are counted who did not hold administrative office in either hierarchy in Moscow but were active in the city's party politics and sat on the MK or MK bureau. Included also are a few career party officials who at the moment of transfer from the Moscow organization were still employed by the Komsomol.

[2]Entries refer only to positions to which the official was appointed within the given period and by no later than the fifth year after his transfer out of the Moscow administration. Individuals named in the same period to more than one position in a given category are counted only once in that category.

[3]Includes two leaders (V. M. Molotov and L. M. Kaganovich) who were already CC secretaries at the time of, and continued to be CC secretaries after, their appointment as Moscow first secretary.

[4]The official here is L. N. Zaykov, who was already a CC secretary when appointed Moscow first secretary and who has remained so.

[5]Includes two appointments to head "bureaus of the CC," whose status was roughly that of a department.

[6]Council of People's Commissars to 1946.

[7]RSFSR commissariats for the most part functioned as country-wide agencies from the formation of the USSR in 1922 until about 1930. Hence, appointments to them in the early period are counted as USSR-level appointments.

[8]Most in this category were political officers in the armed forces.

[9]Includes director of a factory or institute; newspaper editor or deputy editor; secretary of an artistic union; and official of the Comintern (before 1943), the Komsomol (one case), and the trade cooperatives.

SOURCES: Of the 386 individuals whose movements are traced here (some into more than one position), more or less complete biographies were located for 301; in many cases these were obituaries. Only partial information was found for the remaining 85, usually in the form of scattered press references. The principal sources were the Moscow daily press; the major all-Union and Russian republic newspapers (*Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*); biographical entries in encyclopedias and encyclopedia yearbooks; and handbooks of Supreme Soviet deputies. For Moscow officials posted to other union republics, a search was conducted of obituaries in five republic dailies since 1955: *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma-Ata), *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), and *Zarya Vostoka* (Tbilisi). For persons appointed to relatively minor party and government positions, the directories of Soviet officials put out periodically since the late 1950's by the Directorate of Intelligence, US Central Intelligence Agency, were extremely valuable.

and the Moscow soviet.[32] Both newspapers covered Moscow issues thoroughly and offered local figures a unique national forum.

Moscow's stature was equally imposing in the realm of personnel (see Table 2). Muscovites vaulted into positions of influence repeatedly in that first decade. Kamenev's rank (approached, among politicians with a territorial base, only by his ally G. Ya. Zinov'yev of Petrograd) has already been mentioned. Two ex-Moscow politicians previously divided by ideology moved in the same circles: Bukharin, the party's chief theoretician, was a full member of the Politburo by 1924; Rykov joined the Politburo in 1922 and succeeded Lenin as head of government in 1924. G. Ya. Sokol'nikov was the government's chief financier, N. A. Semashko its expert on public health.[33] Others filled lesser positions.

Whatever the patronage role of Kamenev and others, simple propinquity must have counted for a great deal in so protean a political system. The selection of Semashko to be the first people's commissar of health

[32]Co-publication of *Pravda* commenced on March 16, 1918, and of *Izvestiya*, on June 22.

[33]Although Bukharin retained an interest in Moscow issues until after the civil war, Rykov evidently did not. Rykov, like Zelenskiy, was a native of Saratov, and it is possible that there was some prior connection between the two. A leading Moscow radical, Lomov, was also born in Saratov, and he worked amicably with the more conservative Rykov in Moscow's Lefortovo district in 1913–14. See *Granat*, Annex to Vol. 41, pt. 2, pp. 337–40.

Sokol'nikov and Semashko were both born outside of Moscow but educated there and active in Moscow during the revolution. Sokol'nikov wrote in his autobiography (ibid., Annex to Vol. 41, pt. 3, p. 77) that in 1917 he "was close in work to Bukharin, V. M. Smirnov, Osinskiy, Yakovleva, Bubnov, Stukov, and Sapronov."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in July 1918 has been explained by this, and one suspects that a like logic was at work in the nascent Central Committee apparatus.[34] Why else would five of the 11 CC secretaries chosen before Lenin's death be veterans of the Moscow organization? L. P. Serebryakov, a former Left Communist, was aligned with Trotskiy, and I. A. Zelenskiy with Kamenev, but the other three (V. M. Mikhaylov, Ya. E. Rudzutak, and Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy) evidently were factional neutrals.[35] Below them, it is of great interest that the first two heads of the Secretariat's all-important personnel section—Uchraspred, the department of registration and assignments—were Moscow-bred.[36] Maksimovskiy, the founding head in 1919, was followed in 1920 by his deputy and former Moscow colleague, N. V. Lisitsyn.[37]

A machine built and subdued. When Zelenskiy was elevated to the CC Secretariat in 1923, he retained his position as Moscow first secretary. Besides the acknowledgment of status, the cross-appointment—to be an accepted practice for the next 30 years—bespoke Moscow's tight involvement in national party management.[38]

Functions as prosaic as supplying dormitories, cafeterias, and clinics to Kremlin personnel required liaison with the Moscow authorities.[39] In 1922–23, the agitation department of the MK drew up conjointly with the CC department and Glavpolitprosvet the first scheme for political schools for party members.[40] The MK established the first Lenin Institute (the future Institute of Marxism-Leninism) in 1923; it was later appropriated by the CC. The MK "mobilized" thousands of party members on behalf of the center in the 1920's, far more, apparently, than any other committee. Some—for example, second secretary I. I. Min'kov, who was rushed to Samara in September 1921—were ranking officials sent to police a local rebellion or feud. More common was the placement of someone of middling status in a provincial organization short on administrative talent.[41]

It is revealing that when the crucial device of *nomenklatura*—the list of positions to be filled or confirmed by organs of the party—came into its own, the MK was for a time empowered to clear many (perhaps all) appointments in the central bureaucracy. Only in mid-1922 did the CC Secretariat begin to gather this power into its own hands.[42] A parlay in October 1923 worked out boundaries between the two organizations, but as late as 1926 it was being reported that "until recently" there had been "an inadequate delimitation of work between the CC and the MK with respect to Moscow."[43] Adjustments continued for some months.[44]

---

[34]"Since Ye. P. Pervukhin [Semashko's main rival] was located in Petrograd, where he [worked] in the Petrograd soviet, and Semashko was here [as head of the Moscow soviet's health department], Pervukhin was left where he was and Semashko was named to head the new commissariat." V. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, *Vospominaniya o Lenine* (Reminiscences of Lenin), Moscow, Nauka, 1965, p. 261.

[35]All five had long involvements with the Moscow organization and were active there in 1917. Only Yaroslavskiy did not hold an administrative office in Moscow afterward. Mikhaylov, who spent most of the civil war in the army, was a native Muscovite and returned to the MK after a year as a national party secretary. Zelenskiy was in the Moscow soviet until 1920, ending as Kamenev's closest assistant. Serebryakov's main involvement after 1917 was with the Moscow regional party bureau. Rudzutak chaired a "regional economic council" attached to the Moscow soviet before becoming head of the trade unions in 1920.

[36]Uchraspred, known today as the Central Committee's department of organizational-party work, has had many names over the intervening years. For simplicity's sake, I shall refer to the section that assigns a party committee's cadres, at the central or local level, as its personnel department or section.

[37]Maksimovskiy and Lisitsyn had been most active at the regional level, Maksimovskiy having succeeded Yakovleva in 1918 as secretary of the regional party bureau. It is likely that they had a special link with Serebryakov, another Moscow leftist involved in regional work, who was a CC secretary in 1920–21.

[38]As Table 1 shows, every Moscow leader from Zelenskiy to the death of Stalin, save for Khrushchev (during his first term in the *obkom*, 1935–38) and the ill-fated Ugarov (1938), was cross-appointed. Molotov and Kaganovich were already CC secretaries when they started the Moscow job; the others assumed this position anywhere from a few days to three years (in Shcherbakov's case) later. Only one other local organization gained similar recognition, though for a shorter time. S. M. Kirov and A. A. Zhdanov, the Leningrad bosses, were concurrently CC secretaries from 1934 to 1944.

[39]The Secretariat's business office had representatives in the Moscow soviet's health and social security departments by 1922. See "Report of the Chancery of the CC of the Russian Communist Party (B)," *Izvestiya TsK* (Moscow), No. 3 (39), March 1922, p. 55.

[40]See "Report of the Agitation-Propaganda Department," ibid., No. 2 (50), February 1923, p. 38.

[41]Min'kov's Samara assignment is described in *Odinnadtsatyy s"yezd RKP(b): Stenograficheskiy otchet* (11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party [B]: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Partizdat, 1936, pp. 57–58. The published statistics on the movement of personnel are incomplete. But we do know, for example, that between March and August 1921 Moscow put 1,219 communists at the disposal of the CC, 32 percent of the national total. The Secretariat's assignment of 835 of these cadres to work in the capital at this time greatly diminished Moscow's net contribution, and a party journal grumbled about "the colossal overload of Moscow with communists, at the expense of the provinces." "Summary Report of the Personnel Department of the CC of the Russian CP," *Izvestiya Tsk*, No. 33, October 1921, p. 13. For a typical later report, see the statement about the MK's supply of 730 activists in 1925 for work in the provinces in *Pravda*, Dec. 5, 1925, p. 5.

[42]"In the summer of 1922 there began the concentration in the CC of the register of responsible officials in central offices and in agencies of Russian, regional, and provincial scope. By agreement with the MK, the register of these officials was transferred from the MK to the CC." "Report of the Personnel Department," *Izvestiya Tsk*, No. 3 (51), March 1923, p. 33. It is not clear from such descriptions how many high-level positions were in the MK's grasp before the transfer began, but it would seem that a good number were and that the MK also participated in some personnel decisions bearing on other areas.

[43]N. Kozlov, "On the Personnel Work of the Party," ibid., No. 1 (22), Jan. 18, 1926, p. 2.

[44]In November 1926, the several categories within the MK's *nomenklatura* covered 4,470 positions. The CC's *nomenklatura* took in 5,500 positions at the beginning of 1926, but at year's end an unspecified number of intermediate positions in central agencies were transferred to MK control. This seems to have been a (fn. 44 continued on p. 38)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Like the CC staff, the local party apparatus was rapidly assuming the bureaucratic and clientelistic traits that define it to the present day. Zelenskiy managed the transition in Moscow from the old conspiratorial style. The relative ease with which he delivered Moscow votes to the Kamenev-Zinov'yev-Stalin triumvirate during their 1923–24 split with Trotskiy was one proof of the organization's growing coherence. Zelenskiy's biggest headache was discontent among Moscow's thousands of penurious postsecondary students, rather than the Old Bolsheviks who were the typical oppositionists before 1921.[45] He proudly declared that the Moscow organization had passed the test and was now of "decisive significance for the entire party."[46]

Zelenskiy's quiet removal later in 1924—Stalin's first swipe at his coalition partners—brought to the fore a talented outsider, the first party apparatchik to be undisputed boss of the organization. N. A. Uglanov had previously been secretary in Nizhniy Novgorod (later called Gor'kiy) and in Petrograd, where he fought bitterly with Zinov'yev in 1921. Both Kamenev and Zinov'yev had cause to resent the appointment, yet they are said to have approved and to have hoped to use him against Stalin.[47] If so, they soon rued it, for Uglanov sided with Stalin against them, swept the MK and *raykomy* clean of their friends, saw to Kamenev's replacement as mayor by K. V. Ukhanov, and achieved an ignominy among anti-Stalinists second only to Stalin himself.

Moscow, "the tsardom of comrade Uglanov," was much discussed at the 14th Party Congress in December 1925, most bitingly by Leningrad-based oppositionists who hearkened to the ancient rivalry between the two cities. "How many officials," one mused, "has comrade Uglanov gotten rid of so as to create a tsardom of indifference and calm in Moscow? They number in the dozens and maybe in the hundreds." Lenin's widow, N. K. Krupskaya, claimed that abuse of the former capital "has gone further and further . . . since Uglanov became head of the Moscow organization." Stalin's favorites defended Uglanov, pronouncing his organization "a model of Leninist unity . . . the best in our party."[48]

That Uglanov kept a certain distance at the congress was a portent. While supportive of Stalin's program, he carried himself as a statesman determined to keep Moscow out of the clutches of any individual—be it, by implication, Kamenev or Stalin. Uglanov was against "spheres of influence" in Moscow. No one should be allowed "to turn our party's mightiest organization into a weapon of his own policy."[49]

That, of course, is precisely what Stalin was to do. As is well known, Uglanov was annihilated in 1928 as a kingpin of the so-called Right Opposition, the last protofaction to stand up to Stalin before he locked in his dictatorship and abandoned the New Economic Policy (NEP), the moderate social and economic program of the 1920's. What bears emphasis here is the Moscow dimension of the affair.[50]

Among the villains of the right, only three full members of the Politburo were painted blacker than Uglanov: Bukharin, Rykov, and M. P. Tomskiy, the head of the trade unions, all of whom had roots in the Moscow party.[51] Moscow's was the only big local organization to join them in defense of the NEP; there were tangible reasons for this. A staple of the NEP was conciliation of the peasantry, and Moscow's proletariat was known for its easy communication with the village. More important, light industry, especially textiles, was the economic backbone of Moscow *guberniya*, which could expect to lose out in any swing toward heavy industry. Uglanov was unapologetic about lobbying for textiles: "Of course, as secretary of the Moscow organization, it is obvious that I would very often have had to argue, pressure, and make a fuss so that we would be given more money."[52]

passing phase, for I have found no subsequent word of it. See the references in ibid., No. 1 (22), Jan. 18, 1926, p. 2; No. 45-46 (166–67), Nov. 22, 1926, p. 6; and No. 2-3 (175–76), Jan. 21, 1927, p. 6.

[45]*Moskovskiye bol'sheviki v bor'be s pravym i "levym" opportunizmom (1921–1929 gg.)* (Moscow Bolsheviks in the Struggle against Right and "Left" Opportunism), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1969, pp. 61–63. In 1923, 70,000 of the country's 200,000 students were in Moscow, where they and their teachers made up 28 percent of the party. They were instrumental in the Trotskyites' takeover of Khamovniki *rayon*, the site of Moscow University, where Maksimovskiy was briefly *raykom* secretary in early 1924.

[46]*Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1924, p. 4.

[47]On the appointment and the Uglanov-Zinov'yev feud, see especially *XIV s"yezd*, pp. 192, 193, 509–12, 954–55. Stalin seems to have seen the scrap with Zinov'yev as evidence of Uglanov's talent, saying when he was sent to Nizhniy Novgorod that he was "an able, up-and-coming party worker." A. I. Mikoyan, *V nachale dvadtsatykh* (In the Early 1920's), Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p. 144.

[48]*XIV s"yezd*, pp. 184, 451, 394.

[49]Ibid., p. 193.

[50]A concise summary of events within the organization is given by Nobuo Shimotomai, "Defeat of the Right Opposition in the Moscow Party Organization, 1928," *Japanese Slavic and East European Studies* (Kyoto), Vol. 4, 1983, pp. 15–34. Of the major histories, Cohen, op. cit., esp. pp. 234–37, is best on the Right's connection with Moscow. Soviet scholarly accounts are tendentious, but details can be gleaned from F. M. Vaganov, *Pravyy uklon v VKP(b) i yego razgrom (1928–1930 gg.)* (The Right Deviation in the All-Union CP [B] and its Defeat [1928–1930]), 2nd ed., Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, pp. 175–99, and *Moskovskiye bol'sheviki v bor'be . . .*, pp. 237–316.

[51]Bukharin's and Rykov's Moscow connections have often been pointed out, but not Tomskiy's. Although he was born in St. Petersburg, his official biography shows him to have headed the Moscow Bolshevik organization briefly in 1909. Tomskiy spent 1909–16 in a Moscow prison, was active in the revolution in Moscow, and was chairman of the city's trade union council before becoming head of the national union federation.

[52]*Shestoy ob"yedinennyy plenum MK i MKK VKP(b) (18–19 oktyabrya 1928)* (Sixth Joint Plenum of the MK and MKK [Moscow Control Commission] of the All-Union CP [B], October 18–19, 1928), Moscow, MK VKP(b), 1928, p. 17.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Power was contested as much as principle. Uglanov resisted total Stalinization out of the same spirit of independence that flared at the 14th Congress. He tried to buttress the MK's authority: "The different parts of the organization must stop bypassing the MK and petitioning the central organs. The MK must become the leading organ of the Moscow organization."[53] He boldly stated his desire to groom personnel for Moscow within the local apparatus, "and for the time being to close the door to outsiders." "Let us not be accused of Moscow local patriotism, because we know our own people better, we can see what they are good for. I think that we have to carry things to extremes in this regard."[54] One party history alleges that Uglanov meant "to concentrate in the MK the selection of cadres for all central economic, state, and party organs."[55] Had there been any truth to this, Stalin's fury would have been assured.

Stalin assailed Uglanov at an MK plenum in October 1928, without yet demanding his head. He was seconded by several MK defectors, most strongly by the head of its personnel section, V. I. Polonskiy. Two *raykom* secretaries (M. A. Pen'kov and M. N. Ryutin) and Uglanov's propagandist (N. N. Mandel'shtam) were dismissed. On November 27, a cowed MK sacked Uglanov, second secretary V. A. Kotov, and the two district secretaries left on the bureau (Ye. F. Kulikov and V. A. Yakovlev). V. M. Mikhaylov, the former Moscow (and national) party secretary now in charge of the Moscow trade unions, was given a brief reprieve. The imposition of V. M. Molotov, Stalin's henchman in the CC Secretariat, as first secretary made the rout complete.[56]

Uglanov's tsardom having crumbled, there could now be no doubt that Moscow belonged to Stalin's party empire. But who was to run things on Stalin's behalf? Would he have the emperor's ear, be the creature of a lesser prince, or be a mere lackey? And how were his decisions to mesh with wider policy?

Molotov stayed only the five months it took him to dislodge the most inveterate rightists. He passed the reins in April 1929 to his second secretary, K. Ya. Bauman, a Moscow communist of Latvian origin who had been associated with him for some time.[57] Uglanov's accuser, Polonskiy, became second secretary.

Bauman himself was to stumble in less than a year, just as the creation of a giant new *oblast'* expanded his turf. The problem was policy toward the peasantry, Bauman's (and Molotov's) area of special interest. Bauman was a partisan, in public and in private, of "tearing out the roots of capitalism in the village" and waging war on the prosperous *kulak*.[58] Although his region was little affected by the procurement crisis in the grain-growing lands, Bauman thrust it to the forefront of the battle for collective farms. When the party called for the formation of the "Twenty-five Thousanders," the proletarian shock troops of collectivization, in November 1929, Bauman's machine provided 6,600 volunteers. The next month the MK offered to assume *shefstvo* (tutelage) over collective farms in the middle Volga, Central Asia, and several other areas.[59]

While the first party conference of Moscow *oblast'* called in September 1929 for collectivization of 25 percent of the *oblast*'s 1.5 million farm households within five years, and the *obkom* bureau called in December for 40 to 50 percent by the end of 1930, Bauman in January 1930 held out the goal of full (*sploshnaya)* collectivization by that spring. Only 3 percent of Moscow *oblast'* households were collectivized as of October 1, 1929 (it ranked 18th in the country); the proportion was 37 percent by February 1, 1930, and 73 percent (sixth) by March 1.[60]

The pell-mell collectivization that took place all over the USSR in the winter of 1929–30 aroused peasant resistance and forced a hasty if temporary retreat. Again, Moscow figured prominently in the crisis. The enthusiast Bauman, close at hand, was the ideal scapegoat. He was the main butt of Stalin's scurrilous "Dizzy with Success" article in *Pravda* on March 2, 1930, which blamed local officials for "excesses," and of other articles and resolutions that appeared later that month. On April 4, the Moscow party bureau confessed to a "major mistake" in the campaign, one soon branded "paper-statistical maximalism." On April 22, Bauman paid for it by be-

---

[53]*Rabochaya Moskva* (Moscow), Oct. 18, 1924, p. 3.

[54]This remark, made in September 1928, was one of those Stalin demanded retracted when the disagreement went public. Within a month, Uglanov was so pressed that he was complaining how "it has become extremely difficult for me . . . to replace the lowliest technician." *Shestoy ob"yedinennyy plenum . . .*, pp. 10, 119.

[55]*Ocherki istorii* (1966), p. 445.

[56]See *Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1928, p. 3. Not until a year later (ibid., Nov. 18, 1929, p. 2) did Uglanov, Kotov, Mikhaylov, and Kulikov formally repudiate their views.

[57]In 1923–24, Bauman had been deputy chief of the Central Committee's personnel department, which was headed by L. M. Kaganovich but supervised by Molotov. For most of Bauman's term as head of the MK's personnel section (September 1924–April 1928), the CC secretary supervising this function was Molotov. In April 1928, after Molotov shifted his interests to agriculture, Bauman became head of the Secretariat's new rural department and Molotov's closest deputy. He followed Molotov to the MK that November.

[58]See the description of his role in the Politburo's commission on collectivization in A. M. Gak and I. I. Sanina, "Karl Yanovich Bauman," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 12, December 1967, pp. 103–04.

[59]L. Kozlova, *Moskovskiye kommunisty v bor'be za pobedu kolkhoznogo stroya, 1927–1933 gg.* (Moscow Communists in the Struggle for the Triumph of the Kolkhoz System, 1927–1933), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1960, pp. 20–21.

[60]*Ocherki istorii* (1966), pp. 466–67.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing purged and replaced by L. M. Kaganovich.[61]

It was not difficult to find locals eager to kick the fallen leader, as Polonskiy had done the year before. Addressing the next *oblast'* party conference, F. G. Leonov, who had supplanted Polonskiy as second secretary, said that both Bauman and Uglanov proved that "any attempt to set the Moscow organization apart from the CC inevitably leads . . . it to a separate line." The capital was not hewing to the higher standard expected of it. "The Moscow organization, located on the same territory as the CC, has turned out to be less connected with it than a whole lot of other party committees a good distance from Moscow." "Any attempt" by Moscow, Leonov continued, "to say 'more' than the CC or to say it 'better' can only end in the kind of error that has political significance in principle and consequences in practice."[62]

A Stalinist paragon. Kaganovich, the new boss, needed no coaching. He had been in league with Stalin since participating in the sovietization of Turkestan in 1920–21 (when Stalin was people's commissar of nationalities). When Stalin became general secretary in 1922, he made Kaganovich, at age 28, chief of the party's personnel section.[63] Kaganovich went on to be CC secretary in 1924–25, first secretary of Ukraine for three years, and, upon re-entering the Secretariat in July 1928, the scourge of rightists in the party and trade unions. By July 1930, upon his elevation to full member of the Politburo and Molotov's passage out of the Secretariat, Kaganovich became de facto second secretary of the party. He had Stalin's personal trust, to the extent anyone did, and was a frequent guest at Stalin's Kremlin flat and dachas. His five years in the Moscow *obkom*, which in 1931 was relocated next door to the CC building on Old Square, took it from disarray to a condition of unprecedented authority.[64]

Lazar Kaganovich seen as people's commissar for railways in 1936, shortly after relinquishing his duties in the Moscow party organization.

—Sovfoto.

Kaganovich's punishment of those tarred with the faults of his predecessors—and, up to a point, this included Molotov, a competitor for Stalin's favor—was not unprecedented.[65] Nor was he the first to place underlings in important positions elsewhere, although he may have done this with less enthusiasm than others (see Table 2). When political departments were formed at state farms and machine-tractor stations in 1933, Moscow's provision of one-third of the first 10,000 recruits was portrayed as routine stuff.[66]

One real departure was Kaganovich's packing of

[61]Bauman did not go without a fight. He "painted over [his] mistakes . . . and engaged in polemics against [other] members of the [*obkom*] plenum." *Pravda*, May 4, 1930, p. 4.

[62]Ibid., June 20, 1930, p. 5. At the party congress several weeks later, Bauman, without naming Leonov, dismissed as "nonsense" the charge that Moscow had pursued a separate line under him. *XVI s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy partii(b): Stenograficheskiy otchet* (16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [B]: Stenographic Report), Moscow and Leningrad, Ogiz, 1931, p. 215. Bauman lost his candidate's seat on the Politburo at the congress, but, surprisingly, remained one of five CC secretaries until the end of 1930. According to the account of a former party official (Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, *Tekhnologiya vlasti* [Technology of Power], Frankfurt, Posev, 1976, p. 325), Bauman stayed in Stalin's secret "cabinet" and was in charge of the daily operations of the Secretariat. The only explanation would be his protection by Molotov.

[63]Kaganovich was, by 1924, chairman of the caucus of party department heads. *Trinadtsatyy s"yezd Rossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy partii (bol'shevikov): Stenograficheskiy otchet* (13th Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik]: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Krasnaya nov', 1924, p. 137.

[64]Kaganovich had a prior interest in Moscow party affairs. While working in the Secretariat, he was appointed to the 1924, 1925, and 1929 Moscow committees. One of his former subordinates in Ukraine, I. L. Bulat, was made head of the MK's personnel section in April 1929 and third secretary in January 1930.

[65]For instance, Leonov, brought into the Moscow machine as a *raykom* secretary when Molotov ousted Uglanov, was relieved as *obkom* second secretary in July 1930 and sent to work in Siberia. Some officials with a tie to Molotov may have remained. See the reference to Bulganin in fn. 69 below.

[66]V. Markovich, "The Countryside Received a Mighty Detachment of Bolsheviks," *Partiynoye Stroitel'stvo* (Moscow), No. 13-14, July 1933, p. 63.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Moscow apparatus with cadres previously affiliated with him. N. S. Khrushchev, for one, had known Kaganovich since 1917 and had been a local secretary and deputy head of the Ukrainian party's personnel department under him before coming to Moscow to study in the new Industrial Academy. Plucked from the academy before graduation to clean up a wayward *raykom,* he was quickly promoted.[67] To run his personnel department, Kaganovich in 1930 picked G. M. Malenkov; the two had been acquainted since Turkestan and, in the CC apparatus, had collaborated in a 1925 purge of Moscow students and professors.[68] N. A. Bulganin, the new Moscow mayor, had been with Kaganovich in Turkestan and in 1919 in his native Nizhniy Novgorod, where Kaganovich had his first big position.[69]

Although the careers of Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Bulganin would soar the highest, they were not isolated cases. One can identify 21 other senior Moscow functionaries between 1930 and the Great Purge (11 of whom made it to *obkom* or *gorkom* secretary) who had earlier served with or under Kaganovich, several at two locations. Two had done so at Nizhniy Novgorod, one at Voronezh (in 1919–20), five in Turkestan, eight in the CC Secretariat in 1922–25 or 1928–30, and 11 in Ukraine.[70]

With such an entourage, and with his Kremlin star cresting, it was fitting that a Kaganovich cult would bloom. He was hailed not only as party chief (*vozhd'*) of Moscow, the only time this accolade was bestowed, but as "the best comrade-in-arms" (*luchshiy soratnik*) of Stalin. Kaganovich piled up national offices and honors: head of the CC's agriculture and transportation departments; superintendent of the 1933–34 party purge; chairman of the Party Control Commission in 1934–35. He gave the organizational report at the 1930 and 1934 party congresses and was often Stalin's troubleshooter in the provinces.

Kaganovich's and Moscow's influence was clearly communicated by another innovation: holding the capital up for admiration and imitation throughout the political system. Moscow was unique, one *obkom* official emphasized at the 17th Congress in 1934, in being "geographically close to comrade Stalin" and piloted by his worthiest disciple, Kaganovich. "Inculcating a Stalinist style of work from top to bottom and bottom to top, [we] have turned the Moscow organization into a forward column, a vanguard."[71]

Kaganovich's icy efficiency at resuming and completing farm collectivization was but one of many ways in which he and his machine were said to be a beacon to the party. His administrative techniques were extolled in article after article in *Partiynoye Stroitel'stvo*, the party's organizational journal. The explosion of heavy industry in Moscow, and the proliferation of new and upgraded factories (like the Stalin Automotive Works, the First Ball-bearing Works, and the Bobriki Chemical Combine) in the *oblast',* made it a veritable microcosm of the first two five-year plans. After becoming the seat of the Academy of Sciences in 1934, Moscow was Russia's main research laboratory as well.

Moscow acquired an almost mystical aura in Stalinist culture. In 1931, the Central Committee passed a special decree on its housing and municipal woes. When a master plan was adopted four years later, *Pravda* presented it as a yardstick: "As Moscow is rebuilt, so shall all the cities of our great Motherland be rebuilt."[72] Moscow was the chosen site of the greatest of Stalin's showcase projects, and the press often showed him, pharaoh-like, touring them with his aides. The opening of the Moscow subway in May 1935 was a national festival; it bore Kaganovich's name for twenty years. The Moscow-Volga Canal, dug between 1933 and 1937, was the

---

[67]On their early association, see *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott, New York, Bantam, 1971, pp. 29–36. Khrushchev writes (p. 33): "I was widely regarded as someone who had been very close to Kaganovich, and it's true, I had been."

[68]Avtorkhanov, who was a student in Moscow later in the 1920's, emphasizes their cooperation in the institute purge (*Tekhnologiya vlasti*, pp. 89–91).

[69]Although Bulganin clearly had these shared experiences with Kaganovich, Avtorkhanov (op. cit. pp. 644–45) maintains that he also received special protection from Molotov.

[70]These are the 21, with "N" in parentheses standing for service with Kaganovich in Nizhniy Novgorod, "V" for Voronezh, "T" for Turkestan, "CC" for Central Committee apparatus, and "U" for Ukraine:
N. V. Andreas'yan (CC), A. I. Bulushev (CC), N. Ye. Donenko (CC, U), N. A. Filatov (CC), G. N. Kaminskiy (CC), V. M. Klement'yev (T, U), Ye. S. Kogan (T), D. S. Korotchenko (U), S. Z. Korytnyi (U), N. V. Margolin (U), B. V. Margulis (U), I. P. Nosov (N, V), L. M. Perchik (U, CC), Ya. Kh. Peters (T), K. V. Ryndin (CC), K. F. Starostin (N, U), S. N. Tarasov (U), Ya. Ya. Tsirul' (CC), A. A. Volkov (T, U), S. B. Zadionchenko (U), and I. G. Zhuravlev (T). Donenko, who served as *obkom* secretary for transport in 1932–1933, had arguably held the most strategic positions, having been Kaganovich's assistant for party cadres in the Secretariat's personnel department in 1923–24 and head of the Ukrainian party's personnel section in 1928–29.
Biographies containing this information can be found for Nosov, Peters, and Ryndin in *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia—hereafter, *BSE*), 3rd ed., Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1970–1981. Only press references tell of Tsirul's experience; press biographies and obituaries were used for the rest: Andreas'yan, Donenko, Korytnyi, Margolin, and Volkov in *Rabochaya Moskva*, June 8, 1933, pp. 2–4; Filatov in ibid., Feb. 18, 1934, p. 2; Perchik and Tarasov in ibid., Mar. 14, 1935, p. 1; Margulis in ibid., May 27, 1933, p. 3; Kogan, Starostin, and Zhuravlev in *Vechernyaya Moskva* (Moscow), July 3, 1936, p. 1, Mar. 9, 1935, p. 1, and Mar. 17, 1936, p. 2; Bulushev and Klement'yev in *Izvestiya*, June 12, 1956, p. 4, and May 30, 1946, p. 4; Korotchenko in *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Apr. 8, 1969, p. 1; Kaminskiy and Zadionchenko in *Pravda*, July 27, 1930, p. 3, and Nov. 21, 1972, p. 3.

[71]*XVII s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii(b): Stenograficheskiy otchet* (17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [B]: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Partizdat, 1934, p. 102.

[72]*Pravda*, July 12, 1935, p. 1. See the stimulating discussion of Moscow in Vladimir Papernyy, *Kul'tura "dva"* (Culture "Two"), Ann Arbor, MI, Ardis, 1985, pp. 85–87.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second big undertaking (after the White Sea Canal) of the NKVD's (secret police's) convict labor force. The Palace of Soviets, which was sited in the shadow of the Kremlin, was begun but never finished. It was to have been the most mammoth structure in the world: taller than the Empire State Building and crowned by a figure of Lenin larger than the Statue of Liberty.

The 1935 transition from Kaganovich to Khrushchev, who had already been making many of the MK's decisions, was the first honorable retirement of anyone but a short-term Moscow first secretary since 1917. Malenkov, Kaganovich's cadres deputy, had left in 1934 for the strategic post of deputy head (to N. I. Yezhov, a rival of Kaganovich) and then head of the CC's personnel department.[73] Khrushchev, the first Moscow leader since 1923 not to be made a CC secretary, concentrated on local issues. Although neither he nor any subsequent boss was to equal Kaganovich in sheltering cronies, Khrushchev was able, among the Kaganovich clique, to give precedence to ex-Ukrainian administrators like himself, among them several whose careers had run in tandem to his own.[74]

From Purge to Purge

Untold numbers of Moscow officials were felled in 1937–38 on trumped-up charges of "counterrevolution" and "wrecking."[75] When it came to cheering on Yezhov and the NKVD, there was little to choose between Khrushchev and A. I. Ugarov, the Leningrader substituted for him in early 1938. Ugarov differed in being trapped in the terror. He was arrested without announcement in October 1938, and his job was given to A. S. Shcherbakov.

The Great Purge created winners, too, outside and inside the Moscow apparatus. As Ugarov enthused in May 1938, the party turned to Moscow for "people for the most responsible, the leading, the most important posts," including "not a few" transposed to other regions. "A year or a year-and-a-half ago . . . many of us would have doubted that it would have been possible for people to move so fast. This is what we call Bolshevik promotion . . . this really is the Moscow organization!" So great was the outflow, Ugarov acknowledged, that the Moscow organs "sometimes end up in a kind of 'impoverished' position."[76]

Table 2 shows the surge of Muscovites into external positions. Khrushchev (now the party viceroy in Ukraine) and Bulganin (RSFSR premier in July 1937) made huge strides, and both had their Moscow wards in tow.[77] The following of Malenkov, who became a CC secretary in 1939, appears to have been less personalized, but, as Stalin's right hand for cadres, he dispensed more patronage than the others.[78] Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Bulganin, all now emancipated from Kaganovich, were to enter the Politburo in 1939, 1946, and 1948.

For others, different connections or sheer luck were the ticket to success. Two Muscovites, besides Khrushchev, were dispatched as first secretaries of a union republic during the purge—A. A. Volkov, *gorkom* second secretary in 1937, went to Belorussia, and D. Z. Protopopov, a *raykom* first secretary, to Tadzhikistan.[79]

[73]Malenkov seems to have kept the close connection with the Moscow apparatus until after he replaced Yezhov. He was removed as candidate member of the *obkom* bureau only in March 1935.

[74]For instance, D. S. Korotchenko (whose name was Russified to Korotchenkov at the time) had been chairman of the Bauman *rayon* soviet in 1931, when Khrushchev was *raykom* secretary; he made it to second secretary of the *obkom* in 1936–37. S. B. Zadionchenko, another Bauman official, received major promotions in 1937 and later. S. Z. Korytnyi, who had worked in close proximity to Khrushchev in Kiev, was a department head in the Krasnaya Presnya *raykom* when Khrushchev was *raykom* first secretary in 1931–32; he became *obkom* secretary for ideological questions in 1936.

[75]Changes in party committees give a rough idea of the effect of the purge in Moscow. Of the 63 elected to the *gorkom* in May 1937, 10 were re-elected in June 1938, and I was able to trace eight to new positions; the other 45 (71 percent) were presumably purged. Of 64 on the 1937 *obkom*, eight were re-elected, 10 are known to have survived elsewhere, and 46 (72 percent) are unaccounted for.

[76]A. Ugarov, "Elections of Party Organs in the Moscow Organization," *Partiynoye Stroitel'stvo*, No. 9, May 1, 1938, pp. 15–19.

[77]Ex-Muscovites were to prosper with Khrushchev in Ukraine. Like him, most were originally brought to Moscow from Ukraine by Kaganovich. As early as March 1937, the Moscow second secretary (Margolin) took over the important Dnipropetrovsk *obkom*. His Moscow successor (Korotchenko) was briefly *obkom* boss in Smolensk (where a Moscow *rayon* mayor, R. Ye. Mel'nikov, was made mayor of the *oblast'* center), but by the end of 1937, Korotchenko replaced the purged Margolin in Dnipropetrovsk, and once Khrushchev arrived, Korotchenko became Ukrainian premier. A Moscow deputy mayor (K. S. Karavayev) became chairman of the Dnipropetrovsk *oblast'* soviet in 1938 (he was later a Ukrainian deputy premier), by which time, Zadionchenko of Moscow was first secretary there. Within several weeks of Bulganin's appointment as premier of the RSFSR, one Muscovite (Zadionchenko) had become deputy premier and another (I. N. Kuznetsov) head of his chancery.

[78]One who seemed especially reliant on him was F. F. Kuznetsov, the *raykom* first secretary who rose in 1938 to chief of the cadres department of the army's political directorate (a department in Malenkov's sphere). P. I. Seleznev, Malenkov's subordinate in the Moscow *obkom* and CC department, was designated first secretary of the important Krasnodar *kraykom* in 1939. Although it is impossible to tell whether personal loyalty was involved, Malenkov was the ranking party official in the cadres realm when 12 Moscow officials were named provincial first secretaries in 1937–38. Other Muscovites made spectacular leaps at this time—for instance, V. V. Luk'yanov, the deputy head of a *raykom* department, in 1938 became second secretary of the Kirov *obkom*, and in 1940 first secretary. The best biographies of Kuznetsov, Seleznev, and Luk'yanov are in *Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976–80, Vol. 4, p. 512; and *Pravda*, Mar. 9, 1949, p. 4, and Oct. 28, 1958, p. 4.

(Fn. 79 is on page 43.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A. G. Zverev, first secretary of the Molotov *raykom,* caught Stalin's eye in 1937 with a report to the party cell of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which was located in his district. The report earned him an audience with Stalin, who on the spot made him deputy commissar of finance of the USSR and, four months later, commissar (minister), a job he kept until 1960.[80] The new man in the *raykom,* S. G. Yemel'yanov, soon found himself deputy commissar of heavy industry.[81]

After the Great Purge, Moscow's senior status in the party continued to be recognized, albeit more ritualistically and with more slavish deference to Stalin. "The Moscow organization," first secretary Shcherbakov allowed at the 18th Congress in 1939, "finds itself in a superior position in the sense that Muscovites work in the city where comrade Stalin lives and works."[82] In 1947, a similar tone would pervade the lavish celebration of the 800th anniversary of the founding of Moscow.

In terms of appointments, Muscovites' advances were less bold after 1938. Besides Malenkov, the only ones to make it onto the Secretariat before 1953 were the dual-appointed first secretaries (Shcherbakov, G. M. Popov, and Khrushchev in his second term). Only B. N. Chernousov was made head of a CC department, the crucial personnel section (November 1948–March 1949).

Nevertheless, Moscow was still held to have special rights and obligations in staffing. It was cited during and after World War II as the party's main human reserve or, more fulsomely, its "forge of cadres" (*kuznitsa kadrov*). Like all civilian units, Moscow mobilized personnel for the war effort. Shcherbakov himself added command of the political directorate of the armed forces to his duties in June 1942. By one reckoning, in wartime the *gorkom* alone placed about 5,000 party members in "leading work," not only in Ukraine, but in the army, the police and foreign services, and "other organizations."[83]

Alumni of the Moscow organization, the city second secretary wrote in 1947, were to be found in "numerous . . . state-wide posts . . . and in all *oblasti,* territories, and republics."[84] In 1949, Popov disclosed that since the war the *obkom* and *gorkom* had sent more than 5,000 persons "to various sectors of socialist construction" outside the organization (out of the 40,000 given administrative appointments). Former comrades were "in leading work in the party CC, secretaries of party *obkomy* and of central committees of the national communist parties, ministers and deputy ministers, and [other] major state and party posts."[85] As the nod to "national" parties connotes, many were posted outside the RSFSR, especially in newly-annexed territories.[86]

Even today, mystery shrouds the high politics of the Moscow party in the late Stalin period. What is indisputable is that Shcherbakov, the moon-faced alcoholic whose term as Moscow boss was the longest to date, was a protégé of A. A. Zhdanov, Malenkov's main rival among the national party secretaries. Shcherbakov launched his career as a district secretary and propaganda specialist in Zhdanov's Nizhniy Novgorod regional committee in 1924–30. When Zhdanov later took charge of Soviet cultural policy, Shcherbakov was a key enforcer, serving jointly from 1934 to 1936 as head of the CC's culture department and secretary of the Union of Writers. Shcherbakov was then Zhdanov's second secretary in Leningrad in 1936–37, spending only a year away from him (in Siberia and the Donbass) before being handed the Moscow post. It was appropriate that, upon Shcherbakov's premature death in May 1945, his personal assistant went to work for Zhdanov.[87]

---

[79]Protopopov's earlier service in the secret police may have facilitated his promotion. Volkov in the late 1920's worked in Nizhniy Novgorod under A. A. Zhdanov, who was a CC secretary by 1937 and Malenkov's main rival. Volkov was purged in 1938, but Protopopov lasted in Tadzhikistan until 1946. Volkov followed a long line of Muscovites in Belorussia. The 1932–37 first secretary, N. F. Gikalo, had been a Moscow *obkom* and *gorkom* secretary before 1932. Two Moscow veterans (V. G. Knorin and A. I. Krinitskiy) headed the organization in the 1920's. The Belorussian leader in 1930–32, K. V. Gey, served as a Moscow secretary for the next two years.

[80]A. G. Zverev, "On Some Aspects of the History of the Soviet Financial System," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), No. 2, February 1969, pp. 139–40.

[81]Yemel'yanov's biography, which does not identify the *raykom* he was in, is in *Moskovskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 5, 1962, p. 4.

[82]*XVIII s"yezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy partii(b): Stenograficheskiy otchet* (18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [B]: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1939, p. 70.

[83]*Boyevoy otryad srazhayushcheysya partii: Moskovskaya partiynaya organizatsiya v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny* (Military Detachment of the Fighting Party: The Moscow Party Organization in the Great Fatherland War), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1985, p. 393.

[84]I. Parfenov, "The Bolsheviks of the Capital in the Struggle for the Socialist Reconstruction of Moscow," *Partiynaya Zhizn',* No. 16, August 1947, p. 29.

[85]*Moskovskiy Bol'shevik* (Moscow), Feb. 2, 1949, p. 6.

[86]I have found biographies of 12 Moscow officials transferred outside the RSFSR to a wide range of positions between June 1941 and March 1953. In Ukraine, A. N. Aleksandrov was made an instructor in the CC's machine-building department, and A. P. Mironov became secretary of the Cherkassy *gorkom* (see *Pravda Ukrainy,* May 18, 1973, p. 4, and *Pravda,* July 6, 1961, p. 4). A. S. Yakovlev was appointed Kazakhstan CC secretary for cadres, and I. Ye. Shmelkov became first secretary of the Alma-Ata *gorkom* (*Moskovskaya Pravda,* Oct. 1, 1966, p. 4, and *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* [Alma Ata], Mar. 20, 1970, p. 4). Eight went to the Baltic republics: A. N. Isachenko as secretary of the Lithuanian CC and L. D. Novozhilov as a CC organizer (*Pravda,* Jan. 4, 1949, p. 4, and *Moskovskaya Pravda,* Mar. 20, 1985, p. 4); I. S. Yashin as deputy head of the Estonian CC's cadres section and K. S. Mikheyev as second secretary of a district committee (*Moskovskiy Bol'shevik,* July 13, 1947, p. 4, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* [Moscow], July 21, 1968, p. 4); and, in Latvia, K. A. Novikov as second secretary of the Riga *gorkom,* A. G. Kukain and I. V. Tikhvinskiy as officials of the republican CC, and V. A. Shmidt as head of the municipal bank (*Pravda,* Nov. 10, 1974, p. 4, and *Sovetskaya Latviya* [Riga], June 19, 1956, p. 4, Mar. 7, 1969, p. 4, and Feb. 23, 1965, p. 4).

(Fn. 87 is on page 44.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Shcherbakov's death spared him the infighting over Zhdanov's rather moderate ideological approach, which worsened after Zhdanov's own death in August 1948 and climaxed in the "Leningrad affair." In 1948–49 Malenkov and L. P. Beria, overseer of the secret police, attacked Zhdanov's Leningrad base and had a number of important Zhdanovites executed.[88] In Moscow, Shcherbakov's heir, Popov, went at first unscathed, but in December 1949 he was unseated on Stalin's orders. He was replaced by Khrushchev, who had returned from Kiev to be first secretary of the Moscow *obkom* (and to purge it) and a CC secretary.

What did this "Moscow affair" have to do with the more notorious Leningrad case? Scholars have believed that Popov's ties ran via his predecessor Shcherbakov to Zhdanov, and that his fall was a last act of Malenkov's anti-Zhdanov purge.[89] This interpretation is almost certainly mistaken.

Stalin may in his own mind have bracketed Popov with the derelict Leningraders. In his memoirs, Khrushchev depicts Stalin as more than usually querulous about the Moscow leadership by 1949, and as being incited by an anonymous denunciation of Popov which drew on the paranoia generated by the Leningrad purge.[90] Beyond this, in that it underplays both Khrushchev's role and Malenkov's Moscow connections, the case for a simple coupling of the two scandals breaks down. In the tape recordings from which his memoirs were assembled, Khrushchev says that Stalin had in 1938 invited him back from Ukraine as "plenipotentiary (*upolnomochennyy*) of the Central Committee" to help settle the succession to the arrested Ugarov, and that he himself favored Shcherbakov's candidacy at the time.[91] More to the point, the tapes divulge that Malenkov was behind the rise of Popov. An aviation engineer without party experience, Popov in 1938 went straight from graduation from the Industrial Academy to instructor in Malenkov's CC personnel department.[92] In November 1938, he was made (*gorkom*) second secretary to Shcherbakov. "Malenkov promoted him," Khrushchev relates; this was after Stalin admonished that the job should go to someone "who would watch [things] and, if there were any incident, report to the CC."

Popov, in other words, arrived in the Moscow apparatus as a Malenkov-affiliated spy on Shcherbakov, the Zhdanovite chief. Nothing suggests that his ties with Malenkov slackened after he stepped into Shcherbakov's shoes in 1945. His cross-appointment to the CC Secretariat in March 1946 gave the impression of a careful offset to the promotion of a Zhdanov ally at the same time.[93] In Moscow, Popov got rid of many Shcherbakov appointees (including seven of eight *obkom* and *gorkom* secretaries). He favored officials from the *gorkom* (his sphere until 1945) over those from the *obkom* and also persons with experience related to aviation, the industry where he was trained and that Malenkov had supervised in wartime.[94]

Circumstantial evidence links Malenkov to another

---

[87]According to his obituary (*Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1947, p. 4), A. N. Krapivin worked after Shcherbakov's death as "assistant to a secretary of the CC." The secretary could only have been Zhdanov, because he signed the obituary first. If the bond between Shcherbakov and Zhdanov is obvious, their relations with other senior figures are not always so. For example, Shcherbakov in 1920–21 worked in Turkestan, where many later clients of Kaganovich—one of them, Malenkov—also worked. As a junior CC official, Malenkov wrote an article on party work in Nizhniy Novgorod detailed enough to suggest firsthand knowledge (in *Izvestiya TsK*, No. 38 [113], Oct. 5, 1925, pp. 6–7).

[88]The best study of this period is Werner G. Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation 1946–53*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982.

[89]Hahn (ibid., p. 40) sees Popov as "an apparent ally of Zhdanov." Robert Conquest in his classic book *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession, 1945–1960* (London, Macmillan 1960, p. 100) describes the affair as an attack on "some rather less close associates of Zhdanov's, through his ally Shcherbakov . . . in the Moscow party machine."

[90]*Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 262–66.

[91]"Oral Memoirs of Nikita S. Khrushchev" (Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York, NY), Part II, p. 162. Soviet newspapers placed Khrushchev in Moscow at the end of October 1938, and it was on October 30 that Shcherbakov first appeared as Moscow leader. Khrushchev says he later came to view Shcherbakov as an ignoramus and to regret having supported him.

In the tapes, Khrushchev is warm toward Ugarov, who, he says, was nominated for the Moscow position by Zhdanov of Leningrad (a curious thing, because Ugarov was a holdover from Kirov's days in Leningrad). Khrushchev admits to no role in Ugarov's demise, but one public reference to his Moscow mission portrayed him as in complicity. A Moscow delegate to the 18th Congress in 1939 stated that the previous autumn the "dregs of humanity" (Ugarov and company, apparently) had sabotaged food and fuel deliveries in Moscow and that Khrushchev ("one of the best Stalinists, a marvellous organizer, our own Muscovite") had been summoned from Ukraine to "uproot the enemies with an iron hand." See *XVIII s"yezd*, p. 557.

[92]The major biographies of Popov say only that he worked "in the apparatus of the CC" in 1938, but one early portrait (*Moskovskiy Bol'shevik*, Nov. 11, 1939, p. 2) is explicit about his having been an instructor in Malenkov's department.

[93]The Zhdanov client was A. A. Kuznetsov, his successor as first secretary of the Leningrad *obkom*.

[94]For example, A. Ya. Sekachev, who had been in the aviation industry and was first secretary of a Moscow *rayon* rich in aviation facilities, was made *obkom* secretary for cadres in June 1948. The *gorkom* secretary for industry from June 1945 onward was N. P. Firyubin, who had a similar background. The new *obkom* second secretary after Chernousov was S. A. Zholnin, formerly director of a defense plant and the *gorkom*'s personnel secretary. O. V. Kozlova, a Moscow *raykom* secretary, was made *obkom* propaganda secretary in July 1946, replacing a Shcherbakov protégé.

Some of those removed by Popov experienced precipitate demotions. M. I. Malakhov, Sekachev's predecessor, was made a low-ranking official of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan); I know of his survival only from his signature on obituaries in the 1960's. V. K. Pavlyukov, who in wartime was *gorkom* secretary for food supply and later (after Popov) was briefly second secretary, vanished after being appointed USSR deputy minister of trade. A death notice ten years later (*Moskovskaya Pravda*, Nov. 14, 1956, p. 4) listed his last post as a humble one—chief of repairs of Moscow's bakeries.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Nikita Khrushchev, a prominent party leader in Moscow and Ukraine before rising to become first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

important actor—Chernousov, second secretary of the Moscow *obkom* since 1939, and thus Popov's counterpart until June 1945 and deputy after that. Chernousov was designated chief of the CC's personnel department in late 1948, when Malenkov must have had the main say in the decision.[95] In the spring of 1949, he was given another major appointment: chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, a post newly vacated by a client of Zhdanov, M. I. Rodionov, who was about to be arrested and shot with Malenkov's connivance.

In all likelihood, then, the housecleaning that Khrushchev did upon his return to Moscow was aimed as much at Malenkov allies, Popov included, as at the lingering clients of Shcherbakov and Zhdanov.[96] It was a kind of rehearsal for the struggle between Khrushchev and Malenkov for Stalin's mantle. Of Popov's eight fellow secretaries in the *obkom* and *gorkom,* five were cashiered in Khrushchev's first month, the remaining three by the spring of 1951. The last to go was the *gorkom* propaganda secretary, N. N. Danilov, a Leningrader and the only survivor from Shcherbakov's day. The sweep was extended to the lower party apparatus and the Moscow soviet (Popov had also been mayor since 1944). Muscovites in external agencies were also affected.[97]

Khrushchev's purge was noteworthy in two respects. First, it was non-lethal, the antithesis of the Leningrad affair. Steep as the demotions were, many amounting to virtual banishment, few people were killed.[98] Second, Khrushchev soon acted as if dissatisfied with some of the results—conspicuously, with his two top deputies, the *gorkom* first secretary (I. I. Rumyantsev) and the *obkom* second secretary (V. P. Alekseyev). Both were shortly to be supervened, Rumyantsev by a local candidate (I. V. Kapitonov) and Alekseyev by a follower of Khrushchev's from Ukraine (Z. F. Oleynik).[99]

It is the jousting between Khrushchev and Malenkov that makes these features of the purge understandable. Its leniency, as Khrushchev boasted in his memoirs, did owe something to his personal compassion, but Malenkov's continuing interest in the beleaguered Popov group would have helped stay Khrushchev's hand in any case.[100] Khrushchev's need to make reappointments to key posts also bears witness to tacit or even explicit bargaining with Malenkov. Only as Khrushchev gained strength could he swing things in his favor.[101] As late as September 1952, he was speaking so acidly

[95]At least one Muscovite, G. N. Kotel'nikov, first secretary of Bauman *raykom,* followed Chernousov into the department as head of a sector (ibid., July 30, 1950, p. 4).

[96]Khrushchev himself seems to have had some surviving friends in the organization. He states in his oral history, for example, that he knew M. A. Yasnov before the war and promoted him from deputy mayor to mayor in 1950. Yasnov was in charge of constructing Moscow's river embankments up to 1938. "Oral Memoirs," Part II, pp. 1203–04.

[97]For example, Chernousov, the Malenkov man in the RSFSR Council of Ministers, was removed in November 1952, presumably at Khrushchev's behest, and was thereafter to hold only minor jobs (see his obituary in *Moskovskaya Pravda,* Jan. 3, 1978, p. 3). The wartime mayor of Moscow, V. P. Pronin (who, as head of the *gorkom*'s personnel department in 1938, must have worked hand in glove with Malenkov) was dropped from his most recent position (minister of labor reserves) in the spring of 1953. He was never identified in an official position again, but received an award on his 80th birthday in 1985.

[98]I know from obituaries and other data of the fates of seven of the eight secretaries. Two, Zholnin and Sekachev of the *obkom,* became industrial managers. Two *gorkom* secretaries, I. M. Kolotyrkin and Firyubin, became deputy mayors of Moscow, with Firyubin later experiencing a long second career as a diplomat; another, I. A. Parfenov, was given a lesser municipal position. Kozlova, the *obkom* propaganda secretary, became an academic, eventually director of a major management institute. Danilov, her counterpart in the *gorkom,* was made deputy head of the government's radio committee, later deputy minister of culture. This leaves only the *obkom* third secretary, N. F. Solov'yev, unaccounted for.

[99]Oleynik had been head of the Kiev *oblast'* soviet since 1943 (*Pravda,* Oct. 17, 1951, p. 4).

[100]Khrushchev describes in his memoirs (*Khrushchev Remembers,* p. 265) how he and Malenkov connived at getting Popov a safe appointment as a factory manager in Kuybyshev. This in fact occurred in 1951, Popov in the interim having been head of two minor government ministries.

(Fn. 101 is on page 46.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of abuses in personnel selection as to convey unease over the extent of his control.[102]

Transition under Khrushchev

The years when Khrushchev was CPSU first secretary were of mixed benefit to the Moscow organization he had so recently led. On the one hand, they brought a wealth of work opportunities and an ebbing of fear and suspicion. On the other hand, seeds of decline were sown, most to be harvested later.

It was tribute to Moscow's prior eminence that among the ten members of the first Politburo (Presidium) after Stalin's death were four whose careers either culminated in its apparatus in the 1930's (Kaganovich) or took off there (Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Malenkov). A fifth and sixth had more tangential Moscow links: Molotov (briefly first secretary in the 1920's) and M. G. Pervukhin (once chief engineer of the Moscow power grid). Although this commonality just might have softened discord within the ruling group, it did not prevent Khrushchev from jettisoning all the other ex-Muscovites when he consolidated his power in 1957–58.[103]

As in the 1920's, the Moscow organization itself played a large role in the succession. It is probable that Khrushchev was not secure here until the spring of 1954. N. A. Mikhaylov, head of Stalin's Komsomol (youth league) and generally thought an ally of Malenkov, lasted only until then as *obkom* first secretary. He gave way to Kapitonov, while Ye. A. Furtseva, Khrushchev's choice as *gorkom* second secretary, was moved up to city first secretary. Furtseva was soon to be the first woman on the Politburo.

The Moscow apparatus was of no small assistance in Khrushchev's bid for national power. It had some utility as a check on senior state administrators—a group over whom Khrushchev, situated in the party, had few direct levers. This function had never been much emphasized in the past. Beginning in 1950, before Stalin's death, the Moscow *gorkom* and *raykomy* were instructed to monitor bureaucratic efficiency and loyalty through the party committees lodged in the headquarters of the government ministries. Furtseva made this one of her pet projects.[104]

More straightforward was Moscow's participation in the assertion of control over Stalin's police apparatus. In 1952, the first secretary of a Moscow *raykom* (V. I. Stepakov) was made deputy chief of the Ministry of State Security's (MGB's) Moscow office, one surmises as a watchdog for Khrushchev. Two other *raykom* secretaries in sequence (A. N. Nikiforov and V. I. Ustinov) acted as secretary of the party committee of the reunified Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), then of the separate Committee of State Security (KGB), from 1953 to 1957. Another Muscovite, K. F. Lunev, was made first deputy head of the MVD in 1953 (he sat on the panel that tried Beria in December of that year), then served five years as deputy chief of the KGB. Yet another, N. P. Dudorov, was Khrushchev's minister of Internal Affairs from 1956 to 1960 and presided over the dismantling of most of the Gulag labor camps and the legal rehabilitation of many victims of Stalin.[105]

Moscow remained a prime talent pool for Khrushchev and his leadership. Suggestive is that it supplied almost as many CC department heads in 1953–64 as in all other periods combined. Nine of the 12 were promoted after 1960. One Moscow high flyer with experience in party liaison with the ministries, P. N. Demichev, was Khrushchev's pick as head of chancery (*upravlyayushchiy*

[101]This applies particularly well to Rumyantsev, whose background was almost identical (aviation industry, first secretary of Leningrad *raykom*) to that of Sekachev, Popov's cadres secretary, whom Khrushchev sacked in January 1950. Rumyantsev was rusticated to the unimportant Velikiye Luki *obkom* in September 1952.

[102]See Khrushchev's remarks to the *oblast'* party conference in *Pravda*, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 2.

[103]On the Moscow affiliation, see *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 338, where Khrushchev talks of his relations with Malenkov in the early 1950's: "I had been friends with Malenkov since the days when I worked in the Moscow organization before the war. We often spent our days off together. We had dachas near each other in the country. Therefore, even though Malenkov showed a certain amount of condescension toward me during the war, especially when Stalin displayed his dissatisfaction with me, Malenkov and I never had a falling out." Khrushchev also states (pp. 408–09) that it was Bulganin who suggested in 1953 that Khrushchev be made CPSU first secretary.

[104]In late 1951, the *gorkom* held a special plenum devoted to the work of the party committees in the ministries, with Furtseva summing up the discussion. For this and subsequent statements by her and others, see *Pravda*, Dec. 9, 1951, p. 2; Jan. 26, 1952, p. 2; July 18, 1952, p. 2; and Sept. 19, 1952, p. 2.

[105]The careers of Lunev and Dudorov can readily be traced from press references, but not those of the three other men. Lunev was head of the Moscow *obkom*'s administrative organs department before moving to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Dudorov was deputy mayor of Moscow in 1952–54, then head of the CC's construction department for the two years prior to taking over the MVD. Of the several official biographies of Stepakov, only those in the *Yezhegodnik* (Yearbook) of the *BSE* mention his KGB position. Nikiforov, who came out of the same *raykom* (Pervomayskiy) as Stepakov, is said to have been party secretary in the MVD and KGB in 1953–54 (see his obituary in *Moskovskaya Pravda*, June 23, 1972, p. 4). The Ustinov biography in *BSE*, 2nd ed., Moscow, Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1949–1958, Vol. 51, pp. 300–01, mentions that he was in "leading work in the KGB" from 1953 to December 1957 (strictly speaking, the KGB dates from 1954). I was told in interviews that his position was secretary of the KGB's party committee; he must have held a lesser office until Nikiforov's 1954 return to local party work (as first secretary in Dzerzhinskiy *rayon*, in which the KGB is located). Another Muscovite, A. G. Yakovlev (formerly first secretary of the Stalin *raykom*), was in "leading work" in the MVD in 1957–60 (see *Moskovskaya Pravda*, June 1, 1968, p. 4).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

delami) of the Council of Ministers when Khrushchev replaced Bulganin as chairman in 1958; Demichev eventually returned as first secretary of the Moscow *obkom* and, in 1960, of the *gorkom*. K. P. Chernyayev, another Moscow man, was given the same delicate job in Khrushchev's party office in 1962.[106]

In the economy, Muscovites gained prominence in construction, the sector in which Moscow, following Khrushchev's recipe of mechanization and standardization, was national leader. Moscow executives dominated the building industry into the 1960's.[107] More generally, the leaders often looked to the capital to staff the innovative agencies, new and old, that were to execute Khrushchev's reforms. When they sought reinvigoration of the trade unions in 1956, the *obkom*'s second secretary, Grishin, was given charge of the union federation.[108] When a national manpower agency (the State Labor Committee) was founded around the same time, A. P. Volkov from the *oblast'* soviet was commissioned to head it.[109] The administrator mainly responsible for implementation of the school reform of the late 1950's was the former ideological secretary of the Moscow *gorkom*, Ye. I. Afanasenko.[110]

Moscow was also front and center in the organization overhauls that marked the late Khrushchev period and hastened his downfall. Muscovites cropped up in the pygmy departments issuing from the subdivision of CC departments along territorial and branch lines.[111] When Khrushchev tried in 1962 to offset decentralization by setting up "Central Committee bureaus" for Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, both were turned over to Moscow politicians.[112] Others from Moscow were recruited by the Party-State Control Committee, the new super-inspectorate.[113]

If all this told of the Moscow organization's abiding importance, other signs, little recognized at the time, were less auspicious. Of most moment was Moscow's receding role in high politics. Khrushchev's Moscow connections were rich, but his larger Ukrainian entourage, built up over a longer period and with less interference from rivals, clearly counted for more. It weighed far more heavily in the struggle to succeed him. Unlike Khrushchev in 1953, the winner in 1964, L. I. Brezhnev, was to have no Moscow vassals.

For unknown reasons, the main promotee from Moscow, Furtseva, quickly lost favor. Lowered from CC secretary to minister of culture in May 1960, she was dropped from the Presidium in 1961. Her successor, Ustinov (out of the KGB's party committee), was sacked without explanation in July 1960, perhaps as an offshoot of her demotion. Khrushchev's former assistant, Demichev, shunted from the *obkom* to replace him, was to be cross-appointed to the CC Secretariat in 1961–62 and then switched to full-time work there. N. V. Yegorychev, who took his place, had standing in neither the Secretariat nor the Presidium.

A complicating factor was the new relationship between city and regional organs of the Moscow party. The

[106]Demichev was once *raykom* secretary in the then Sovetskiy *rayon*, a zone north and west of the Kremlin containing many government offices. Interestingly, he and others were criticized for inadequate contact with the ministries (*Moskovskaya Pravda*, Apr. 2, 1950, p. 3). He moved from the Moscow *gorkom* to the CC apparatus around the time of Khrushchev's promotion to CPSU first secretary, then was a secretary of the Moscow *obkom* in 1956–58. Chernyayev was a Moscow *gorkom* secretary in 1950–52. As no biography is available, his whereabouts up to 1962 are unknown.

[107]Dudorov was the founding head of the CC's construction department in 1954–56. Two other Moscow officials headed this department under Khrushchev (V. P. Abyzov in 1961–64 and A. Ye. Biryukov in 1964–67), another (K. N. Butuzova) was a deputy head, and I have identified five others who held lesser posts. When the State Construction Committee (Gosstroy) was upgraded in 1955 and its chief made a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the first appointee was V. A. Kucherenko, the deputy mayor of Moscow for construction. His main deputy was V. I. Svetlichnyi, a Moscow subordinate. V. F. Promyslov, a Moscow construction specialist (and future mayor), was chairman of the RSFSR Gosstroy from 1959 to 1963, and the city's chief architect, M. V. Posokhin, was concurrently chief of Gosstroy's civil construction arm (Gosgrazhdanstroy) after 1963. A. E. Etmekdzhiyan, from Moscow's building-materials industry, was made first deputy chairman for construction of Gosplan in 1962.

[108]A Moscow *gorkom* secretary, V. I. Prokhorov, had been given the second-ranking position in the unions in 1955, and was to remain there for 30 years.

[109]Volkov was a secretary of the Moscow *obkom* in 1950–52, when Khrushchev was first secretary. The State Labor Committee was chaired briefly by Kaganovich before Volkov became chairman. I. V. Goroshkin, a former secretary of the Moscow *gorkom* who was transferred to the trade unions in 1949, was first deputy chairman of the committee from its establishment to 1959 and then deputy chairman until his retirement in 1977. He was succeeded as first deputy by a former colleague of Volkov's in Moscow *oblast'*, S. S. Novozhilov.

[110]Afanasenko was RSFSR minister of education from 1956 to 1966, there being then no USSR-wide school ministry. He was obviously dependent on Furtseva, the CC secretary supervising education until 1960. He had been head of the education department of Frunze *rayon* of Moscow in the late 1940's, when Furtseva was first secretary in that *rayon*; he succeeded her as *raykom* boss in 1950; and then was head of the *gorkom*'s personnel department and *gorkom* secretary when she was *gorkom* first secretary.

[111]For example, when four "ideological departments" were created in 1963 (for the agricultural and industrial branches in the RSFSR, and for those two branches in all the other republics) both RSFSR departments were headed by Moscow men: Stepakov, who had since 1961 been head of a CC department (for agriculture) and M. I. Khaldeyev, a *raykom* first secretary (for industry). Two ex-*raykom* first secretaries, Ye. M. Chekharin and V. A. D'yakov, headed other CC departments for the RSFSR in 1962–63 (for science and administrative organs respectively). D. A. Polikarpov, a former *gorkom* secretary, had been head of the CC's culture department since 1955; his title, but not his function, varied during 1963–64.

[112]The Central Asian bureau was chaired by V. G. Lomonosov, a *raykom* first secretary, and the bureau for the Transcaucasus was chaired by G. M. Bochkarev, the *gorkom* secretary for industry. I have identified two other Moscow men who worked in the latter bureau.

[113]I have biographical information on five *raykom* secretaries who moved directly onto the committee's staff, and I was told in interviews that many lesser officials joined them. Some remained in the People's Control Committee after 1965.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yekaterina Furtseva, a Moscow city party leader who became the first woman on the CPSU Politburo but later was demoted to minister of culture.

—Sovfoto.

motives behind the February 1956 segregation of *gorkom* from *obkom* remain obscure. The technical demands of managing so large a local unit may have affected the decision, but one can only infer from the silence enveloping it that political calculations were also involved. It would be remarkable if there had been no intramural debate.[114] The short-term ascent of Furtseva clouded the long-term effect: what had hitherto been an integrated organization, with a single boss, was now a pair of smaller organizations, with two leaders. One, the *gorkom* first secretary, was senior but not superior to the other, and was thus inferior, in terms of practical responsibilities and span of control, to previous Moscow bosses. Notwithstanding Demichev's 1960 hop from *obkom* to *gorkom,* city and *oblast'* were now uncoupled to a surprising degree when it came to careers and decision-making.[115]

To worsen matters, the rump *obkom* was torn in 1959 by a spat bad enough to spark intervention from above. Both Kapitonov, the first secretary since 1954, and N. F. Ignatov, chairman of the *oblast'* soviet, were fired in March 1959 and sent, after a delay, to provincial party posts. By the official account, "incorrect and unparty-like relations" had taken shape between them, "which took up a great deal of their time to the detriment of business." The case was an affront to "Leninist principles" of cadres selection and control of leaders.[116] It is hard to see how this affair could not have made ripples in the newly separated city organization.[117]

More subtle trends were also starting to affect the Moscow organization under Khrushchev. One had to do with bureaucratic staffing. Although, as has been documented, individual Muscovites retained access to the all-Union elite, mass recruitment from city party officials seems to have ended in the late 1950's. The Soviets no longer spoke of placements by the thousands or of Moscow as a "forge of cadres."[118]

Moscow also lost some if not all of its symbolic status. A signal of this actually predated Khrushchev: the party

[114]Although there was no public comment about the split of the party committees, a year later some did criticize the decision—taken as part of Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* reform—to make Moscow a separate economic region from its *oblast'*. One Konovalov, the director of a machinery plant on the outskirts of Moscow, proposed to the Moscow *obkom* that a single *sovnarkhoz* be created. According to an account in *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* Apr. 13, 1957, p. 2: "Participants in the plenum met with applause the words of comrade Konovalov when he said: 'Moscow and Moscow *oblast'* have always been in their historic and economic development a single economic region.' "

[115]Besides Demichev, only one other *obkom* or *gorkom* secretary crossed over to the other committee after 1956. This was Biryukov, who in 1959 moved from the *gorkom* (where he was head of the construction department) to be *obkom* secretary for construction. He returned to the *gorkom* in 1960 as secretary for construction, spent 1964 to 1971 in the CC apparatus and RSFSR government, then finished his career in the construction bureaucracy of the Moscow soviet. Since 1958, Moscow *oblast'* has had a separate daily newspaper, *Leninskoye Znamya,* leaving *Moskovskaya Pravda* and *Vechernyaya Moskva* as strictly city newspapers.

[116]"Educate Cadres in the Spirit of High Exactingness," *Partiynaya Zhizn',* No. 8, April 1959, pp. 10–11.

[117]Kapitonov and Ignatov both started their careers at the district level in Moscow city. Ignatov was head of the *gorkom*'s personnel department when Kapitonov was first secretary (1952–54), then was made an *obkom* secretary when Kapitonov moved to the *obkom*. Their falling out may have occurred in 1956, when Ignatov was reduced from *obkom* second secretary to chairman of the *oblast'* soviet. It is of interest that Ustinov, the *gorkom* boss demoted in 1960, was first secretary in 1950–51 of the Krasnaya Presnya *raykom,* in which Kapitonov worked for five years in the 1940's.

(Fn. 118 is on p. 49.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

daily, *Pravda,* ceased to be co-published by the Moscow organization in October 1952.[119] While still given more media play than any other locality, Moscow was starting to be treated less simplistically and reverentially. Its showcase projects were sharply cut back, and the most colossal of them all, the Palace of Soviets, was finally canceled after its long history of engineering and organizational snags.

Another trend was a by-product of Khrushchev's erratic cultural thaw. Moscow's party organs had always watched over cultural activity in the city, but their role was enhanced under Khrushchev by the abandonment of terror and the greater independence among the intelligentsia after de-Stalinization. Demichev in 1961 sounded the alarm about modernism and nonconformism more strongly than any previous spokesman: "A big share of the responsibility for the state of our literature and art lies with the party organization of the capital." The *gorkom* has "recently begun to concern itself more with the activity of the creative unions," which is "only a beginning."[120] These were prophetic words. The Moscow party apparatus was to be drawn more and more into meddling in cultural politics and into the conservative state of mind that justified such meddling throughout the Brezhnev era.

The Grishin Machine

The three Moscow party chiefs after Khrushchev's fall in 1964 were each to come to grief, though under varying circumstances. Yegorychev, the first, was by all accounts too abrasive and ambitious for General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. Well-informed scholars in Moscow have said that he took issue with Brezhnev's de-em-



Viktor Grishin, first secretary of the Moscow city party committee and a member of the CPSU Politburo, speaking in February 1985.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

phasis of the housing problem. He is also reported to have criticized Soviet policy in the Middle East at a Central Committee meeting in June 1967. But the worst mark against him was probably his affiliation with a rival to Brezhnev on the Politburo, A. N. Shelepin, who was about to be pushed off the CC Secretariat.[121] There is no doubt about the links between the two. Yegorychev cut his political teeth in the Komsomol in the late 1940's, when Shelepin was its second secretary. His expressed opinions were much like Shelepin's—assertive in foreign policy, intolerant of dissent, less hidebound on the economy. And the officials demoted after his dismissal were mostly those who resembled him and Shelepin in background.[122]

[118]The last reference I have found to large-scale staffing is Furtseva's statement in 1956 that in the preceding two years, some 3,450 residents of Moscow were recruited for rural administration (in collective farms, machine-tractor stations, and the like). More than 22,000 Muscovites had departed for the Virgin Lands, but one can assume that mostly it was to menial and temporary work. *Moskovskaya Pravda,* Jan. 18, 1956, p. 2.

[119]*Pravda*'s issue of Oct. 14, 1952, was the first not to be co-sponsored since March 1918. Khrushchev had reported to the 19th Congress on changes in party statutes four days before, but *Pravda* was not discussed. As has been mentioned, *Izvestiya,* the organ of the Soviet government, was co-published by the Moscow soviet in the early years; this arrangement came to an end, without explanation, in July 1923.

[120]*Moskovskaya Pravda,* Sept. 27, 1961, p. 3. For another good example from this period, see Yegorychev in ibid., May 18, 1963, pp. 1–2. Furtseva in her day often expressed concern about the intelligentsia, but her focus was scientists and university professors. Her first party position was as secretary in a chemistry institute, and from 1942 to 1950 she was a district party secretary in Frunze *rayon,* then home to Moscow University and 13 research institutes. According to a biography (ibid., Mar. 7, 1950, p. 2), she "struggled . . . for wide application in research of Marxist-Leninist ideology."

[121]A brief summary of the affair, which emphasizes Yegorychev's outspokenness and his link to Shelepin, is in Harry Gelman, *The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente,* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 96–98.

[122]Shelepin began his own rise in the Moscow Komsomol during the war, ending as *gorkom* secretary for defense work. S. P. Pavlov, first secretary of the Moscow Komsomol in the mid-1950's (when Shelepin was national first secretary) and then of the whole Komsomol from 1959 to 1968, was probably as important a link between Shelepin and the Moscow party as Yegorychev. It cannot have been coincidence that both of Yegorychev's second secretaries were Komsomol veterans. N. A. Kuznetsov went on to be RSFSR minister of culture from 1965 to 1974; he was retired a year before Shelepin's exit from the Politburo. V. Ya. Pavlov had been S. P. Pavlov's second secretary in the Moscow Komsomol; he stayed as *gorkom* second secretary until demoted to ambassador to Hungary in 1971.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It would be easy to underestimate Viktor Grishin, who was brought back to Old Square from the trade unions at the end of June 1967. Six years older than Yegorychev, dour in manner, and a soporific orator, he cut an unassuming figure. His elevation to full member of the Politburo in 1971 (after ten years as a candidate), and his appearances at countless ceremonial events, marked him as a quintessential member of the Brezhnev oligarchy.

However, Grishin's unprecedented eighteen-and-a-half years in office, if nothing else, were proof of his mettle as a machine politician. Like Brezhnev, Grishin saw the bureaucracy as his major constituency. There was no purge of the Moscow establishment in 1967: the new first secretary swore by "trust in cadres" and proceeded slowly with personnel changes.[123] Even Yegorychev protégés were eased out tactfully, usually with provision of a sinecure.[124] Grishin worked with the material at hand, making almost no attempt to bring in friends of his own.[125] After the mercurial Yegorychev, he assuaged subordinates by making a point of returning telephone calls and never using foul language. In staffing and other decisions, Grishin faced little interference from Brezhnev himself, who evidently took less interest in Moscow affairs—and, more generally, in local and regional governance in the Soviet Union—than any previous general secretary.

If Grishin had enthusiasms, they were ideological, as he revealed by throwing his weight behind the drive against ideological laxity preceding the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Chosen to give the address at the April 1968 Lenin jubilee, he lashed out at "politically immature elements" in the intelligentsia. A crackdown on experimentation in Moscow's theaters was among the first practical acts of the campaign.[126] The *gorkom*'s propaganda secretary from 1971 to 1976 was one of the most militant know-nothings in the Soviet establishment: V. N. Yagodkin, formerly party secretary at Moscow University, who, according to Moscow informants, took his instructions from the Politburo's ideological dean, M. A. Suslov. Eventually, however, Yagodkin's truculence embarrassed Suslov and Grishin and they agreed in 1976 on the more diplomatic V. N. Makeyev, a *raykom* secretary who had been deputy rector of an economics institute.[127] So crucial was ideology in Moscow in the late 1970's that Makeyev did unusual double duty as propaganda and second secretary. After 1980, with the collapse of détente and the upheaval in Poland, the Moscow apparatus spearheaded the Soviets' "counterpropaganda" effort.

Grishin's Moscow made a certain attempt to recoup some of the symbolic status that had seeped away under Khrushchev. "Being the capital of the state of developed socialism," Grishin bragged in one speech, "Moscow incarnates all its achievements."[128] After adopting a new city master plan in 1971, Grishin and Brezhnev said it was time to "turn Moscow into a model communist city" (*obraztsovyy kommunisticheskiy gorod*). This slogan was brandished before domestic and world audiences at the 1980 Moscow Olympics. It referred, however, to what Moscow should become, not what it was, and to Moscow as a social and economic entity, not to its CPSU organization. Grishin's appeals to emulate the Moscow party apparatus as such were modest and mostly about matters (such as integration of science with industry) in which it had special competence.

---

[123]Indeed, 71 percent of the 129 members of the 1966 Moscow *gorkom* were re-elected to the 1968 committee. This was greater continuity than the 63 percent of members retained between Yegorychev's last two *gorkomy*, in 1963 and 1966, not to mention the 46 percent retained when Yegorychev succeeded Demichev.

[124]As noted above, Yegorychev's second secretary, Pavlov, was not removed until 1971. Two *gorkom* secretaries appointed before Grishin—L. A. Borisov and R. F. Dement'eva—were still in place when he was retired in 1985, as was the mayor, Promyslov (appointed in 1963). L. V. Petrov, head of the *gorkom* personnel section for the two years before Yegorychev's fall, was made chairman of the city's trade unions, remaining until 1986. P. A. Voronina, Yegorychev's second secretary in Bauman *raykom* and earlier a Komsomol worker, survived an equal time in party and municipal work. Petrov's predecessor in personnel, M. F. Davydov, fared worse, perhaps because of a Komsomol past, but even he was made deputy chief of Novosti news agency in 1971. Most Moscow administrators with Komsomol connections made landings as soft as Davydov's: first deputy chief of government archives (A. M. Pegov); head of a directorate in the State Committee on Vocational and Technical Education (G. Ya. Perova); head of the personnel department of the State Committee for Television and Radio (P. I. Shabanov); secretary of the Union of Writers (Yu. N. Verchenko).

[125]There were only two exceptions. L. D. Novozhilov, Grishin's personal assistant, had been his aide in the Moscow *obkom* in the 1950's and worked under him in the unions in 1956–67. A. I. Yashin, who worked early in his career in Grishin's hometown of Serpukhov and later with him in the *obkom*, returned to Moscow as first deputy mayor in 1973. Biographies are in *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Mar. 20, 1985, p. 3, and *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Odinnadtsatyy Sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet: 11th Convocation), Moscow, Izvestiya, 1984, p. 504.

[126]The speech is in V. V. Grishin, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Collected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp. 119–37. The theater affair broadened from criticism of director Anatoliy Efros's interpretation of Chekhov's *Three Sisters*. See *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Feb. 13, 1968, p. 3; Mar. 26, p. 3; June 6, p. 2; Aug. 22, p. 2; Oct. 22, p. 2. The instigators were the first secretaries of two districts containing major theaters, S. S. Gruzinov of Krasnaya Presnya *rayon* and B. V. Pokarzhevskiy of Sverdlov *rayon*. Both were rewarded, Gruzinov becoming Soviet ambassador to Algeria and Pokarzhevskiy chief of Moscow's cultural bureaucracy. In July 1968, an exhibit of modern art was closed down on the orders of the *gorkom* propaganda secretary, A. P. Shaposhnikova. See *Politicheskiy dnevnik 1964–1970* (Political Diary, 1964–1970), Amsterdam, Alexander Herzen Foundation, 1972, p. 391.

[127]Yagodkin drew attention in the Western press in September 1974 by ordering the bulldozing of an unofficial art exhibit. Some Moscow intellectuals so despised him that they made puns on the similarity between his name and that of G. G. Yagoda, one of Stalin's secret police chiefs. In January 1976, Yagodkin was appointed deputy minister of education for personnel.

[128]Grishin, op. cit., p. 210.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ivan Kapitonov, first secretary of the Moscow oblast' *party committee in the mid-1950's.*

—Sovfoto.

In the pivotal area of personnel, there are strong indicators of a deterioration in the Moscow organization's position. Compare the Brezhnev column with the Khrushchev column in Table 2: over a period almost twice as long, considerably fewer Muscovites ended up in offices of almost every type.

The careers of many of the Muscovites conspicuously favored by Khrushchev reached a dead end under Brezhnev. Demichev, the junior party secretary for culture and propaganda (and a candidate member of the Politburo since November 1964), was degraded in 1974 (like Furtseva earlier) to minister of culture. He was able to place people within his ministry, but had little wider impact.[129] His Moscow contemporary, Stepakov, appointed head of the CC's propaganda department in 1965, was toppled in 1970.[130] Besides Stepakov—no novice, for he had headed a department from 1961 to 1964—no one from Moscow made it to the CC secretary or department head level. Not one became first secretary of a provincial party committee. And a mere three were selected for the Council of Ministers, one of them Makeyev (made a deputy premier in 1980) and another a Grishin crony.[131]

This outcome is all the more noteworthy when one considers that Kapitonov, Grishin's former superior who had long experience in Moscow politics, was Brezhnev's principal agent in staffing the party. Retrieved from Ivanovo in late 1964 to head the CC's personnel department (initially for the RSFSR, then for the entire USSR), Kapitonov became CC secretary for party organization a year later. He happens to be omitted from Table 2: his last Moscow job was in the *obkom,* and *obkom* officials are counted only for postings up to the end of 1961, the fifth year after the split with the *gorkom.* Yet, inclusion of Kapitonov would not much change the summary picture.

Indeed, the picture is so consistent that Grishin and Kapitonov must have connived in creating it. In Kapitonov's case, one may speculate that Brezhnev, besides being impressed by Kapitonov's knowledge of the Moscow scene, was at the same time reassured by his undignified ejection from it in 1959, an experience that may actually have biased Kapitonov against Moscow insiders. While five Muscovites can be identified at work in the CC personnel department under Kapitonov, four of them were already in place when he took over.[132] Although individuals from the *obkom* did rather better, the only regional secretary from Moscow proper—I. T. Marchenko in Tomsk—was demoted in 1965.[133]

As for Grishin, it is not outlandish to think that he willingly traded in his subordinates' promotions for his own security. His machine looking inward and his

[129]At the end of the Brezhnev era, three of Demichev's four deputy ministers were ideological specialists out of the Moscow organization. Ye. M. Chekarin entered the CC apparatus in 1962 (when Demichev was Moscow first secretary) and has had a string of positions since. G. A. Ivanov has been first secretary in Sverdlov *rayon* (where many Moscow theaters are clustered) and chief of the ministry's theaters directorate (where another Muscovite, V. I. Korshunov, was his deputy). T. V. Golubtsova was a minor *gorkom* official under Demichev, then first secretary of Gagarin *rayon* (which contains many research institutes) and head of the *gorkom*'s school department.

[130]In both cases, there may have been some connection to Yegorychev and Shelepin, as was rumored of Demichev at the time (*Politicheskiy dnevnik,* p. 659). Yegorychev, Stepakov, and Demichev served together in the Moscow leadership in 1960–62, Yegorychev succeeding Stepakov as *gorkom* second secretary and Demichev as first secretary. After his removal from the CC department, Stepakov finished his career as ambassador to Yugoslavia. Demichev proved more adaptable; he lasted as minister of culture for 12 years, and is today first deputy chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and a candidate member of the Politburo.

[131]The crony, Yashin, was appointed minister of construction materials in 1979. The third individual was A. K. Mel'nichenko, a Moscow deputy mayor who became minister of the medical industry in 1975. Two other ministers with a Moscow background are excluded—Demichev and Lomonosov (who was made chairman of the State Labor Committee in 1976)—because they had been out of the Moscow organization for more than five years.

(Fns. 132 and 133 are on p. 52.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ideas looking backward, he played the game the way his Kremlin peers wanted. He must have been the Moscow deputy of Brezhnev's dreams.

Succession Shocks

The political earthquake that followed the death of Brezhnev hit the Moscow organization even harder than the rest of the party. It knocked down two Moscow leaders in a row, Grishin and Yel'tsin, and shook every institution and interest in the city.

The fascinating thing about Grishin's fall is not that it came, but that a radically different outcome might well have been possible. It has been widely rumored in Moscow, hinted at in the Soviet press, and written in the West that Grishin was put up for general secretary by the Politburo old guard at the close of the reign of K. U. Chernenko, the interim leader sandwiched between Yu. V. Andropov and M. S. Gorbachev.[134] While this theory cannot be definitively proved, it has the ring of truth.

Grishin did behave very much like a contender as the Chernenko interregnum drew to an end. In all probability his hope, the only one open to him, was the same as Chernenko's before 1982: to ingratiate himself with an ailing incumbent and convince party conservatives that he could best preserve the status quo. He tried to be Chernenko's Chernenko, as it were, and Chernenko gave him every encouragement.

When Chernenko awarded Grishin an Order of Lenin for his 70th birthday in October 1984, the citation recalled the image of Moscow as prototype, "a good example for the whole country," with Grishin at the helm.[135] Grishin sang Chernenko's praises as the Politburo representative at an anniversary celebration in Moldavia, where Chernenko and Brezhnev once worked together; he conveyed a greeting that, he said, Chernenko had given him in person. In November, haranguing writers and artists about "socialist realism," Grishin quoted extensively from Chernenko, repeating his words about Moscow as a "good example."[136] At Chernenko's contrived public appearances in the weeks before his death in March 1985, Grishin hovered near his elbow.

Could Grishin with Chernenko's blessing realistically have expected to gain power? What of his intellectual mediocrity, his failure to get protégés into high office or, indeed, to make it into the Secretariat himself? The notion of Grishin as leader of the CPSU may sound laughable, but hardly more so than that of Chernenko. Politicians fearful of change could have read virtue into his very lack of individuality. Having adroitly represented Brezhnev's regime of stagnation in the capital city, he would have suited those who wanted it prolonged country-wide.

Gorbachev's victory rendered moot any speculation about Grishin as general secretary. The question now was whether he could cling to power in Moscow. It is clear in hindsight that items for a bill of indictment had been accumulating for some time. As early as November and December 1982, at the onset of the Andropov "discipline" campaign, there had been arrests in the Moscow retail network. The chief of the city's produce trust, V. A. Ural'tsev, was expelled from the party for corruption in September 1983, and in July 1984, the long-time head of the Moscow trade directorate, N. P. Tregubov, was arraigned for collusion in bribery and profiteering. In July 1985, the People's Control Committee began a large investigation into statistics-padding in housing construction in Moscow. Soon *Moskovskaya Pravda* and central newspapers began to print angry letters about the backwardness of consumer services in the city. Associates of Grishin outside his machine were pensioned off.[137]

Grishin did not surrender without a fight. He conceded "shortcomings" in Moscow and vowed to "activate reserves." He took to speaking obsequiously of Gorbachev.[138] He made what looked like pre-emptive personnel changes—although he may also have had to accept

[132]The four who joined the department before Kapitonov were first deputy head N. A. Petrovichev, deputy heads B. N. Moralev and A. G. Skvortsov, and sector chief V. M. Serushkin. A. T. Kosarev, first secretary of the Kirov *raykom*, came in as a sector head in 1966. Moralev had the longest association with Kapitonov, having worked in the Komsomol in the same *rayon* in which Kapitonov was a party secretary in the 1940's. He first entered the CC apparatus in 1951, and returned to it in 1966 after a hiatus. His obituary appeared in *Pravda* on May 8, 1978, p. 6.

[133]Marchenko was replaced by Ye. K. Ligachev in late November 1965 (just before Kapitonov's promotion to the Secretariat) and was appointed RSFSR minister of local industry. Second secretary of Moscow *gorkom* from 1954 to 1959, Marchenko had been sent to Tomsk not long after Kapitonov's dismissal from the Moscow *obkom*. It is possible that this incident created bad blood between them. Earlier in 1965, Ignatov, whom we know to have fought with Kapitonov, was also demoted, from *obkom* boss in Orel to deputy head of one of the lesser industrial ministries.

[134]The heaviest hint, playing on Grishin's slogan about Moscow as "model communist city," is in an essay by a well-connected Moscow playwright. See Mikhail Shatrov, "1917–1987. Irreversibility of Change," *Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 4, January 1987, p. 5.

[135]*Pravda*, Oct. 5, 1984, p. 1. In September, necessarily with Chernenko's cooperation, Grishin was presented with birthday congratulations by delegations from allied countries, headed by members of the respective Politburos.

[136]*Moskovskaya Pravda*, Oct. 14, 1984, pp. 1–2, and Nov. 13, pp. 1–2.

[137]Makeyev, the *gorkom* second secretary promoted to deputy premier, had been demoted in January 1983. The other two former Grishin subordinates on the Council of Ministers, Yashin and Mel'nichenko, were retired in July and December 1985. The provincial first secretary with the closest past links to Grishin, P. A. Leonov of Kalinin *oblast'* (a Moscow *raykom* and *obkom* official from 1945 to 1955), was retired in August 1985. (Fn. 138 is on p. 53.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

an alien or two into his camp, that is, officials who apparently had known Gorbachev since his Moscow student days in the 1950's.[139]

And, when the Moscow *gorkom* met on December 24, 1985, to discuss "the organizational question"—Grishin's leadership—he is said by knowledgeable Moscow communists to have defended his record and to have balked at resigning gracefully. Expecting resistance, Gorbachev took the extraordinary step of attending the plenum himself and speaking out against Grishin. With the General Secretary's prestige on the line, Grishin was removed and Boris Yel'tsin installed by a reluctant city committee. On February 18, 1986, the Central Committee drummed Grishin off the Politburo and elected Yel'tsin a candidate member.

The imposition of an outsider was a clear vote of no confidence with respect to the *gorkom* as well as to its first secretary. Yel'tsin, provincial first secretary in Sverdlovsk from 1976 to 1985, had headed the CC's construction department since April—and hence was well-versed in malfeasance in the Moscow housing industry—and had been a CC secretary since July. No other head of the Moscow party since Shcherbakov in 1938 had arrived without prior experience in the organization. To accentuate the point, the new second secretary, V. G. Zakharov, was from Leningrad by way of the CC apparatus.[140]

Yel'tsin set the tone for his administration with a piercing critique of the Moscow organization in January 1986:

> *Window-dressing* (paradnost'), *an overemphasis on successes, and a hushing up of shortcomings have been instilled in its style of work and have given rise to conceit and inertia. . . . To a considerable degree this was facilitated by the fact that Moscow and its party organization have been in effect removed from the zone of criticism . . . . Perhaps there are some who think such appraisals too harsh, but sooner or later they had to be heard. We are obliged to be self-critical given the special role in our party of the Moscow city party organization, within which work the communists of all central apparatuses, ministries, and agencies. In keeping with its business, its experience used to be looked upon with great respect in the party.*[141]

Space does not permit a thorough plumbing here of Yel'tsin's stormy tenure as first secretary or of his humiliating departure only twenty-three months after Grishin's.[142] Yel'tsin was, on balance, more ardent even than Gorbachev in his advocacy of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka*, but his temperamental character and at times contradictory policies defy simple categorization. In Moscow, Yel'tsin delighted in populist contacts with city residents and impromptu visits to shops and clinics. To the bureaucracy, he turned a stern face, forcing through the most bruising purge of Moscow's party and municipal agencies since Khrushchev's in 1949–50. Yel'tsin repudiated Moscow's *obraztsovshchina* (posing as a bogus model) and elicited candid discussion of the city's bread-and-butter problems with housing, consumer and health services, planning, pollution, and architectural conservation. He and his confederates struggled to devise policy responses—on the whole, quite conventional ones—and importuned central decision-makers to allocate resources to Moscow's needs, which, in some respects, they did.

In national politics, to which Yel'tsin's position in the Moscow *gorkom* gave him unparalleled access, he projected an image of impatience and iconoclasm. Although he offered few novel solutions of his own to the Soviet Union's economic and social problems, he agitated for constant experimentation (for example, with

[138]Grishin was one of the first to describe Gorbachev as "head" of the Politburo; in June, he praised Gorbachev's "profound report" to a Kremlin meeting. See *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Mar. 19, 1985, pp. 1–2, and June 18, 1985, p. 2.

[139]Three of 19 heads of *gorkom* departments, and seven of 33 *raykom* first secretaries, were replaced between March and December 1985. All three of the new department heads, and four of the seven first secretaries, were to be retired or demoted by Yel'tsin.

The appointment most likely to have originated with Gorbachev is the curious one of L. N. Spiridonov. Two weeks before Chernenko's death, he was appointed as a seventh *gorkom* secretary, for a function (liaison with foreign communists) that had never before merited its own secretary. Spiridonov, a university contemporary of Gorbachev, had been editor of *Moskovskaya Pravda* from 1972 until May 1983, when he entered the CC apparatus. After Grishin's fall, the slate of secretaries was trimmed to six, and Spiridonov was made first deputy editor of *Pravda*. Another of Grishin's secretaries to fare reasonably well is A. M. Roganov, the propaganda chief since 1980. A municipal election poster seen by the author in Moscow in 1982 shows Roganov to have overlapped at Moscow University with Gorbachev and to have been a Moscow Komsomol official starting in 1957, when Gorbachev was working in the Komsomol in Stavropol'. In January 1986, he was selected head of the TV and radio sector of the CC's propaganda department.

[140]When Zakharov was appointed minister of culture in August 1986, the new second secretary, Yu. A. Belyakov (who had served in the CC construction department under Yel'tsin), was also an outsider. According to interviews, A. N. Tsaregorodtsev, appointed head of the *gorkom*'s general department in October 1986 (and removed immediately after Yel'tsin's fall), was from Sverdlovsk, as were several of Yel'tsin's assistants.

[141]*Moskovskaya Pravda*, Jan. 25, 1986, p. 1.

[142]I explore some of the issues in "Moscow Politics and the Fall of Yel'tsin," *The Harriman Institute Forum* (Columbia University, New York), forthcoming in June 1988. An interesting account of the showdown between Yel'tsin and party conservatives in the autumn of 1987 is in Seweryn Bialer, "Lone Rebel vs. Gorbachev," *U.S. News and World Report* (Washington, DC), Mar. 28, 1988, pp. 30–33, which draws extensively on interviews in Moscow. A good survey is Alexander Rahr, "The Ouster of Boris Yel'tsin—the Kremlin's 'Avant-Gardist'," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 506/87, Dec. 18, 1987. The best Soviet source, although one that must be used with caution, is the official transcript of the Moscow *gorkom* plenum that removed Yel'tsin, in *Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1987, pp. 1–3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toleration of voluntary associations in the political area) and relentlessly attacked bureaucratic obstructions to *perestroyka*. Yel'tsin also stimulated the Moscow party organs to pry with unusual vigor into personnel and other decisions in the headquarters of the central government ministries, a practice that may have alarmed high party and state officials.[143]

All this was enough to produce strains and eventually strife between Yel'tsin and more conservative figures in the CPSU leadership, notably Ye. K. Ligachev, the second-ranking CPSU CC secretary. Gorbachev, apparently tiring of Yel'tsin's entreaties and worried about polarization within the party, fell in on this issue with the conservatives. The conflict came to a head at the CC plenum of October 21, 1987, at which Yel'tsin vented his frustration over the pace of *perestroyka* (in Moscow and across the Soviet Union), attempted to resign in protest, and was condemned by Ligachev and Gorbachev. On November 11, with Gorbachev again in attendance, the Moscow *gorkom* accepted the Politburo's demand that Yel'tsin be removed. Gorbachev, although also deriding Yel'tsin for using "methods from the old arsenal," stressed Yel'tsin's pressure from the left on the party consensus, especially through "pseudo-revolutionary phrases" that could not be implemented. Moscow officials sacked by Yel'tsin were allowed to rake him over the coals—several cried at the CC plenum that he had "stabbed the party in the back"—and Yel'tsin offered an abject apology to Gorbachev. He was probably fortunate to receive a second-rate administrative position (first deputy head of the state construction apparatus) several weeks after his disgrace. On February 18, 1988, the Central Committee took away his candidate's spot on the Politburo, two years to the day after he won it.

Inserted in Yel'tsin's place was L. N. Zaykov, the CC secretary for defense industry. This turn to another non-Muscovite—Zaykov, a Leningrader, who became a CC secretary in July 1985 at the same time as Yel'tsin—underscores the seriousness the Politburo attaches to its Moscow problem. Though more technocratic and discreet, Zaykov seems as committed as Yel'tsin to the Gorbachev program. After Molotov in 1928 and Khrushchev in 1949, he is only the third official to be appointed Moscow first secretary already as a voting member of the Politburo. Violating recent precedent, he kept his membership on the Secretariat at the February 1988 CC plenum.

[143]When the ship *Admiral Nakhimov* sank in the Black Sea in 1986, the *gorkom* bureau formally cited for negligence the former minister of shipping (T. B. Guzhenko) and others, "on the instructions of the Central Committee" (*Moskovskaya Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1986, p. 1). Several later accounts of interference made no mention of such instructions.

Boris Yel'tsin listens, shortly before his ouster, as General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev obliquely criticizes the Moscow city party chief in a November 2, 1987, speech commemorating the Bolshevik revolution.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Zaykov walks into a political situation seething from recent events but also structured by history and by larger features of the Soviet system. Now that the narrative has been concluded, a look at unifying themes will help us bring the place and predicament of the Moscow organization into sharper focus.

General Patterns

Several broad patterns emerge from this record. One is the Moscow party organization's enduring importance in Soviet politics. A second is its vulnerability to intervention and crisis. Third, and of greatest analytic interest, is the tendency for its influence to decline.

Importance. Few will quibble with the first proposition, for all the Moscow apparatus's problems. No matter that Zelenskiy's 1924 declaration of Moscow's "decisive significance for the entire party" was self-serving, there is a kernel of truth to it for all periods. The Moscow organization fills an unusual niche. Its size, quality, and, above all, its centrality guarantee that it can never be just another local. Thus Yel'tsin, in the very act of disparaging Grishin's legacy in 1986, could speak of the organization's "special role," and, at the 27th Congress, of "the authority of Moscow and of its party organiza-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion . . . [its] moral credit."[144] "The Moscow city party organization," Gorbachev could aver when he took Yel'tsin to task in November 1987, "is our support (*nasha opora*) and our reliable support. . . . Moscow's concerns are foremost concerns of the Central Committee."[145] The same would never be said of a provincial party committee.

Moscow's importance is in large part a function of communication. In political communication, centrality brings visibility, and visibility carries with it both the opportunity to persuade and the need to control.

This simple logic explains the singular role as mouthpiece and weathervane ascribed to the leader of the Moscow organization. "We all well understand," Chernenko said at Grishin's birthday party, "how great a responsibility lies on the shoulders of the first secretary of the party committee of our state's capital city. Moscow is always and for everyone in view, is it not?"[146] Since Moscow is the media, arts, and science center of the USSR, it also follows that its leaders will be most forward in nursemaiding the intelligentsia.[147] Further, the image of the city itself, and of how it is governed, acquires meaning in Soviet discourse, in good times and bad. When Moscow is in step with the leaders, they can rarely resist making didactic use of it to one degree or another; when it is out of kilter, its mistakes become a cautionary tale of what not to do. "Moscow's potential," Gorbachev said in drawing the moral of Yel'tsin's demise, "is such that, when it goes astray, this adversely affects the entire country, yet, when it acts with full strength, the whole country feels that equally powerfully."[148]

The Moscow elite is similarly unique in being so close to the main node of the semi-closed system of command and communication within the party. Some of its members in the early days sought to maximize their autonomy from the top leadership. The crushing of Uglanov's "tsardom" and the enshrinement of hierarchy in party organization made such dreams futile after the late 1920's. It was as servitors to the general secretary, not barons independent of his court, that Kaganovich, Khrushchev, and those after them made their mark. In times of succession, when control of the court is in dispute, the Moscow organization is inevitably entangled in the intrigue and maneuver.

In doing their jobs from day to day, Moscow politicians have typically sought access to the high leadership, not independence from it. They aspire mostly to exercise shared and delegated power, but that is no small thing in a political system with so much power to dole out. Here they have had, and continue to have, pragmatic advantages. The Moscow party offices, after all, are yards away from the Central Committee; *gorkom* secretaries have dining privileges in the CC canteen, and their subordinates enjoy other perquisites.[149] Khrushchev in the 1930's befriended Stalin's wife, sat in informally on Politburo sessions, and talked politics with Stalin at family dinners and in his theater box. Shcherbakov in the 1940's snatched conversations over a bottle of vodka or wine.[150] Grishin in the 1970's mentioned "constant communication" between Brezhnev and the communists of Moscow.[151] In the 1980's Gorbachev describes frequent dialogues with Yel'tsin, "sharp, sincere, one on one."[152] The point is not that this access is necessarily used effectively—Khrushchev boosted his career with it, Yel'tsin wrecked his—but that a Moscow leader more readily gets the chance.

Vulnerability. If one side of the centrality coin is visibility and access, the flip side is vulnerability. From the outset, the Moscow organization has been prone to trauma, as one can appreciate by simply scanning the roster of individual leaders in Table 1.

From Likhachev in 1917 to Yel'tsin in 1987, there have been 29 departures from the post of Moscow first secretary, as defined in the table. Two have been deaths (the assassinated Zagorskiy, Shcherbakov from natural causes). Shortly after the revolution five secretaries (Zemlyachka, Yefremov, Myasnikov, Zelenskiy in 1920, and Artem) received what would have been considered lateral transfers; the exits of Molotov in 1929 and Kaganovich in 1935 are probably comparable. Only five times has the departing boss won an unambiguous promotion (Khrushchev in both 1938 and 1953, and his protégés Kapitonov in 1954, Furtseva, and Demichev. On the majority of occasions (15), the leader

[144]*XXVII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: Stenograficheskiy otchet* (27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Report), 3 vols., Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, Vol. 1, p. 141.

[145]*Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1987, p. 3.

[146]Ibid., Oct. 5, 1984, p. 1.

[147]In 1978, Moscow contained 79 of the Academy of Sciences' 244 institutes; these 79 establishments employed 23,700 research personnel, 52 percent of the Academy's complement. Moscow was at that point also the site of 75 institutions of higher learning, in which were enrolled 636,000 students, 13 percent of the Soviet Union's total. *Moskva: Entsikopediya* (Moscow Encyclopedia), Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1980, pp. 67, 194.

[148]*Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1987, p. 3.

[149]Author's interviews. The Moscow *gorkom* (and *obkom*) is headquartered at 6 Old Square (*Staraya ploshchad'*), several blocks northeast of the Kremlin; the Central Committee Secretariat is at 4 Old Square. The largest body of Moscow city party officials work in a building around the corner, on Kuybyshev Street.

[150]See *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 43–44, 51–59, 322.

[151]Grishin, op. cit., p. 358.

[152]*Pravda*, Nov. 13, 1987, p. 3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was resoundingly demoted (Likhachev, Pyatnitskiy, Yakovleva, Zelenskiy in 1924, Uglanov, Bauman, Ugarov, Popov, Rumyantsev, Mikhaylov, Kapitonov in 1959, Ustinov, Yegorychev, Grishin, and Yel'tsin). The odds have scarcely improved since Stalin. There were three promotions and three demotions under Khrushchev; since then there have been three straight demotions.

Except for Kapitonov in 1959 and Ustinov in 1960, for whom personality and happenstance were evidently prime, and Ugarov, who was killed in the Great Purge for no rational reason, the mix of power and policy considerations precipitating the demotions can be identified. A number of the most important removals have been directly linked to the process of political succession. This applies without qualification to all four Moscow leaders in office at the time of the successions of the 1920's, 1950's, 1960's, and 1980's. Zelenskiy, Mikhaylov (appointed *obkom* first secretary within days after Stalin's death), Yegorychev, and Grishin were ousted on average 11 months after the election of a new general secretary. Two others, Popov and Rumyantsev, forfeited their positions during the prologue to the Stalin succession.

At other times, policy has taken precedence over power. In Lenin's lifetime, Likhachev, Pyatnitskiy, and Yakovleva fell victim to internecine quarrels over revolutionary strategy. Both Uglanov and Bauman, after backing Stalin in the succession struggle, broke with him over economic and political issues, much the same way as Yel'tsin broke with Gorbachev. Indeed, if Grishin is factored in, there are eery parallels between the 1920's and the 1980's. Uglanov and Grishin were upended for being more conservative than the general secretary. After them, however, Bauman (setting aside Molotov's five months as caretaker) and Yel'tsin lost out for being more radical. Overlearning the lessons of the previous conflict with the right, Bauman and Yel'tsin became a liability on the left. Some of the phraseology used to reproach them—"dizzy with success" in 1930, "pseudo-revolutionary" in 1987—could easily be interchanged. In both cases, the Politburo used malcontents inside the organization to pummel their boss.[153] And it replaced both with a higher-ranking and more dependable politician (Kaganovich in 1930, Zaykov in 1987).

If these explosions vary in exact detail, what ties them together is the Moscow organization's vulnerability to them. In the first decade of Soviet history, when factions and quasi-factions with ideological platforms still operated in politics, Moscow was a supportive milieu in several ways. Principally, as discussed above, it was socially heterogeneous, and it was where dissidents could get the best hearing from the national elite.

Clientele groups, more loosely related to policy, survived Stalinization. Moscow, as the national capital, was susceptible to penetration by a variety of patrons, their followings sometimes succeeding one another but sometimes overlapping, sometimes cooperating but often competing. Enough examples of bonding in different periods have been recited—Zelenskiy with Kamenev, Uglanov with the Bukharin group, Bauman with Molotov, Khrushchev with Kaganovich, Shcherbakov with Zhdanov, Popov and Chernousov with Malenkov, Furtseva and Demichev with Khrushchev, Yegorychev with Shelepin, Yagodkin and Makeyev with Suslov—to verify the phenomenon. Even if it has become a less important factor since the 1950's, it does not seem about to disappear. When their patrons have been strong, Moscow clients have drawn protection; when patrons have wavered or become weak, clients have drawn fire. The plurality of patronage networks, when they were at their peak, probably worked to lessen the Moscow organization's overall élan and resistance to aggression.

Whatever the impact of group affiliations, political vulnerability is the lot of the Moscow party organs, due to the same characteristic—centrality—that makes them prominent. Gorbachev in 1987 pilloried Yel'tsin for "striving always to be in view."[154] The phrase "in view" (*na vidu*) was the very one Chernenko used three years earlier in characterizing the job of Moscow first secretary and how well Grishin had done it. Chernenko, maybe more insightfully, was looking beyond the man to the position. Had an Uglanov, a Bauman, a Yegorychev, a Grishin, or a Yel'tsin been toiling in Rostov or Chelyabinsk in their respective times, he might have been ignored when he misstepped—or his errors not even have been spotted in the first place. In Moscow, "in view" of all and sundry, he has to be dealt with, and quickly.

Dwindling influence. The prominence of the Moscow party organization is a constant factor, and crisis a recurrent one, whereas the final pattern is dynamic. The dynamic here is one of secular decline: in Soviet politics, Moscow does not pull the weight that it used to. Without yet becoming *not* important in an absolute sense, it has become considerably *less* important than in the past.

As one gauge of political status, we can look again at the assignment of Moscow personnel to other segments of the establishment. It is reasonable to posit that the more Muscovites get such assignments, the higher their

[153]At the city party plenum that fired Yel'tsin, a former *raykom* first secretary saw it as reprehensible that members of the *gorkom* bureau had not appealed earlier for help from above: "Surely these comrades could have gone to the Central Committee, which is not far from here." Ibid.

[154]Ibid., p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 3: Annual Rate of Appointment of Moscow Officials to Other Positions

(Average number of appointments per year)

Period	Rank I posts[1]	Rank II posts[2]	All posts[3]
First decade (1917–27)	3.7	10.1	13.9
Early Stalin (1928–36)	2.0	4.2	6.2
Great Purge (1937–38)	7.0	13.5	20.5
Late Stalin (1939–Mar. 1953)	1.4	6.9	8.3
Khrushchev (Mar. 1953–Oct. 1964)	2.2	7.2	9.4
Brezhnev (Oct. 1964–Nov. 1982)	0.2	4.2	4.4
Post-Brezhnev (Nov. 1982–Feb. 1988)	0.6	1.9	2.5
Average (weighted)	1.8	6.2	7.9

[1]Central Committee secretary or department head, first secretary of a provincial party committee, member of the USSR Council of Ministers.
[2]All other positions in Table 2.
[3]Because of rounding, numbers in this column do not always equal the sum of the numbers in the previous two columns.

collective standing in the Soviet elite. Table 3 brackets the positions listed in Table 2 into two rank ranges and gives the average annual number of appointments for each range and time period. To be sure, this is but a partial picture, as the table presents only the frequency of appointment of Muscovites, not their staying power in office or their access systematically compared to non-Muscovites. Some of the demonstrated changes in mobility may reflect general tendencies in the elite as well as the specifics of Moscow; many others, to be appreciated fully, would need to be closely studied in temporal context. During the Great Purge, for instance, not only do we know that Moscow was a net exporter of cadres, and at a high rate, but also that the flux was phenomenal everywhere in the elite and that a fair number of those advanced were themselves to be purged. Under Brezhnev, to take a very different era, mobility subsided throughout the bureaucracy; egress by Muscovites might have been expected to slow down, as it did.

With these qualifications duly noted, gross trends are picked up in Table 3. The first two decades after 1917 are marked by sharp oscillations in the professional mobility of Moscow officials: high in the formative years, lower after Stalinization, abnormally high in 1937–38. Mobility is more or less stable after the Great Purge. Then there is some resurgence under Khrushchev, and a plunge under Brezhnev.

Equally salient is the contrast in Table 3 between the two broad grades of external position. Until 1964 the two categories behave similarly. After Khrushchev, however, the deterioration is much more drastic for the more commanding Rank I positions. Although Muscovites in the Brezhnev years are still being admitted to Rank II positions at roughly the rate of the pre-purge Stalin regime, albeit at only about 60 percent of the Khrushchev rate, they are rising to Rank I positions at only about one-tenth the frequency of the early Stalin and Khrushchev periods and perhaps one-seventh that of the late Stalin period. After Brezhnev, Rank II promotions continue to slide; the slight upturn for Rank I is largely an artifact of the measure used.[155]

A generally recognized yardstick of stature in Soviet politics is representation on the CPSU Central Committee. Table 4 summarizes this for Moscow local officials, and it traces a downward curve much like that for external appointments. Moscow politicians, having constituted nearly 10 percent of the full members of the CC in the late 1920's, and 3 to 5 percent from 1934 to 1956 (discounting the low 1939 ratio as an aberration corrected in 1941), today fill a mere 1 percent of the seats. In the 1920's, it was common for Moscow's deputation to include, in addition to the MK's two secretaries and the city mayor, a *raykom* secretary, the chairmen of the local trade union and economic planning councils, and even (in 1925) the head of the MK's personnel department. Today, to a CC many times as large, Moscow sends only its first and second party secretaries and its mayor. From 1934 to the present, the proportion of full CC members who are local party or government officials has remained roughly the same; had Moscow retained its share of 1934, let alone 1925 or 1927, it would have had 13 full members on the 1986 committee.

The same worsening trend is visible for the more elusive, non-quantifiable indicators of status. Recapitulation of four of these indicators is sufficient. First, cross-appointment of the Moscow first secretary to the CC Secretariat, a routine procedure under Stalin—which was taken to an extreme when Kaganovich served as second secretary of the whole party—recurred during only two brief intervals under Khrushchev and not at all under Brezhnev, despite Grishin's incredible longevity. It is too soon to tell if the Zaykov cross-appointment is a reversion to the earlier pattern or, as seems more likely, a temporary response to crisis. Second, Moscow is no longer depicted as a special "forge of cadres" or storehouse of talent for the party. Third, the Moscow party's co-publication of *Pravda*, which brought with it, among

[155]The three Rank I positions that produce the score of 0.6 are the cross-appointment of Zaykov to CC secretary (he already held this office upon becoming Moscow first secretary) and the appointments as USSR ministers of two men who had been brought into the Moscow organization from the outside and served there only briefly: Yel'tsin (first deputy chairman of Gosstroy) and Zakharov (minister of culture). Two other appointees to the Council of Ministers have Moscow backgrounds (V. Ya. Pavlov and S. G. Shcherbakov), but their connections were too remote in time for them to be counted.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 4: Representation of Moscow Officials on the CPSU Central Committee

Year of congress	Full members		Candidate members	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1918	1 of 15	6.7	0 of 7	0
1919	1 of 19	5.3	0 of 8	0
1920	1 of 20	5.0	1 of 12	8.3
1921	1 of 25	4.0	0 of 15	0
1922	2 of 27	7.4	0 of 19	0
1923	3 of 40	7.5	0 of 17	0
1924	4 of 51	7.8	1 of 35	2.9
1925	6 of 63	9.5	0 of 43	0
1927	7 of 71	9.9	3 of 50	6.0
1930	6 of 71	8.5	5 of 63	7.9
1934	3 of 71	4.2	7 of 68	10.3
1939[1]	1 of 71	1.4	4 of 68	5.9
1952	4 of 125	3.2	1 of 112	0.9
1956	6 of 133	4.5	1 of 122	0.8
1961	3 of 175	1.7	1 of 155	0.6
1966	3 of 195	1.5	2 of 165	1.2
1971	3 of 241	1.2	2 of 155	1.3
1976	4 of 287	1.4	0 of 139	0
1981	3 of 319	0.9	1 of 151	0.7
1986	3 of 307	1.0	2 of 170	1.2

[1]At the 18th CPSU Conference in February 1941, two of the Moscow candidate members (G. M. Popov and V. P. Pronin) were promoted to full members, making Moscow's share 4.2 percent of the full members and 2.9 percent of the candidate members.

other things, detailed coverage of Moscow stories in the CPSU's national newspaper, was halted in 1952. Moscow news is nowhere near as plentiful as it once was in *Pravda*, *Izvestiya*, and other central organs. And fourth, the symbolic primacy of Moscow and its institutions has slowly been fading since its apogee in the 1930's. Grishin's campaign to make Moscow a "model communist city" in the 1970's is notable mostly for being ignored at the time and scorned since 1985.

If these are the symptoms of the erosion of the Moscow party organization's position, what causes lie behind it? A simple explanation not to be overlooked has to do with demographics and territorial organization, which have made the Moscow organization, measured in numbers of party members, much smaller in relation to total party size than it was at its peak. Because of Moscow's rapid population growth and the formation of the immense *oblast'* in 1929, the Moscow *obkom* in 1930 had jurisdiction over 13.5 percent of all party members (and candidates), of whom 8.1 percent were in the city of Moscow and 5.4 percent in the environs. By 1939, after controls on immigration into Moscow had begun to take effect and the Moscow *oblast'* had been trimmed in size, the *oblast'* accounted for 10.5 percent of total party ranks, and Moscow within it, for 7.7 percent. By 1956, on the eve of the *obkom-gorkom* division, the *oblast'* and city shares were down to 9.2 and 6.1 percent. On January 1, 1987, 5.9 percent of the CPSU membership (9.6 percent of membership in the RSFSR) was enrolled in the capital city and another 2.7 percent (4.3 percent of RSFSR membership) in the self-sufficient *oblast'* organization.

A Moscow first secretary whose committee had 13.5 percent of all party members on his books—a figure which translates into 22 percent of all RSFSR communists in 1987—would in all likelihood speak with a louder voice than one with 5.9 percent. Somewhere in the middle would be a unified and compact *oblast'* organization, which Moscow had from the late 1930's to 1956 and which exists elsewhere in the CPSU. Today it would contain 8.5 percent of total party members. The present Moscow city organization is 1.9 times as large as the second largest local organization, that of the Leningrad *oblast'*; if integrated with the Moscow *oblast'* organization, which is the third largest local, it would have 2.7 times as many members as Leningrad *oblast'*. An *oblast'*-wide party organ, whose leaders would be conversant with rural as well as urban administration, would be more representative of the Soviets' local bureaucracy than the current Moscow *gorkom*, with its exclusively urban orientation. Moscow officials might thereby have a better chance of assignment to leadership positions in other regions, which have been effectively blocked to them since the late 1950's.[156]

So deleterious has the 1956 bifurcation of the Moscow organization been to its position in party politics that one wonders whether the effect was not intended. The Soviet regime after Stalin was greatly influenced by the adoption of formal and informal constraints on leaders, for example, the convention banning the use of violence against political opponents and the (unpublished) Central Committee resolution of 1964 forbidding the head of the CPSU to be chairman of the Council of Ministers. One could well imagine concern about the actual or potential power of the Moscow party apparatus mounting during de-Stalinization and resulting in the decision of February 1956 and, quite possibly, in a broader understanding within the party elite about the need to keep

[156]Since 1960, five men with recent experience in the Moscow *obkom* were appointed first secretary of another region, for which some competence in agriculture is still expected—Yu. N. Balandin (Kostroma), N. F. Ignatov (Orel), A. A. Kandrenkov (Kaluga), P. A. Leonov (Sakhalin and Kalinin), and Ye. I. Sizenko (Bryansk)—but not one from the Moscow *gorkom*. On the other hand, four officials from Moscow city were named second secretary of a non-Russian republic, for which general political skills seem more germane—L. I. Grekov and V. G. Lomonosov (Uzbekistan), B. V. Nikol'skiy (Georgia), and V. N. Rykov (Turkmenistan).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow on a short tether.[157]

Whether or not this occurred, the influence of the Moscow organization has clearly been hedged by wider shifts in the Soviet political system. One of these is the consolidation and maturation of institutions. More and more, as the Brezhnev regime openly recognized, Soviet institutions have developed routines and resist poaching on their staffing and other procedures. The Moscow party organization thus operates in a denser and more obstructed political medium than it did in 1930 or 1940. Institutions over which its personnel once ranged freely now have a life of their own and are forces that it must take into account.

The government of the Russian republic, of which Moscow is the capital city, is an excellent case in point. Well into the 1950's, the RSFSR Council of Ministers was a rather impotent and rudderless organization, its leaders drafted from the outside, including, often, from the party and municipal apparatus of Moscow. Today it has a more rounded recruitment base and well-set procedures. In the absence of a republic-level party committee for the RSFSR, its Council of Ministers looks more and more like a substitute for such a committee, and its chairman, the RSFSR premier, is a member of the Politburo who vies with the Moscow party boss for attention.[158]

By the same token, the Moscow party organization itself has become substantially institutionalized, and this makes it less malleable in the hands of its own first secretary. One of Boris Yel'tsin's mistakes was to fail to appreciate this factor. He gravely overextended himself by seeking to assert national leadership through a local apparatus that he only partially controlled.

Finally, the position of Moscow and its governors also has been affected by evolutionary changes in political culture and psychology. Moscow's geographic centrality remains a given, and it remains true, as was emphasized above, that the occupants of the Kremlin seek to project as favorable an image as possible of and from their capital. And yet, rising levels of education and sophistication make it difficult if not impossible to do so in the manner of the past.

The Stalin-era cult of Moscow, with its invocation of the semi-divine leader and his showcase building projects and the admonitions to take cues from the Moscow vanguard, was tailored to the needs of a fairly primitive dictatorship ruling a largely peasant society. It is most doubtful that such a simplistic cult could be sustained today. Few Soviets in 1988 would do other than smirk at a speaker who told a party congress that Moscow should be revered in the CPSU because a particular general secretary resided there, or because his "closest comrade-in-arms" was first secretary there. Yel'tsin's message in 1985–87 was considerably more sophisticated than that, but it met at best a mixed reception. The Soviet elite and Soviet society may simply have become too complex to fall in behind a one-city bandwagon, whatever it is proclaiming. In this respect, the decline of the Moscow organization is emblematic of the modernization of the Soviet political system at large.

---

[157]A gossipy work by two former Soviet journalists refers in a general way to high-level discrimination against officials native to or experienced in Moscow: "the Kremlin leaders fear that people who have longtime connections in the capital would have an adequate base there for plots and coups." Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Behind the High Kremlin Walls*, New York, Berkley Books, 1986, p. 132.

[158]From 1937 to 1957, five Muscovites served as chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR: N. A. Bulganin (1937–38), I. S. Khokhlov (1940–41), K. D. Pamfilov (acting, 1942–43), B. N. Chernousov (1949–52), and M. A. Yasnov (1956–57). But none has served since Yasnov. Three Muscovites were first deputy chairman—V. P. Pronin (1944–46), A. M. Safronov (1949–57), and Yasnov (1957–66)—but, again, none since Yasnov. Seven Moscow officials were deputy chairman between 1937 and 1960, only three since then.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987

EDITORS' NOTE: By arrangement with Richard F. Staar and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, CA), we present the latest version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties," covering developments in 1987. This Checklist continues a series that has appeared in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (YICA)* since 1976, and has been jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of material to appear in *YICA 1988*. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions should be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism*, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

Richard F. Staar

THE "NEW THINKING" that permeates the Kremlin also extends to Moscow's views regarding the world communist movement. This new outlook apparently is based on a more realistic assessment of constraints on Soviet power and influence. Moscow seeks to reduce external pressures on the USSR so that domestic economic and social problems can be solved. Communist parties, both inside and outside the Soviet empire, are expected to support these objectives. These guidelines are being disseminated through the CPSU Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, under Vadim Medvedev, and Anatoliy Dobrynin's International Department, which deals with all other, non-ruling, communist movements.

Richard F. Staar, coordinator of the international studies program at the Hoover Institution (Stanford, CA), resumed editorship of the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs *after having served as US Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna, Austria, from 1981 to 1983. A revised edition of his monograph,* USSR Foreign Policy after Detente, *appeared in 1987. The author is indebted to Dennis L. Bark, Robert Conquest, Thomas H. Henriksen, Ramon H. Myers, James H. Noyes, William E. Ratliff, and Margit N. Grigory—all members of the* YICA *editorial board—for their contributions to this essay.*

The goal is a rebuilt, economically more powerful Soviet Union, which would again project an image of a model socio-political system for the rest of the world; this, in turn, is expected ultimately to benefit all national communist parties. Moscow sees a period of global détente as a main prerequisite for this process. Interdependence and cooperation, thus, should replace East-West confrontation during this breathing spell (*peredyshka*).

Non-ruling communist parties are being told to subordinate class struggle temporarily to the world-wide peace campaign. In joining with other left-wing movements in the struggle against the arms race, the communists are not to aspire to a leading role or to lecture their domestic allies, but to "seek to learn from them."[1] Third World revolutionary-democratic parties are also told to use extreme caution in deciding whether or not to resort to armed struggle. Manifestations of leftist extremism should be renounced because "any local conflict has a tendency to grow into a regional or even a world conflict."[2] The implication appears to be that revolutionary insurgencies cannot count on automatic Soviet military assistance or intervention on their behalf.

This less dogmatic Soviet approach could be seen in speeches and activities marking the 70th anniversary

[1]Vitaliy Korionov, "Acknowledging Responsibility," *Pravda* (Moscow), May 9, 1987, p. 4.

[2]Ye. Plimak, "Marxism-Leninism and the Revolutionary Character of the Late 20th Century," ibid., Nov. 14, 1986, pp. 2–3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Growth of Communist Parties in Non–CP-Ruled States

Region	1970		1986	
	Number of CP's	CP members (millions)	Number of CP's	CP members (millions)
Asia, Australia, and Oceania	19	0.60	22	1.40
The Americas	25	0.38	25	0.40
Africa	9	0.02	11	0.08
Western Europe	21	2.27	22	2.80
Totals	74	3.27	80	4.68

Source: N.F. Shumikhin, Ed., *Sotsializm i sovremennyy mir* (Socialism and the Contemporary World), Kiev, Vyshcha shkola, 1987, p. 20.

of the Bolshevik Revolution. CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev set the tone on November 2 when he declared: "the days of the Comintern, of the Informburo, and even of binding international conferences, have passed."[3] He reportedly listed six generally recognized principles that should apply to relations between the CPSU and other ruling communist parties: (1) unconditional and total equality; (2) responsibility of the ruling party for affairs in its own country; (3) concern for the general cause of communism; (4) respect for achievements in other communist-ruled countries; (5) voluntary cooperation; and (6) strict observance of peaceful coexistence.[4]

On November 4, the Soviet leader told members of 178 delegations (from 119 countries)[5] that "the communist movement needs renewal and qualitative changes." He rejected the "arrogance of belief in one's omniscience" and extended an invitation "not only to fraternal parties, communists, but also to socialists and social democrats, and representatives of other trends in political thought and action . . . to cooperation and joint search."[6]

According to a Soviet authority, the world communist movement had expanded from 88 countries with parties and some 50 million members during the early 1970's to almost 100 countries with one or more parties and over 82 million members in the mid-1980's.[7] Of this last figure, more than 77 million reportedly live in the 16 communist-ruled states of what Moscow calls "the world socialist system." The remainder, fewer than 4.7 million, are scattered in 80 other countries (for a geographic distribution of this latter category, see Table 1).

Twelve of the ruling parties govern the states of the Soviet-led "socialist commonwealth of nations," which was most recently augmented by the implicit recognition of the former "revolutionary democratic" Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party as a communist party.[8] (Cambodia does, however, enjoy only observer status with the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance —CEMA). Other "revolutionary democratic" states will presumably be advanced to membership in the commonwealth once their ruling parties qualify for consideration as full-fledged communist parties. One Soviet source indicated that approximately 40 revolutionary democratic parties exist in the Third World, although it did not enumerate them.[9] The four ruling movements outside the so-called commonwealth are those in Albania, China, North Korea, and Yugoslavia (the last one also being an associate CEMA member).

The Checklist includes 107 countries or other geographic entities with either one or more communist parties recognized by Moscow, a "vanguard revolutionary democratic" party, or one of the more radical among the revolutionary-democratic or liberation movements not yet termed "vanguard" by Moscow. The CPSU acknowledges the existence of more than one communist party in Australia, Costa Rica, Greece, India, Jamaica,

[3]M. S. Gorbachev over Moscow television, Nov. 2, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Nov. 3, 1987, p. 59.

[4]Cited by Vladimir Kusin, in "Gorbachev, Eastern Europe, and the Communist Movement," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Background Report/220, Nov. 13, 1987, p. 2.

[5]Editorial, "Socialism's Decisive Contribution," *Za rubezhom* (Moscow), No. 46, Nov. 13–19, 1987, p. 1. The delegations included not only recognized communist parties, but also social democratic parties and Marxist-Leninist movements from the Third World. The Chinese and Albanians were not present.

[6]M. S. Gorbachev over Moscow television, Nov. 4, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 4, 1987, pp. 23–24.

[7]N. F. Shumikhin, Chief Ed., *Sotsializm i sovremennyy mir* (Socialism and the Contemporary World), Kiev, Vyshcha shkola, 1987, p. 20.

[8]Kampuchean representatives attended meetings during 1987 with newspaper editors, heads of official press agencies, and deputy directors of party international departments of Soviet-bloc countries—all held in Moscow. See *Pravda*, May 7, June 19, and Dec. 16, 1987. In addition, Kampuchea is featured as one of the 16 "socialist" countries in a supplement to *New Times* (Moscow), Nov. 8, 1987, p. 12.

[9]K. N. Brutents, "Liberated Countries: The Anti-Imperialist Struggle," *Pravda*, Jan. 10, 1986, p. 3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lebanon, New Zealand, Spain, and Sweden. It also recognizes one each in such non-sovereign territories as Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palestine, Puerto Rico, Réunion, and West Berlin. Certain communist parties operate in more than one geographic area—e.g., the Communist Party of Malaya (in Malaysia and Singapore) and the Communist Party of Ireland (in Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

The vanguard revolutionary democratic parties[10] include the ruling parties in Afghanistan, Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen. Revolutionary democratic parties or movements are listed for Bahrain, Grenada, Nicaragua (the ruling Sandinistas), Suriname, and Zimbabwe, although Moscow is somewhat unclear about how it views the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. Finally, several Marxist-Leninist movements not recognized by Moscow are listed in italics.

The acronym for those movements not designated as "Communist Party of . . ." appears on the Checklist, with the full name provided in the legend. Population data are estimates as of July 1987.[11] The list also identifies the party leader (the secretary general or general secretary, unless otherwise noted in parentheses); the dates of the most recent party congress or national conference; the legal status of the movement; its percentage of the vote and the number of seats it won in the most recent (the year in parentheses) national elections—if the party was legal and participated. Table 2 lists in chronological order the congresses or equivalent national conferences held during 1987.

Most of the 16 ruling communist parties recorded insignificant change in membership from the previous year, with the exception of increases claimed by China (2 million), Romania (80,000), the Soviet Union (500,000), and Vietnam (an estimated 200,000). Among the non-ruling movements, it is estimated that the Communist party of Brazil lost one-fourth of its members. The communists in Uruguay claimed an increase of almost 50 percent. The estimate for Bangladesh grew by two-fifths, but that for Indonesia dropped a comparable percentage; and those for Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand were reduced even more. Estimates are provided wherever no official data are available or the membership claimed seems unrealistically high.

The Checklist notes 15 new leaders of communist parties. Turnover by resignation, replacement by congresses, or by other top leadership decision took place in Bolivia, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. Deceased leaders were replaced in Brazil, Bangladesh, and New Zealand. There were unconfirmed reports of the emergence of a new leader of the Communist Party of Thailand.

During 1987, parliamentary elections were held in 23 of the listed countries. The ruling communist or revolutionary-democratic parties in Albania, China, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe achieved overwhelming victories in uncontested elections. Communist parties won no seats in the parliaments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Malta, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Switzerland, but did win seats in Finland (15, down from 27); Iceland (8, down from 10); Italy (177,

Table 2: Party Congresses in 1987

Party	Congress/conference	Date(s)
CP of Lesotho	7th	"Early 1987"
CP of Philippines	9th	January
CP of Lebanon	5th	Feb. 3–5
PTE–UC (Spain)	*1st*	*Feb. 8*
PdAS of Switzerland	13th	Feb. 27–Mar. 1
CP of Sri Lanka	13th	Mar. 22–26
PSUM (Mexico)	Merger congress	Mar. 23
CP of Austria	26th	Mar. 25–28
CP of Bangladesh	4th	Apr. 7–11
CP of Denmark	28th	Apr. 16–19
NKP of Norway	19th	Apr. 23–26
PCPE (Spain)	2nd	Apr. 25–27
E.AR (Greece)	1st (from KKE-I)	Apr. 24–26
KKE (Greece)	12th	May 12–16
SEW (West Berlin)	8th	May 15–17
VPK (Sweden)	28th	May 23–27
CP of Peru	9th	May 27–30
SKP–Y (Finland)	*1st*	*June 5–7*
CP of Australia	29th	June 6–8
NDP (Suriname)	1st	June 7
CP of Tunisia	9th	June 12–14
SKP (Finland)	21st	June 12–15
YSP (South Yemen)	4th	June 20–21
PPS (Morocco)	4th	July 17–19
CP of Brazil	8th	July 17–20
CP of USA	24th	Aug. 13–16
PPC (Costa Rica)	15th	Aug. 23–24
PDPA (Afghanistan)	2nd Natl. Conf.	Oct. 18–19
CP of China	13th	Oct. 25–Nov. 1
CP of Sudan	4th (legal)	Oct. 31
AB of Iceland	Biennial	Nov. 7–10
CP of Great Britain	40th	Nov. 14–18
PMS (Mexico)	1st	Nov. 25–30
CP of Japan	18th	Nov. 26–28
CP of France	26th	Dec. 2–6
CF of Martinique	9th	Dec. 12–14
AKEL of Cyprus	Extraord. Cong.	Dec. 20

[10]For a listing of 24 significant revolutionary-democratic movements, see Table 1.3 in Richard F. Staar, *USSR Foreign Policies After Detente*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, rev. ed., p. 14.

[11]For the most part, these data are drawn from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1987*, CPAS WF 87-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

down from 198); Portugal (30, down from 38); and Suriname (where Desire Bouterse's National Democratic Party won only 10.4 percent of the seats and 3 of 51 seats). Results from elections in Haiti are incomplete, and in Turkey, the party was illegal. Below, we discuss major developments by region.

Subsaharan Africa. The most newsworthy event affecting a Marxist-Leninist party in Subsaharan Africa was the approval of a new constitution in Ethiopia by 81 percent of those voting in a February 1987 referendum. When the constitution went into effect in September, the country officially became the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Additionally the Dergue, or provisional military administrative committee, transferred its power to the newly established national Shengo, or parliament, which elected strongman Mengistu Haile Mariam president of the country. This movement toward an institutionalized communist party-state is only apparent, as Mengistu retains his positions as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and general secretary of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia.[12] Ethiopia is pushing ahead with its resettlement and ruralization programs, despite the ensuing disorganization of agriculture and the attacks by Eritrean rebels.

The Central Committee of the South African Communist Party (SACP), which operates in exile from Europe and elsewhere in Africa, elected Dan Tloome as chairman. He replaced Joe Slovo, who filled the general secretary slot, which had been vacant since the death of Moses Mabhida in March 1986. The new leadership alignment recalls an earlier practice, whereby the party chairman concentrated on diplomacy and publicity while the general secretary focused on political and administrative functions. The party welcomed rent strikes, white defections from the "ruling class," and widespread disturbances inside the Republic of South Africa as making "even more effective the conduct of the revolutionary struggle on all fronts."[13]

Zimbabwe witnessed a strengthening of the power of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). On December 31, 1987, its leader, Robert Mugabe, was installed as the country's first executive president. As a consequence, he now holds the positions of party, government, and state leader. The year 1987 marked significant further movement toward a single-party state, although it is not clear whether ZANU-PF is viewed by Moscow as a "vanguard" party. The 30 parliamentary seats that had been reserved for whites (who make up less than two percent of the population) were ordered abolished. By filling those seats that were actually vacated, ZANU-PF increased its representation to 77 of 100 seats. Mugabe coopted Joshua Nkomo and a part of his opposition Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) into ZANU-PF.[14] Other elements of ZAPU, which represents the Ndebele people (the second largest ethnic group in the country), resisted this merger with the Shena-dominated ZANU-PF and engaged in continuing anti-government violence. Mugabe moved against opponents to the merger within his own party, replacing Marxist ideologues and ethnic chauvinists with moderates.

In neighboring Mozambique, President Joaquim Chissano reshuffled his council of ministers and the military high command in hopes of containing the guerrilla warfare successes of the opposition movement RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance). The military position of the ruling FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), while remaining difficult, appeared to stabilize thanks chiefly to the presence of some 30,000 foreign troops, mainly from Zimbabwe and Tanzania, and about 3,000 advisers from the Soviet bloc. In an effort to reverse the country's economic slide, FRELIMO enacted an economic rehabilitation program that formalized, in part, recent moves toward a market-type economy and away from a hard-line Marxist economic structure. FRELIMO also maintained its previous pragmatic policy of accommodation with the West and with international financial institutions in an attempt to attract assistance and investment.[15]

The Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) continued to occupy an ambiguous position. Although the party is illegal in Lesotho, its general secretary, Jacob M. Kena, operates openly as a trade union leader. A 7th CPL Congress, reportedly held "in utmost secrecy in early 1987,"[16] focused on the work of political organizing throughout the country.

The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) functions legally, a status it has enjoyed since 1985, when the government of Gaafar Nimeiri was overthrown. In 1986, the party won 3 of 264 contested seats and may also hold two uncontested seats in the 301-member legislature. In 1987, as a visible part of the parliamentary opposition, it initially opposed the government's handling of the war in the south between the predominantly Arabic-speak-

[12]See the Russian-language proceedings of the WPE's founding congress in *Uchreditel'nyy s"yezd rabochey partii Efiopii: Addis-Abeba, 6–10 sentyabrya 1984 goda* (The Founding Congress of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, September 6–10, 1984), Moscow, Politizdat, 1987, pp. 256.

[13]*African Communist* (London), No. 109, 2nd quarter 1987, p. 7.

[14]"Unification of the Party," *Pravda*, Dec. 24, 1987, p. 5.

[15]*The New York Times*, Jan. 25, 1988, pp. 1 and 4; and Richard Grenier, "Weaning Mozambique," *National Review* (New York), Feb. 5, 1988, pp. 41–44.

[16]*World Marxist Review* (Toronto), November 1987, p. 95.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing Muslim northerners and the non-Muslim southerners. Toward the end of the year, however, the SCP gave its support to some governmental military measures. The party, which advocates a secular state, has opposed the government's decision not to abrogate the 1983 Islamization laws.

Across the continent in Senegal, several communist and leftist parties remained divided and without meaningful impact on national politics. The Marxist parties have tried, without much success, to form coalitions; they are critical of the government's austerity policies, required by the IMF and World Bank in return for financial assistance. The Party of Independence and Labor, officially recognized by Moscow as a communist movement,[17] sent representatives to a number of Soviet bloc-sponsored meetings.

In Nigeria, the Marxists operate from much less organized platforms than in Senegal. They joined the national debate on the structure of a new political system with the release of the Nigerian Labour Congress's manifesto, which called for socialism in Nigeria. The appeal of socialism is centered mainly among the intelligentsia and trade unionists, not in functioning parties. In fact, at least one Soviet source seems not even to recognize the continued existence of the communist Socialist Workers' and Peasants' Party.[18]

The ruling Marxist-Leninist parties in Angola, Benin, and Congo/Brazzaville experienced a difficult year. In the People's Republic of Angola, the ruling MPLA-PT (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Labor Party) continued to confront the twin problems of a badly faltering economy and an escalating insurgency conducted by UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). For reasons both of survival and of ideological affinity, the MPLA-PT has relied on substantial support from the Soviet bloc. During 1987, the USSR provided military equipment worth more than US$1 billion, and Cuba increased its troop presence to 40,000 in an unsuccessful effort to eliminate UNITA.[19] The deteriorating economy served as a reason to replace a number of high Angolan officials. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos dismissed Foreign Trade Minister Ismael Gaspar Martins and Internal Trade Minister Adriano Pereira dos Santos, Jr., in May, citing food and medicine shortages. Maria Mambo Cafe, in charge of social and economic affairs, was fired in December. She had been an opponent of expanded economic ties with the West and of efforts to join the IMF.[20]

The People's Revolutionary Party of Benin (PRPB) attempted to bolster a weak economy by revitalizing the private sector, increasing the performance of state corporations, and improving relations with Western countries. The regime encountered considerable opposition, particularly from public employees, who demonstrated to protest the lack of salary raises, and from students, who demonstrated for payment of their scholarships.[21]

Dramatic events rocked the People's Republic of the Congo, which also experienced opposition to its policies dealing with economic problems brought on, in part, by the decline in international oil prices. An unsuccessful June plot to kill the chairman of the ruling Congolese Workers' Party (PCT), Denis Sassou-Ngouesso, led to a purge that removed Camille Bongou, the regime's number two man and chief PCT ideologue. Interestingly, the government relied on French rather than Soviet aid in the operation that captured coup leader Captain Pierre Anga and his followers.

The Americas. In August 1987, the five Central American presidents signed an agreement in Guatemala, pledging to take the region's peace process into their own hands. The strength of the plan, drawn up by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, included a series of deadlines on its implementation. The plan called for simultaneous and equal implementation of a number of provisions designed to end the conflict and outside support for indigenous belligerents, to institutionalize democracy in the region so as to prevent future conflicts, and to verify—but not enforce—compliance.[22]

From the beginning of 1987, Arias stressed that the main obstacle to peace in the region was the Sandinista government in Managua, remarking that "with or without contras and with or without military aid, I continue to think that there will be violence in Nicaragua if the Nicaraguan people cannot elect their leaders freely."[23] On January 15, 1988, Arias (who won the 1987 Nobel

[17]Shumikhin, op. cit., p. 21.

[18]The volume edited by V. V. Zagladin and G. A. Kiselev, *Politicheskiye Partii: Spravochnik* (Political Parties: A Handbook), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1986, does not even bother to mention Nigeria in its comprehensive listing of countries and parties.

[19]*The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Apr. 1, 1987; Prensa Latina (Havana), Jan. 7, 1988.

[20]Luanda Domestic Service, Dec. 14, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Africa (Sub-Sahara)* (Washington, DC), Dec. 15, 1987, p. 5.

[21]"Life in Benin Without Embellishments," Moscow Radio, Dec. 3, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 28, 1987, p. 35.

[22]Susan Kaufman Purcell, *Evaluation of the Central American Peace Plan*, Washington, DC, Central American Peace and Democracy Watch, January 1988, p. 1. Compliance with major provisions was set for November 5, 1987, then postponed to January 5, 1988, and then to January 15. After a meeting of the Central American presidents on the last date, the deadlines were extended for another month.

[23]XEW Television (Mexico City), Feb. 6, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-LAT*), Feb. 10, 1987, p. P/5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peace Prize for his efforts) and two other presidents —Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and Jose Azcona of Honduras—pointedly criticized Nicaragua for failing to comply with the plan's provisions. This was evidenced by Managua's refusal to negotiate a cease-fire directly with the resistance movement, by half-hearted democratization at home, by continued receipt of aid from abroad, and by provision of assistance to guerrilla movements elsewhere in the region. As one analyst has noted, the other Central American countries, while sometimes falling short, all complied more fully and more honestly.[24] In the face of this pressure, as well as the possibility that the US Congress would vote more aid for the resistance, the Nicaraguan government made additional concessions, including an agreement to negotiate directly with the resistance. These negotiations began on January 28, 1988.[25]

In Nicaragua, the economy continued to deteriorate, with inflation rising to over 1,000 percent and with rationed food often unavailable. The armed resistance, numbering approximately 16,000 men, operated on half of Nicaragua's territory—though not on the populous Pacific coast. According to press reports, this force seemed to have made considerable headway building support among the Nicaraguan people. In October, two months after the signing of the peace accord in Guatemala, the Nicaraguan opposition newspaper *La Prensa,* which had been outlawed for more than a year, was allowed to resume publication and criticize the regime.

Speculation as to divisions within the Sandinista leadership continued to surface. According to Major Roger Miranda, who had served as a top aide to Defense Minister Humberto Ortega until opting to defect in October 1987, the Sandinistas intend to double the size of their army and militia to about 600,000 by the mid-1990's and have agreed to train Salvadoran guerrillas in the use of surface-to-air missiles.[26]

President Duarte met with representatives of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in San Salvador, and rebel leaders enjoyed wide access to the general news media, though no cease-fire was reached. The FMLN continued to fight a defensive war in the countryside, but increasingly waged guerrilla warfare in the capital to take advantage of Duarte's vacillating policies. FMLN political front leaders Ruben Zamora and Guillermo Ungo visited El Salvador after the Guatemala accords.

Forces of the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URNG) are estimated to have declined from about 10,000 in 1981–82 to fewer than 2,000. During 1987, the URNG concentrated more on propaganda and reorganization than on military encounters—e.g., they set up a radio station, La Voz Popular, clearly modeled on the Salvadoran FMLN's Radio Venceremos. The government met with guerrilla leaders in Madrid without resolving differences.[27] The communist Guatemalan Party of Labor, meanwhile, continued to call the URNG "pseudo-leftist."[28]

In Colombia, the truce between the government and some guerrilla groups continued to fall apart even as evidence mounted concerning cooperation between the guerrillas and the country's powerful drug rings. In October, the leaders of six major guerrilla organizations formed the Simón Bolivar National Guerrilla Coordinating Board. Defectors from the Communist Party of Colombia claimed that the guerrillas have Cuban instructors and an air base with modern Soviet-made weapons. A so-called America Battalion claims to incorporate guerrillas from Colombia, the Alfaro Lives! movement in Ecuador, and the Tupac Amaru II movement in Peru. In mid-June, *World Marxist Review* sponsored an international seminar in Bogota on"Democratization in Latin America," for Colombians and representatives from five other countries, which was addressed by speakers from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.[29]

A variety of Marxist-Leninist movements in Peru operated at high intensity. The United Left (IU) remained the second largest political force in that Andean country, making Peru one of only two countries in the region (the other being Guyana) whose major opposition party is Marxist-Leninist. The Peruvian Communist Party, which held its 9th Congress in 1987, is a major actor in the coalition. The IU—a coalition of organizations ranging from moderate to extreme left—is emerging as the only alternative to the APRA government of Alán Garcia, which is encountering seemingly intractable political and economic problems on all sides. Meanwhile, the Soviet bloc remains the major outside influence on the Peruvian military. In May, Peru purchased five Antonov–32 military transport planes to replace An–26 planes bought a decade earlier; it is reported that Cuba wanted to buy some of the An–26's.[30]

---

[24]Purcell, op. cit., pp. 1–10.

[25]*The New York Times*, Jan. 29, 1988.

[26]Ibid., Jan. 24 and 28, 1988; Miranda interview at US Department of State on Dec. 8, 1987, in undated State Department release headed "Robert Miranda Bengoechea"; and Humberto Ortega comments confirming the 600,000 figure, on Managua Domestic Service, Dec. 12, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Dec. 14, 1987, pp. 16–20.

[27]*The Washington Post*, June 7, 1987; also *FBIS-LAT*, Sept. 3, 1987, p. 3.

[28]World Marxist Review, *Information Bulletin* (Toronto), February 1987, p. 29.

[29]AFP (Paris), Oct. 2, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Oct. 5, 1987, pp. 25–27; *El Siglo* (Bogota), Aug. 4, 1987; *World Marxist Review*, September 1987, pp. 90–91.

[30]AFP (Paris), May 26, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, May 27, 1987, p. J/1.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Widespread terrorism, perpetrated in the main by the ultra-leftist "Shining Path" (Sendero Luminoso), forced the Garcia government to maintain 17 of Peru's provinces under a state of emergency. In a partial tactical shift aimed at competing with other leftist political forces, Sendero has turned in part to less violent forms of political activity; for example, it also announced that it will hold its first national congress in 1988.[31]

In Chile, the communist party joined other leftist groups during June to form a United Left coalition, the most widely-based leftist opposition group since the Popular Unity coalition of the early 1970's. Tensions continued within the party proper and within the broader United Left, however, because of continuing communist support for the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, perpetrator of terrorist acts. Not until October did the communist party begin encouraging registration for voting in the 1988 presidential plebiscite.

Communist parties had substantial representation and influence in the legislatures of Guadeloupe, Guyana, Martinique, and Peru; representation was only minimal in Brazil (where the party convened its 8th Congress, the first ever held legally in the country), Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In other countries—including Panama—communists applied pressure indirectly through fronts, other parties, and student and labor groups. In Bolivia, a prominent communist was elected head of the large Bolivian Labor Central (COB). For the first time in history, the United Party of Haitian Communists ran a candidate for president. The movements in Argentina and Uruguay were highly critical of the amnesty bills of their respective governments, both of which set short deadlines for filing of charges against military personnel accused of breaking the law during anti-guerrilla campaigns in the 1970's.

In Cuba, the economy remained in a state of decay during 1987, but Fidel Castro resisted the trend in the communist world toward decentralization and the increased use of material incentives. The Cuban leader increasingly stressed a blend of volunteer work and moral incentives characteristic of the 1960's, policies that had wrecked the economy in that earlier period. Unlike current leaders in other major communist-ruled countries—particularly the Soviet Union and China—Castro cannot blame predecessors for his country's current troubles; they are of his own making. To adopt Chinese- or Soviet-style reforms would be to admit that Cuba has been on the wrong track since 1959. Defector reports indicate that the leaderships of Cuba and of Nicaragu are infested with corruption and favoritism.[32]

Despite Castro's refusal to follow the Soviet model in economic reform, the Cuban leader played a prominent role at the celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November. He returned home, saying his ties to Moscow have never been better. Trade with the Soviet Union was expected to reach a turnover of $9 billion in 1987, some $200 million more than in 1986. Part of the massive Soviet support for Castro—an estimated US$5 billion annually in economic and military aid—continued to come in the form of Soviet purchases of half the Cuban sugar crop at three times the world market price.[33] US-Cuban relations deteriorated in the first part of 1987 but improved somewhat in the final months of the year as several agreements were signed, including an immigration pact. Fidel Castro stated his support for the Arias peace plan and met several times with Sandinista leaders to discuss it.

The Soviet Union made advances in Latin America, both before and after Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's trip to a number of regional capitals in October and November. These included an expansion of already extensive trade with Argentina, the securing of resupply facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet in Uruguay, the sale of military equipment to Peru, and conclusion of agreements with Panama for Aeroflot landing rights and a service contract to provide drydock and other shore facilities in that country for the Soviet fishing fleet.[34]

The Communist Party USA claims that it continues to grow, which is denied by some analysts. However, the party decided not to run a candidate of its own in the 1988 presidential election. Instead, it resolved to seek to expand its positions in the national "peace movement," among blacks, and within the Democratic party.[35] In Mexico, the communist-dominated United Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM) merged with the small but influential social democratic Mexican Workers' Party (PMT) and three still smaller groups to form the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS). It is of marginal consequence in Mexican politics.

Asia and the Pacific. Except for the regime in North Korea, the ruling communist parties of this region were all involved in nurturing reforms to make their systems work more effectively. The Communist Party of China (CCP) successfully put down large-scale student dem-

[31]Lima Panamericana Television, Nov. 20, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Nov. 23, 1987, p. 39; also *Que Hacer* (Lima), No. 50, 1987 p. 59.

[32]*The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Nov. 27, 1987; and *The New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1987.

[33]*Granma* (Havana), Jan. 19, 1987.

[34]*Crítica* (Panama City), Nov. 27, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Dec. 2, 1987, pp. 30–31; and *The Washington Post*, Dec. 16, 1987.

[35]*People's Daily World* (New York), Sep. 24, 1987; *The New York Times*, Nov. 20, 1987; and *The Washington Times*, Jan. 21, 1988.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

onstrations in early January 1987 and responded with a campaign of its own: an "anti-bourgeois liberalism" drive to rid the party of over-zealous critics. By spring, writer Wang Ruowang, astro-physicist Fang Lizhi, and journalist Liu Binyan had been expelled from the party, and by summer, nearly 400,000 college graduates and postgraduate students were being sent out to do manual production work for two years instead of being assigned to government agencies.[36] Another one million were to spend the summer recess at compulsory work in factories, offices, and rural villages as part of a program to "remold their views." Security organs continued to search out and arrest "counterrevolutionaries." Between late January and early June 1987, authorities reportedly discovered 15,000 anticommunist posters in 11 counties of Sichuan province alone.[37]

The CCP convened its 13th Congress in late October. Delegates approved a new slate of leaders for the Politburo and elected a smaller and younger Central Committee, cutting that body from 210 to 175 and lowering the average age from 59 to 55. The representation of the military in the Politburo was reduced, and a new generation of leaders "replaced" the survivors of the Long March in the top party positions. Yet, veteran leaders Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and Peng Zhen still remain on the scene as elder statesmen.

The 13th CCP Congress upheld the party line set forth in late 1978: modernization as the primary goal and reforms to achieve that objective. The new party general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, strongly emphasized that while pursuing reforms, the CCP would firmly uphold the "four cardinal principles:" adherence to the socialist road; upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat; upholding the dictatorship of the communist party; and adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Zhao stated that China still remained in the "primary stage of socialism," and he described the road to modern socialism as long and arduous.

China's agricultural reforms—permitting more privatization and free market determination of prices—suffered serious setbacks, as the country had to import 14 million tons of grain in 1987 at a cost of US$1 billion, the largest annual grain-import figure in this decade.[38] Pork, vegetable oil, and sugar became so scarce in the cities that the state had to reimpose rationing in December 1987. These developments took place because farmers continued to transfer their land and labor to higher-priced crops and products such as *chuanxiong*, a leafy medicinal plant grown in Sichuan province, whose price has risen astronomically in recent years (from $40 to $8,000 a ton).

On January 10, 1988, the Chinese weekly *Liaowang* published an interview with Soviet chief Gorbachev, who was reported to have proposed a summit meeting with Beijing's leaders in order to speed up reestablishment of normal relations between the two largest communist-ruled states.[39] China refused the invitation several days later on the grounds that Moscow had not fulfilled the three demands made by Beijing as initial conditions for normalization: withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan; an end to Soviet support of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia; and a sharp reduction in USSR troops and missiles deployed along China's northern border.

In Communist-ruled Vietnam, Nguyen Van Linh (72) heads the new "circle of five" leaders, who had replaced Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Duc Tho. This leadership concentrated on reshuffling personnel —ridding the party of inept and corrupt members and building networks of supporters throughout the country; by the end of 1987, Linh was in charge, with allies in important positions. Although the new leaders talked reform,[40] they initiated few positive steps. They do, however, place new stress on openness (*cong khai*) in conducting party business and on learning from previous mistakes. On January 21, 1988, Linh acknowledged to a group of foreign journalists that Vietnam's farmers could not buy fertilizers, that factories worked at only 30 to 70 percent of capacity, that inflation was rampant, and that the family planning system was in disarray. He stated that Vietnam could learn from the capitalist world, and expressed the hope that ties with China could be improved and that the United States and Vietnam could now put their war behind them.[41]

The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, with some 88,000 members, responded to Moscow's call for reform by holding meetings to discuss how to bolster Mongolia's sagging pastoral economy. The United States established diplomatic ties with Mongolia, the Soviets removed some troops from the country, and Ulaanbaatar modestly improved relations with Beijing.

The Korean Workers' Party continued to mobilize support for Kim Chong-il to succeed his father, Kim Il-song, in North Korea. North Korea probably caused the destruction of a Republic of Korea (ROK) airplane over Burma in November 1987. The United States added

[36]*Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), July 1, 1987, p. 2.
[37]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), July 7, 1987, p. K/1.
[38]*The Wall Street Journal*, Jan. 19, 1988, pp. 1 and 15.
[39]Reported in *The New York Times*, Jan. 11, 1988, pp. 1 and 6.
[40]"Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Plenum," *Pravda*, Dec. 21, 1987, p. 5.
[41]*The New York Times*, Jan. 22, 1988, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pyongyang to its list of terrorist regimes.[42] The North refrained from any serious negotiations with the Republic of Korea during the latter's year of political turbulence and decided to boycott the September 1988 Olympic Games in Seoul.

During the spring of 1987, some 653 members of the Marxist-Leninist faction of the Malyasian Communist Party surrendered to the government, leaving a greatly reduced force of guerrillas in that country's border area.[43] In Thailand, too, defections from the local communist party continued, and police arrested a handful of its leaders while they were in Bangkok to plan a 5th Party Congress for October 1987. The name of the current leader of the Communist Party of Thailand, Thong Jaensri, may be a pseudonum, as was believed the case with Pracha Tanyapaiboon in last year's listing. The Burmese Communist Party's leaders are aging, yet remain committed to expanding their base areas in the north, which are protected by their People's Army. According to a Western journalist who visited these areas in early 1987, serious splits in the BCP leadership exist. The party has failed in recent years to reestablish a foothold in central Burma.[44]

The Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), escalated activities to destabilize the country. Rebel leaders allowed a cease-fire with the Aquino government to expire and resumed armed struggle. The NPA escalated killings of government officials and their key supporters. Rebel forces also increased contacts with international support groups outside the Philippines. Late in the year, the government reversed its policy of reconciliation with the communists and ordered military and paramilitary activities against the NPA. The United States increased its military aid to the Philippines. But it has not been possible for government forces to suppress the NPA, and the conflict has become a stand-off.

The total population of the independent island states in the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea, amounts to around 5.5 million. There is no communist party in this region, although several formal Marxist groupings exist in the French-associated territory of New Caledonia. Over the last few years, student, youth, and trade union organizations in Fiji, Nauru,[45] New Guinea, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and West Samoa have sent representatives to various communist front meetings in Eastern Europe and the USSR, as well as pro-Soviet labor union activities in Australia. In March 1987, when USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Canberra, he surprised his hosts by adding Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Tuvalu to the list of island nations that have shown interest in developing agreements with the Soviet Union. The conservative Tongan Minister for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Crown Prince Tupouto, traveled to Moscow in February 1987, reportedly to discuss a fishing agreement, although previously he had assured Australia that his country had no fish to sell to the Soviets.

The Bangladesh Communist Party held its 4th Congress in April 1987 at Dhaka and endorsed the objective of promoting a "national democratic revolution." This line calls for working with all "progressive liberal democratic forces" to topple the current regime. In New Zealand, communist-led front organizations organized support for Nicaragua and opposition to government plans to privatize social welfare and reduce budget deficits. Although unsuccessful in the latter effort, some group members did win seats in the 1987 elections to the Council of Trade Unions.

During early July, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party hosted a congress for the purpose of initiating a campaign to transform Asia and the Pacific Basin into a peace zone. Seventeen communist parties of the region participated, with the Japanese and North Koreans absenting themselves (the Chinese were not invited). Gorbachev sent a message of greeting to the congress, in which he discussed how the region's communist parties and front organizations could promote nuclear-free zones and prevent the United States, Japan, and South Korea from strengthening security ties.[46] In November and December 1987, Soviet diplomats met in Tokyo with Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno and stated that Moscow would like to improve relations with Japan.[47]

The Middle East. The political as well as military fortunes of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) continued to deteriorate during 1987 despite efforts to coopt opposition leaders and a modest increase in Soviet military strength to approximately 120,000, the level existing before the previous year's force cutback.[48] With its rule effective only in a few prin-

[42]Ibid., Jan. 21, 1988, p. 2.

[43]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EAS*), June 8, 1987, p. H/1.

[44]Bertel Lintner, "The Rise and Fall of the Communists," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), June 4, 1987, pp. 27–29.

[45]Note the announcement of diplomatic relations with Nauru in *Pravda*, Dec. 30, 1987, p. 4.

[46]*FBIS-EAS*, July 10, 1987, pp. BB/1–3; and *People's Democracy* (New Delhi), July 19, 1987, p.3.

[47]*The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 18, 1987, pp. 7 and 10; and *Pravda*, Dec. 2, 1987, p. 4.

[48]US Department of State, *Afghanistan: Eight Years of Occupation*, Washington, DC, December 1987, Special Report No. 173.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cipal towns during daylight, the PDPA sought to broaden its appeal by such stratagems as altering the name of the state from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Republic of Afghanistan,[49] and by stressing the more religiously significant name—Najibullah—of PDPA General Secretary Najib.[50] As discussions about the withdrawal of Soviet occupying forces intensified, PDPA reform efforts became marked by an air of desperation. There were purges and internal party reorganization, and major state reforms, all designed to create the image of a PDPA purified of Soviet and communist identity and suited to lead a genuine national coalition. This effort appeared to be no more successful than the doubling of military salaries in June was in stemming mass military defections and draft dodging.[51]

The only other ruling Marxist-Leninist movement in the region, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in the People's Democratic Republic of [South] Yemen (PDRY), also struggles for internal and international legitimacy, even though it does control its own territory without Soviet occupation forces. Since the bloody civil war of January 1986, most of the veteran Marxist ideologues who gave the regime its legitimacy either have been killed or live in exile in North Yemen. This complicates the PDRY-Soviet relationship, although Moscow supports large advisory programs to YSP organizations, apparently in the hope of strengthening the regime's roots. Gorbachev's "personal representative," Karen Brutents represented the USSR in two days of high-level talks in Aden toward the end of the year.[52]

For members of the tiny, illegal communist movements on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf—the Communist Party of Saudi Arabia (CPSA) and the Bahrain National Liberation Front (NLF/B)—the new high-profile Soviet diplomatic activity presents anomalies. Even as CPSA General Secretary Mahdi Habib called for "an end to the absolutist administration" in his country,[53] Moscow was redoubling its efforts to formalize relations with the Gulf States and for the first time officially had received a Saudi oil minister, the newly-appointed Hisham Nazir.[54] Similarly, although the thrust of the NLF/B's propaganda focused on the arrests in late 1986 of some 18 of its members, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy toured Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman suggesting security guarantees for shipping in the region and agreeing to lease three Soviet tankers for the transport of Kuwaiti oil.[55]

Further deterioration of economic and social conditions in Iran gave some credence to claims by the communist Tudeh party on the occasion of its 46th anniversary that ". . . the number of party cells has increased throughout the country . . . ."[56] Although all opposition groups in Iran, whether legal or illegal, have new opportunities as the country's economy worsens, there is no sign that the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini yet faces a threat to its physical control of the country.

Like the Tudeh, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) places blame for the Iran-Iraq war on its own country's central government. Although the conflict remains unpopular in both Iran and Iraq, neither society has yet generated a major anti-war movement onto which the local communist party could graft itself. The ICP retains its goal of a national front uniting all parties opposed to the ruling Baathist regime, but in fact the ICP remains buried in a front with the Democratic National Party of Kurdistan/Iraq and some smaller organizations clearly dominated by the Kurds.[57]

The Syrian Communist Party (SCP) plays the role of restive lap dog, used and tolerated by the Baathist regime of Hafez al-Assad and restricted to occasional oratorical objections against Syrian policy. In a Moscow speech, veteran SCP leader Khaled Bakhdash mentioned "Syria's great economic difficulties" and drew a contrast between the condition of "the workers, peasants, and working masses" and that of the "parasitic" bourgeoisie and the bureaucratic apparatus.[58] Assad's relations with the Soviet Union encountered problems during 1987, particularly over an apparent Soviet cutback in arms shipments, which appeared to be part of an effort to permit the USSR to join the peace process in the region. During Assad's visit to Moscow in April, Gorbachev mentioned in a toast that the Soviet Union's lack of relations with Israel was abnormal and that military expansion was not the way to achieve peace in the area.[59]

In the course of 1987, communist parties from the Middle East convened twice in Athens and once at Beirut. On each occasion, they attacked the United States and other NATO countries for their presence in the Persian Gulf.[60]

[49]*Kabul New Times*, Nov. 29, 1987.

[50]For explanation of the name change, see TASS, Oct. 4, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 5, 1987, p. 30.

[51]Radio Kabul in Dari, June 28, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East & South Asia* (Washington, DC), July 2, 1987, p. P/2.

[52]*Middle East International* (London), Oct. 24, 1987, p. 14; and *Pravda*, Dec. 24 and 28, 1987.

[53]*World Marxist Review*, March 1987, p. 102.

[54]TASS, Jan. 22, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1987, p. H/1.

[55]TASS, Apr. 19, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 23, 1987, p. H/1–2. On a visit by K. N. Brutents to Kuwait see *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1988, p. 4.

[56]*Tudeh News* (London), Oct. 14, 1987.

[57]*Le Monde Diplomatique* (Paris), October 1986, p. 18.

[58]*Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Nov. 4, 1987.

[59]*The Washington Post*, Oct. 12, 1987; and *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1987.

[60]See *Pravda*, Sept. 8 and Aug. 31, 1987; and Moscow Radio, Oct. 22, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 23, 1987, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Checklist of Communist Parties in 1987

L — legal; O — outlawed; R — ruling; U — unrecognized

Subsaharan Africa[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
A. Angola (MPLA-PT)	7,950,244	35,000 claimed	José Eduardo dos Santos	2nd, Dec. 9–11, 1985	R	— (1980); all 203 MPLA approved
B. Benin (PRPB)	4,339,096	Less than 2,000	Mathieu Kérékou (Chairman, CC)	2nd, Nov. 18–24, 1985	R	— (1984); all 196 PRPB approved
C. Congo (PCT)	2,082,154	9,000 est.	Denis Sassou-Ngouesso (Chair.)	3rd, July 23–30, 1984	R	95.0 (1984); all 153 PCT approved
D. Ethiopia (WPE)	46,706,229	50,000 est.	Mengistu Haile Mariam	1st (Const.), Sept. 6–10, 1984	R	85.0 (1987); all 835 WPE members
1. Lesotho	1,621,932	No current data	Jacob M. Kena	7th, "early 1987"[e]	U	(1985)[f]
E. Mozambique (FRELIMO)	14,535,805	130,000 claimed	Joaquim Albert Chissano	4th, Apr. 26–29, 1983	R	— (1986); incomplete tally
2. Nigeria (SWPP) (prob. defunct)	97,383,000[g]	No current data	Dapo Fatogun	1st, Nov. 1978	O	(1983)
3. Réunion	549,697	2,000 est.	Paul Vergès	5th, July 12–14, 1980	L	29.2 (1986); 13 of 45 to leftist coalition (7 for PCR)
4. Senegal (PIT)	7,064,025	No current data	Amath Dansoko	2nd, Sept. 28–Oct. 2, 1984	L	0.5 (1983); none
5. South Africa	34,313,356	No current data	Joe Slovo Dan Tloome (Chair.)	6th, Dec. 1984 or early 1985 in London	O	(1984)
6. Sudan	23,524,622	9,000 est.	Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud Mansur	4th (legal), Oct. 31, 1967	L	1.67 (1986); 5 of 301[h]
F. Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF)	9,372,000	No current data	Robert G. Mugabe	2nd, Aug. 8–12, 1984	R	76.0 (1987); 77 of 100[i]

The Americas[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
7. Argentina	31,144,775	80,000 claimed	Athos Fava	16th, Nov. 4–7, 1986	L	5.3 (1987); none (in Broad Front coal.)[j]
8. Bolivia	6,309,642	500 claimed	Simón Reyes Rivera (First Sec. to July) Humberto Ramirez (majority faction) Carlos Soria Galvarro (minority)	5th, Feb. 9–13, 1985; Extraordinary, Apr. 26–29, 1986	L	2.21 (1985); 4 of 130 FPU coalition

[a]Arabic numerals indicate the 96 countries or geographic areas in which Moscow apparently recognizes the existence of communist parties. Listed with capital letters "A" through "L" are 12 countries in which there are significant "revolutionary democratic"parties (a majority of them ruling)—organizations on the verge of evolving into full-fledged communist parties in Moscow's eyes. In italics are several other important rival communist organizations, often pro-Beijing, that are not recognized by Moscow.

[b]Drawn from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1987*, CPAS WF 87-001, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, unless otherwise noted.

[c]The party secretary general or general secretary, except when some other official is the most important, in which case, the position occupied is noted in parentheses.

[d]An em dash indicates that the communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate, the year of the most recent election (where the legislature still sits) is given in parentheses.

[e]See *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), November 1987, p. 95. This account ignores previous mention of a November 1984 congress of the CPL (see, for example, *African Communist* [London], 3rd Quarter 1985).

[f]Although individual party members are allowed to operate legally, the party itself is illegal and did not participate in the 1985 elections.

[g]Arthur S. Banks, Ed., *Political Handbook of the World 1987*, Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, 1987, p. 423.

[h]These included 2 elected from territorial constituencis and 3 elected by graduates of universities and technical schools.

[i]Elections to the 30 seats formerly reserved for the white population increased the representation of ZANU-PF in the 100-member legislature from 64 to 77.

[j]The party also failed to win any seats in the September 6, 1987, parliamentary and provincial bi-elections.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Americas[a] (cont.)	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
9. Brazil	147,094,739	15,000 est.	Salomão Malina	8th (called Natl. Meeting of Communists), July 17–20, 1987	L	— (1986); 2 of 487
10. Canada	25,857,943	2,500 est.	William Kashtan	26th, Apr. 5–8, 1985	L	.05 (1984); none
11. Chile	12,448,008	20,000 est.	Luís Corvalán Lepe	16th, June 1984 (clandestine)	O	n/a
12. Colombia	30,660,504	18,000 est. (incl. youth org.)	Gilberto Vieira White	14th, Nov. 7–11, 1984	L	1.4 (1986); 9 of 199, Patriotic Union
13. Costa Rica (PVP)	2,811,652	3,500 est. (pre-split)	Humberto Vargas Carbonell	15th, Sept. 15–16, 1984	L	0.8 (1986); 1 of 57, Popular Alliance
(PPC)		No current data	Manuel Mora Valverde	15th, Aug. 23–24, 1987	L	— (1986); 1 of 57, United People coalition
14. Cuba	10,259,047	523,639 claimed	Fidel Castro Ruz	3rd, Feb. 4–7, and Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 1986	R	— (1986), all 499 PCC approved
15. Dominican Republic	6,960,743	750 est.	Narciso Isa Conde	3rd, Mar. 15–17, 1984	L	0.3 (1986); none
16. Ecuador	9,954,609	500 est.	René Maugé Mosquera	10th, Nov. 27–29, 1981	L	3.6 (1986); 3 of 71, Broad Leftist Front
17. El Salvador	5,260,478	1,000 est.	Shafik Jorge Handal	7th, Apr. 1979	O	(1985)
G. Grenada (MBPM)	84,748	No current data	Kenrick Radix (Chairman)	1st, Oct. 1985	L	5.0 (1984); none
18. Guadeloupe	336,354	3,000 est.	Guy Daninthe	8th, Apr. 27–29, 1984	L	— (1986); 10 of 41, out of 22 won by left coalition
19. Guatemala (PGT)	8,622,387	500 est.	Carlos González[k]	4th, Dec. 1969	O	(1985)
20. Guyana (PPP)	765,844	200 est.	Cheddi Jagan	22nd, Aug. 3–5, 1985	L	16.8 (1985); 8 of 53 elected members
21. Haiti (PUCH)	6,187,115	350 est.	René Théodore	1st, 1979	L	(1987); incomplete
22. Honduras	4,823,818	200 est.[l]	Rigoberto Padilla Rush[m]	4th, Jan. 1986 (clandestine)	O	(1985)
23. Jamaica (WPJ)	2,455,536	75 est.	Trevor Munroe	3rd, Dec. 14–21, 1984	L	— (1983); boycotted
24. Martinique	344,922	1,000 est.	Armand Nicolas	9th, Dec. 12–14, 1987	L	— (1986); 3 of 41
25. Mexico (PMS)	81,860,566	90,000 claimed	Gilberto Rincón Gallardo	Merger congress, Mar. 23, 1987; 1st, Nov. 25–29, 1987	L	3.24 (1985); 12 of 400 to predecessor PSUM
26. Nicaragua (PSN)	3,319,059	No current data	Gustavo Tablada	10th, Oct. 1973	L	1.3 (1984); 2 of 96
H. (FSLN)		4,000 claimed	Daniel Ortega (Coord., Ex. Com.)		R	63.0 (1984); 61 of 96
27. Panama (PdP)	2,274,833	13,089 est.	Rubén Dario Souza	8th, Jan 24–26, 1986	L	— (1984); none
28. Paraguay	4,251,924	4,000 est.	Júlio Rojas (acting)	3rd, Apr. 10, 1971	O	n/a
29. Peru	20,739,218	2,000 est.	Jorge del Prado Chavez	9th, May 27–30, 1987	L	26.0 (1985); 6 0f 180, of 48 to United Left coalition

[k] *González leads the "Camarilla" faction; Daniel Rios leads the National Leadership Nucleus Faction of armed revolutionary dissidents.*
[l] The Honduran CP is one of six organizations in the Honduran Revolutionary Movement formed in 1982.
[m] Although Padilla, in exile, claims to be the leader, there is strong evidence that Mario Sosa Novarro is really in charge within the country.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Americas[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
30. Puerto Rico	3,320,520	125 est.	Frank Irrizarry	Unknown	L	0.3 (1984); none
I. Suriname (NDP)	388,636	2,000 est.	Desire Bouterse	1st, June 7, 1987	R	10.4 (1987)
(25 FM)		No current data	Harvey Naarendorp	1st, May 12, 1984	L	(1987)
(SCP)		*25 est.*	*Unknown*	*Unknown*	*L*	*n/a*
31. United States of America	243,084,000	17,500 claimed	Gus Hall	24th, Aug. 13–16, 1987	L	0.01 (1984); none
32. Uruguay	2,964,052	11,000 claimed	Rodney Arismendi	20th, Dec. 1970	L	6.0 (1984); none to Frente Amplio
33. Venezuela	18,291,134	4,000 est.	Alonso Ojeda Olaechea	7th, Oct. 24–27, 1985	L	2.0 (1983); 3 of 195

Asia and the Pacific[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
34. Australia (CPA)	16,072,986	1,000 est.	Judy Mundey	29th, June 6–8, 1987	L	0.3 (1987); none
(SPA)		500 est.	Peter Dudley Symon	5th, Sept. 28–Oct. 1, 1984	L	negl. (1987); none
35. Bangladesh	107,087,586	5,000 est.	Muhammed Farhad (d. Oct. 1987) Saifudden Ahmed Manik	4th, Apr. 7–11, 1987	O banned Nov. 87	— (1986); 6 of 330
36. Burma	38,822,484	3,000 claimed	Thakin Ba Thein Tin (Chairman, CC)	3rd, Sept. 9–Oct. 2, 1985	O	n/a
37. Cambodia (KPRP)	6,536,079	7,500 est.	Heng Samrin	5th, Oct. 13–16, 1985	R	99.0 (1981); all 117
(PDK or KCP)		*No current data*	*Pol Pot*	*3rd, Dec. 14, 1975*	*O*	*n/a*
38. China	1,064,147,038[n]	46,011,951 claimed	Hu Yaobang until Jan. 16, 1987; Zhao Ziyang	13th, Oct. 25–Nov. 1, 1987	R	— (1987); all 3,202 CCP approved
39. India (CPI)	800,325,817	479,000 claimed	C. Rajeswara Rao	13th, Mar. 12–17, 1986	L	2.71 (1984); 6 of 544
(CPM)		361,000 claimed	E.M.S. Namboodiripad	12th, Dec. 25–30, 1985	L	5.96 (1984); 22 of 544
40. Indonesia	180,425,534	1,400 est. (+ ca 200 exiles)	Jusuf Adjitorop (pro-Beijing) Satiadjaya Sudiman (pro-Moscow)	7th Extraord., April 1962	O	n/a
41. Japan	122,124,293	470,000 est.	Tetsuzo Fuwa until Nov. (Chairman of Presidium) Hiromu Murakami (Chairman of Presidium) Kenji Miyamoto (Chairman, CC)	18th, Nov. 26–28, 1987	L	9.47 (1986); 27 of 512
42. Korea, North (KWP)	21,447,977	2,500,000 est.	Kim Il-song	6th, Oct. 10–15, 1980	R	100 (1986); all 706 KWP approved
43. Laos (LPRP)	3,765,887	40,000 claimed	Kaysone Phomvihane	4th, Nov. 13–15, 1986	R	(1975); 46-member Sup. Peop. Ass. all LPRP apptd.
44. Malaysia (CPM)	16,068,516	1,350 est.[o]	Chin Peng	Last known, in 1965	O	(1984)
(MCP)		*800 est.*	*Ah Leng*	*Unknown*	*O*	*(1984)*

[n]The Beijing Central Office of Statistics estimates the population at 1,072,330,000.
[o]Includes an estimated 350 members operating in Singapore.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Asia and the Pacific[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
45. Mongolia (MPRP)	2,011,066	88,150 claimed	Jambyn Batmonh	19th, May 28–31, 1986	R	93.5 (1986); 346 of 370 MPRP apprvd.
46. Nepal	17,814,294	10,000 est.[p]	Man Mohan Adhikary	3rd (pre-split),[q] 1961	O	n/a
47. New Zealand	3,291,600[r]					
(CPNZ)		50 est.	Richard C. Wolfe (d. July 19) Harold Crook	23rd, Apr. 22, 1984	L	— (1987); none
(SUP)		300 est.	George H. Jackson	7th, Oct. 26–27, 1985	L	— (1987); none
48. Pakistan	104,600,799	Less than 200 est.	Ali Nazish	1st, 1976 (cland.)	O	n/a
49. Philippines (PKP)	58,100,000[s]	200 est.	Felicismo Macapagal	8th, 1980	L	(1987)
(CPP)		*15,000 est.*	*Rafael Baylosis*	*9th, Jan. 1987*	*O legal Jan. '87*	*(1987); boycotted (participated via (Bayan Party)*
50. Sri Lanka	16,406,576	5,000 est.	Kattorge P. Silva	13th, Mar. 22–26, 1987	L	1.9 (1977); 1 of 168
51. Thailand	53,645,823	250 est.	Thong Jaensri (?)	4th, March–Apr.1984 (cland.)	O	n/a
52. Vietnam	63,593,000	1,900,000 est.	Nguyen Van Linh	6th, Dec. 15–18, 1986	R	98.8 (1987); 496 of 614; all 614 VCP endorsed

Eastern Europe and the USSR[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
53. Albania (PPSh)	3,085,985	147,000 claimed	Ramiz Alia	9th, Nov. 3–8, 1986	R	99.9 (1987); all 250 Democratic Front
54. Bulgaria	8,960,749	932,055 claimed	Todor Zhivkov	13th, Apr. 2–5, 1986	R	99.9 (1986); all 400 Fatherland Front
55. Czechoslovakia	15,581,993	1,705,490 claimed	Gustáv Husák (resign. Dec. 17) Miloš Jakeš	17th, Mar. 24–28, 1986	R	99.94 (1986); all 350 National Front
56. Germany (East) (SED)	16,610,265	2,324,386 claimed	Erich Honecker	11th, Apr. 17–21, 1986	R	99.94 (1986); all 500 National Front
57. Hungary (MSzMP)	10,613,000	870,992 claimed	János Kádár	13th, Mar. 25–28, 1985	R	98.9 (1985); all 352 Pat. Peop. Front
58. Poland (PZPR)	37,726,699	2,130,000 claimed	Wojciech Jaruzelski	10th, June 29–July 3, 1986	R	78.8 (1985); all 460 Fatherland Front
59. Romania	22,936,503	3,640,000 claimed	Nicolae Ceauşescu	Natl. Conf., Dec. 14–16, 1987	R	97.8 (1984); all 369 Front of Socialist Dem. and Unity
60. USSR	284,008,160	19,037,946 claimed	Mikhail Gorbachev	27th, Feb. 25–Mar. 6, 1986	R	99.9 (1984); all 1,500 CPSU approved[t]
61. Yugoslavia (SKJ)	23,430,830	2,168,000 claimed	Milanko Renovica Boško Krunić (Pres. of Presidium)	13th, June 25–28, 1986	R	— (1986); all 308 Soc. All. approved

[p]Three-quarters of this number are estimated to be pro-Beijing or neutral in relations with communist movements abroad.
[q]The right wing of the party held its own congress in 1968.
[r]New Zealand Department of Statistics.
[s]*Asia Yearbook*, Hong Kong, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1987.
[t]A reported 71.4 percent are members of the CPSU. See TASS, Mar. 6, 1984, transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 7, 1984, p. R/5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East and North Africa[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
J. Afghanistan (PDPA)	14,183,671	40,000 est.[u]	Najibullah	2nd Natl. Conf., Oct. 18–19, 1987	R	Rev. Council rule since 1978
62. Algeria (PAGS)[v]	23,460,614	450 est.	Sadiq Hadjeres (First Secretary)	6th, Feb.1952	O	(1982)
K. Bahrain (NLF/B)	464,102	*Negligible*	*Yusuf al-Hassan al-Ajajai (Chairman)* Saif ben Ali (Sec. Gen.)	*Unknown*	O	*n/a*
63. Egypt	51,929,962	500 est.	Farid Mujahid (?)	2nd, 1984 or early 1985	O	(1984)
64. Iran (Tudeh party)	50,407,723	1,500 est.	Ali Khavari (First. Sec., in exile)	Natl. Conf. (in exile), 1986	O	(1980)
65. Iraq	16,970,000	No current data	Aziz Muhammad (First Secretary)	4th, Nov. 10–15, 1985	O	(1984)
66. Israel	4,222,118[w]	2,000 est.	Meir Vilner	20th, Dec. 4–7, 1985	L	3.4 (1984); 4 of 120
67. Jordan	2,794,000	No current data	Fa'iq Muhammad Warrad (resigned) Dr. Yaqub Zayadin	2nd, Dec. 1983	O	n/a
68. Lebanon (LCP)	3,320,522	3,000 est.	George Hawi	5th, Feb. 3–5, 1987	L	(1972)
(OCAL)		*1,500 est.*	*Muhsin Ibrahim*	*1st, 1971*	O	*(1972)*
69. Morocco (PPS)	23,361,495	4,000 est.[x]	'Ali Yata	4th, July 17–19, 1987	L	2.3 (1984); 2 of 306
70. Palestine	4,500,000[y]	200 est.	Bashir al-Barghuti (?)	1st, 1984 (?)	U	n/a
71. Saudi Arabia	14,904,794	Negligible	Mahdi Habib	2nd, Aug.1984	O	n/a
72. Syria	11,147,763	5,000 est.	Khalid Bakhdash	6th, July 1986	L	0.78 (1986); 8 of 195
73. Tunisia	7,561,641	2,000 est.	Muhammad Harmel (First Secretary)	9th, June 12–14, 1987	L	(1986); boycotted
L. Yemen, Aden (YSP)	2,351,131	31,000 cl., includ. cand. membs.	'Ali Salim al-Bayd	4th, June 20–21, 1987	R	— (1986); all 111 YSP approved

Western Europe[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
74. Austria	7,569,283	15,000 est.	Franz Muhri (Chairman)	26th, Mar. 25–28, 1987	L	0.72 (1986); none
75. Belgium	9,873,066	5,000 est.	Louis van Geyt (President)	25th, Apr. 18–20, 1986	L	1.2 (1987); none
76. Cyprus (AKEL)	683,651	12,000 claimed	Ezekias Papaioannou	16th, Nov. 26–30, 1986; Extraord. Cong., Dec. 20, 1987	L	27.4 (1985); 15 of 56
77. Denmark	5,130,260	10,000 est.	Jørgen Jensen (Chairman, to April 1987) Ole Sohn (Chairman)	28th, Apr. 16–19, 1987	L	0.9 (1987); none

[u]The PDPA claims a total of 185,000 members and candidate members. See Radio Kabul, Oct. 18, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Near East & South Asia* (Washington, DC), Oct. 23, 1987, p. 33.

[v]The pro-Moscow PAGS is not mentioned in the Algeria section of V. V. Zagladin and G. A. Kiselev, Eds., *Politicheskiye Partii: Spravochnik* (Political Parties: A Handbook), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1986, p. 219. The party does apparently continue to operate through various mass organizations of the ruling National Liberation Front.

[w]*Excludes the population of East Jerusalem and the West Bank.*

[x]The party claims a membership of 30,000.

[y]Includes the populaton of East Jerusalem, Gaza, Jordan, and the West Bank.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	Percent of vote last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
78. Finland (SKP)	4,939,880	20,000 claimed	Arvo Aalto (Chairman)	21st, June 12–15, 1987	L	9.4 (1987); 16 of 200 to SKDL Front (11 to SKP)
(SKP-Y)		*16,663 claimed*	*Jouko Kajanoja (General Secretary) Taisto Sinisalo (Chairman)*	*1st, June 5–7, 1987*	*L*	*4.3 (1987); 4 of 200*
79. France	55,596,030	604,282 claimed	Georges Marchais	26th, Dec. 2–6, 1987	L	9.8 (1986); 35 of 577
80. Germany (West)	60,989,419[z]	40,000 est.	Herbert Mies (Chairman)	8th, May 2–4, 1986	L	0.5 (1987); none for "Peace List"
81. Great Brit. (CPGB)	56,845,195	9,700 est.	Gordon McLennan	40th, Nov. 14–18, 1987	L	0.1 (1987); none
(NCPB)		*No current data*	*Eric Trevett*	*5th, Nov. 23–24, 1985*	*L*	*No data*
82. Greece (KKE)	9,987,787	42,000 est.	Kharilaos Florakis (First Secretary)	12th, May 12–16, 1987	L	9.9 (1985); 13 of 300
(E.AR)		No current data	Leonidas Kyrkos	Founding Congress, Apr. 24–26, 1987[aa]	L	1.8 (1985); none[bb]
83. Iceland (AB)	244,676	3,000 est.	Olafur Ragnar Grimsson (Chair.)	Biennial Cong., Nov. 7–10, 1987	L	13.2 (1987); 8 of 63
84. Ireland	3,534,533	500 est.	James Stewart	19th, Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 1986	L	— (1987); none
85. Italy	57,350,850	1,505,000 claimed	Alessandro Natta	17th, Apr. 9–13, 1986	L	26.6 (1987); 177 of 630
86. Luxembourg	366,127	600 est.	René Urbany (Chairman)	24th, Feb. 4–5, 1984	L	4.9 (1984); 2 of 64
87. Malta	344,479[cc]	300 est.	Anthony Vassallo	Extraord., May 18–25, 1984	L	0.08 (1987); none
88. Netherlands	14,641,554	12,000 est.[dd]	Elli Izeboud (Chairman)	30th, Nov. 29–Dec. 2, 1986	L	0.6 (1986); none
89. Norway (NKP)	4,178,545	5,500 est.	Kaare Andre Nilsen (Chairman)	19th, Apr. 23–26, 1987	L	0.2 (1985); none
(AKP)		*10,000 est.*	*Kjersti Ericsson (Chairman)*	*3rd (or 4th), Dec. 1984*	*L*	*— (1985); none*
90. Portugal	10,314,727	200,000+ claimed	Alvaro Cunhal	11th Extraord., Feb. 2–6, 1986	L	11 (1987); 30 of 250 to United Peop. Alliance coal.
91. San Marino	22,791	1,200 claimed	Gilberto Ghiotti	11th, Jan 27, 1986	L	24.3 (1983); 15 of 60
92. Spain (PCE)	39,000,804	60,000 est.	Gerardo Iglesias	11th, Dec. 14–18, 1983	L	4.6 (1986); 7 of 350 United Left Coalition[ee]
(PCPE)		25,500 est.	Juan Ramos (Secretary Gen.) Ignacio Gallegos (Chairman)	2nd, Apr. 25–27, 1987	L	4.6 (1986); 7 of 350 United Left Coalition[ee]
(PTE-UC)		*14,000 est.*	*Adolfo Pinedo Santiago Carrillo (Chairman)*	*1st, Feb. 8, 1987*	*L*	*1.2 (1986); none*

[z] Including West Berlin.
[aa] The E.AR is the most significant successor to the KKE-Interior (KKE-I), which split at its April 1987 congress; the smaller faction is the KKE Renovating Left of Giannis Banias.
[bb] *The vote was for the pre-split KKE-I.*
[cc] Malta Office of Statistics.
[dd] The party claims 27,000 members.
[ee] The vote and seat figures are combined totals for the two parties, which participated in the elections through the United Left Coalition.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western Europe[a]	Mid-1987 population[b]	Party membership	Party leader[c]	Last congress	Legal status	last elect. (date); seats in legis.[d]
93. Sweden (VPK)	8,383,026	17,800 claimed	Lars Werner (Chairman)	28th, May 23–27, 1987	L	5.4 (1985); 19 of 349
(APK)		5,000 claimed	Rolf Hagel (Chairman)	28th, Nov. 7, 1986	L	(1985);none[ff]
94. Switzerland (PdAS)	6,572,739	4,500 est.	Armand Magnin (until March) Jean Spielman	13th, Feb. 27–Mar. 1, 1987	L	— (1987); none
95. Turkey	52,987,778	Negligible	Haydar Kutlu	5th, autumn 1983	O	(1987)
96. West Berlin (SEW)		7,000 claimed	Horst Schmitt (Chairman)	8th, May 15–17, 1987	L	0.6 (1985); none

[ff]The APK withdrew from contention one month prior to the 1985 election in order not to split the socialist vote. In 1982, the party won 0.1 percent of the vote and no seats.

LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

AB	People's Alliance
AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP	Workers' Communist Party
APK	Communist Workers' Party
CPA	Communist Party of Australia
CPGB	Communist Party of Great Britain
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
CPM	Communist Party (Marxist) of India
CPNZ	Communist Party of New Zealand
CPP/NPA	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army
CPS	Communist Party of Suriname
E.AR	Greek Left
FSLN	Sandinista Front for National Liberation
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
KKE	Greek Communist Party
KPRP	Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
KWP	Korean Workers' Party
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party
LPRP	Lao People's Revolutionary Party
MBPM	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement
MCP	Malaysian Communist Party
MPLA-PT	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Party of Labor
MPRP	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
MSzMP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
NCPB	New Communist Party of Britain
NDP	National Democratic Party
NKP	Norwegian Communist Party
NLF/B	National Liberation Front/Bahrain
OCAL	Organization of Communist Action of Lebanon
PAGS	Socialist Vanguard Party
PCE	Communist Party of Spain
PCPE	Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain
PCT	Congolese Labor Party
PdA	Party of Labor
PDK	Party of Democracy of Kampuchea (former Khmer Rouge, also known as the Kampuchean Communist Party—KCP)
PdP	People's Party
PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT	Guatemalan Party of Labor
PIT	Independence and Labor Party
PKP	Philippine Communist Party
PMS	Mexican Socialist Party
PPC	Costa Rican People's Party
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PPS	Party of Progress and Socialism
PPSh	Albanian Party of Labor
PRPB	People's Revolutionary Party of Benin
PSN	Socialist Party of Nicaragua
PTE-UC	Workers' Party of Spain–Communist Unity
PUCH	Unified Party of Haitian Communists
PVP	Popular Vanguard Party
PZPR	Polish United Workers' Party
SED	Socialist Unity Party
SEW	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
SKJ	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
SKP	Finnish Communist Party
SKP-Y	Finnish Communist Party-Unity
SPA	Socialist Party of Australia
SUP	Socialist Unity Party
SWPP	Socialist Working People's Party
VPK	Left Party Communists
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WPJ	Workers' Party of Jamaica
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
25 FM	25 February Unity Movement

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eastern Europe and the USSR. After the CPSU announced that it would convene its 19th national conference in the summer of 1988, five East European ruling parties scheduled their own special conferences for dates between the end of 1987 and June 1988.[61] The first such gathering, in Bucharest during December 14–16, 1987, was devoted to the "new stage of building socialism" and the "advance toward communism." The remaining meetings scheduled are in Bulgaria (opening January 28, 1988), Hungary (in the first half of 1988), Yugoslavia (in March 1988), and Poland (in mid-1988). Neither the East German nor the Czechoslovak communists have mentioned a special conference as of this writing.

The Albanian Party of Labor (APL) continued to experiment with a limited domestic reform. Centralization of the economy was reduced slightly, and local managerial authority was somewhat increased.[62] Otherwise, cultural stagnation continued despite some effort to relax the general atmosphere. The Albanian national election on February 1, 1987, reportedly registered 100 percent participation, a world record.

APL leader Ramiz Alia expanded contacts with other countries. The foreign minister of Greece lifted the state of war with Albania and signed eight agreements at Tirana in August; West Germany established diplomatic relations in October and the premier of Bavaria traveled to Albania with a loan agreement; and the Albanian regime accepted an invitation to attend a Balkan conference, to be held during February 1988. There were no contacts with either the Soviet Union or the United States, although Albania did send a delegation to a meeting of a Soviet front organization, the International Federation of Resistance Movements, held in May in Athens.[63] Relations with Yugoslavia continue to be rancorous over the position of Albanians in the Yugoslav region of Kosovo.

Bulgaria has imitated, at least on the surface, the Soviet examples of openness and economic restructuring more closely than has any other East European client state. Campaigns against alcoholism and corruption were followed by a reorganization of the government. No relaxation occurred, however, in regime treatment of those ethnic Turks who refused to become Bulgarized and change their names.[64]

Leading Bulgarian communists, especially General Secretary Todor Zhivkov (75), visited Moscow frequently. They all emphasized full support for USSR foreign policies. Zhivkov also made a week-long trip during May to China, which seemed to be part of the continuing East European rapprochement with that country. An objective fostered by the Soviet Union—a nuclear- and chemical-free zone in the Balkans—received endorsement by the Greek prime minister during a visit to Sofia in July.[65]

Gorbachev visited Czechoslovakia in April and apparently nudged its cautious leadership toward economic reform. By July, the Prague regime had begun issuing draft laws on changes for industry, agriculture, and cooperatives. Toward the end of the year, Gustáv Husák (almost 75) retired, and Miloš Jakeš (66) replaced him as party general secretary.[66] One of the top collaborators with the Soviet Union during the August 1968 invasion of his country, Jakeš subsequently directed a purge that expelled half a million communists from the party.

The aging Erich Honecker (75) continues to rule the German Democratic Republic, with no designated heir apparent. He presides over the most successful economy in the bloc, although a chronic energy shortage may affect this status in the future. Much of East Germany's success is due to financial support coming from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Honecker made a five-day visit during September to the FRG, including his birthplace in the Saarland. During the visit Honecker strongly reiterated the "two-state" view of Germany, but the communiqué issued at the conclusion of his visit mentioned establishment of an economic commission for closer contact between small- and medium-sized enterprises in the two countries.[67]

Until recently, Hungary under János Kádár (75) had proceeded farther than any other Soviet client-state in market-oriented economic reforms. Indeed, the Hungarian economic model has been praised in both Moscow and Beijing. However, the Hungarian reform, which dates back to 1968, appears to have run out of steam. At the end of June 1987, a new prime minister, Karoly Grosz (57), began an effort to stabilize the faltering economy, which experienced inflation of 15 percent and carries the highest per capita foreign debt in the

[61]Vladimir V. Kusin, "Communist Parties to Hold Special Conferences," in "Eastern Europe in 1987," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Background Report/237, Dec. 11, 1987, pp. 3.

[62]Louis Zanga, "Albania," ibid., RAD Background Report/250, Dec. 30, 1987, p. 8.

[63]See *Rruga e partise* (Tirana), No. 10, Oct. 1987, pp. 67–76, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC, hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Nov. 9, 1987, pp. 6–7; and Unie Résistance Service d'Information, *Xe Congrès Statutaire de la FIR* (The 10th Statutory Congress of the FIR), n.p., n.d., pp. 52, 59.

[64]Amnesty International, *Bulgaria: Continuing Human Rights Abuses Against Ethnic Turks*, London, July 1987.

[65]British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), *Current Affairs Research & Information Section*, CARIS Report No. 86/87, July 15, 1987.

[66]Peter Matuska, "Czechoslovakia," in "Eastern Europe in 1987," loc. cit., p. 13. A biography of Jakeš appeared in *Pravda*, Dec. 18, 1987, p. 1.

[67]*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), Sept. 9, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bloc.[68] The government has opted for reducing imports from the West and lowering the standard of living; the state budget for 1988 includes drastic cuts in government subsidies. The period of stabilization is expected to last three to six years, to be followed by 10 to 15 years of full development.[69] Bonn offered Hungary 1 billion DM in credits in October. Kádár visited Brussels in an attempt to obtain a trade agreement with the European Economic Community.

Poland is also engaged in a "second stage" economic reform, begun with a reorganization of the central government in October 1987. In the following month, only two-thirds of all registered voters took part in a referendum on regime reform proposals. Of those who voted, some 44 percent supported the new economic policies; and 46 percent, the official plans for liberalization—i.e., both failed to win the required simple majority. Ignoring public opinion, the regime announced that prices would be increased from 40 to 200 percent in 1988, to be offset in part by a 20 percent pay raise.[70]

Poland's party and state leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski (63), scored a success when the United States lifted all economic sanctions against his country early in 1987. Poland's US$37 billion foreign debt is the largest of any East European country. US Vice President George Bush paid a visit during September, and an American ambassador was appointed to Warsaw. Moscow accorded Jaruzelski a position of honor atop the Lenin mausoleum monument at the traditional Revolution Day parade in Red Square.[71]

Ceauşescu celebrated his 69th birthday in January 1987 amidst a cult of personality unknown anywhere else in the communist world except perhaps in North Korea. The Ceauşescu family seems to run Romania, with wife Elena in charge of appointing key personnel; son Nicu serving as party first secretary for Sibiu County; brother Nicolae A., as head of cadres for the interior (police) ministry; and brother Ion, as first deputy chairman of the State Planning Committee. When Gorbachev visited Bucharest in May, he criticized Brezhnev-era "nepotism" in the Soviet Union,[72] perhaps implying a parallel with Romania.

Romania's county first secretaries and government officials continued to be rotated, in order to prevent them from building any power base. Several thousand workers ransacked the city hall in Braşov to protest harsh living conditions. Arrests broke up the demonstrations. Before the end of the year, half of the profit-sharing fund was paid out in advance to workers.[73]

In Yugoslavia, nearly 1,500 strikes, involving approximately 250,000 workers, took place during the first 50 weeks of 1987. Inflation reached 164 percent by December. A revised bankruptcy law went into effect at mid-year, and the unemployment rate of 20 percent was expected to increase once some 200 unprofitable firms are permanently shut down.[74] The ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia continued to lose working-class and youthful members. Purges and forced resignations of party leaders could not reverse the deterioration. Payments on a US$20 billion foreign currency debt are being postponed. According to a Tito-era finance minister, the country is in a virtual state of "civil war" i.e., law and order has broken down.[75]

In the Soviet Union, Dinmukhamed Kunayev (75), whose ouster as Kazakhstan party leader and replacement by an ethnic Russian had triggered December 1986 rioting, lost his Politburo seat in January 1987. At the same Central Committee plenum, Aleksandr Yakovlev (64) became a candidate Politburo member, and Brezhnev holdover Mikhail Zimyanin (72) was removed as secretary for culture. Two new secretaries were added: Nikolay Slyun'kov (58), a protégé of Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, will direct economic planning; and Gorbachev's former law school classsmate, Anatoliy Luk'yanov (56), will supervise the administrative organs department.[76]

At the June 1987 CC plenum, Yakovlev and Slyun'kov were both promoted from candidate to full membership on the Politburo, as was agriculture boss Viktor Nikonov (58), who did not have a preliminary tour as candidate member. Army General Dimitriy Yazov (63), who had replaced Marshal Sergey Sokolov the previous month as defense minister, also became a candidate Politburo member. All except Slyun'kov are clients of CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev. The Politburo reached a membership of 14.[77]

Geydar Aliyev (64), reportedly an opponent of Gorbachev's, retired from the Politburo at its fall plenum.[78] However, the most dramatic development concerned Boris Yel'tsin (56), who expressed strong opposition to

[68]Alfred Reisch, "Hungary," in "Eastern Europe in 1987," loc. cit., pp. 25–26.

[69]*Magyar hirlap* (Budapest), Aug. 20, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Aug. 27, 1987, p. 5.

[70]Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Poland," in "Eastern Europe in 1987," loc. cit., pp. 37–38, on the referendum; *The New York Times*, Jan. 31, 1988, p. 3, on consumer prices.

[71]See photograph in *The Boston Globe*, Nov. 8, 1987, p. 17.

[72]*Scînteia* (Bucharest), May 27, 1987.

[73]*The New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1987; *Scînteia*, Dec. 12, 1987.

[74]Milan Andrejevic, "Yugoslavia," in "Eastern Europe in 1987," loc. cit., pp. 45–46.

[75]Cited by ibid., p. 48.

[76]*Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1987.

[77]Ibid., June 27, 1987.

[78]Ibid., Oct. 22, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the slow pace of *perestroyka*. According to Luk'yanov, Yel'tsin also asked to be relieved of his positions.[79] November 11, 1987, Yel'tsin was fired as Moscow party chief, and a week later was appointed deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Construction.[80] A consistent supporter of the General Secretary, Lev Zaykov (64), took over the Moscow position.

By the end of 1987, it appeared that Gorbachev had been able to strengthen his control over both the Politburo and Secretariat as well as to move his closest associate, Yakovlev, into the third-ranking position, after unofficial "second secretary" Yegor Ligachev (67). All of this places Gorbachev in an advantageous position for the national party conference which is scheduled to open June 28, 1988, in Moscow.

Western Europe. Auspicious prospects for the region's communist parties at the beginning of this decade have steadily deteriorated. Cohesion has been replaced with internal strife in many parties as they struggle to find their future role in society at a time when "the idea of socialism" is fading in appeal.[81] The local communist parties face a dilemma as they seek to retain support among working-class constituents. The parties must "either reassert their traditional philosophy, at the risk of losing more support, or move toward the social democratic center, at the risk of losing their identity."[82]

Only 11 of Western Europe's 23 communist parties found themselves in parliaments as 1987 ended. The party in Cyprus won 27.4 percent of the vote in the most recent elections, followed closely by the Italian Communist Party, at 26.6 percent. The others included San Marino (24.3), Iceland (13.2), Portugal (10.0), Greece (9.9), France (9.8), Finland (9.4), Sweden (5.4), Spain (5.8 for all factions), and Luxembourg (4.9). Except in San Marino, party members held no cabinet posts. The 12 parties without seats received between 0.03 (Great Britain) and 1.2 (Belgium) percent of the vote in the most recent national election.

Communists in Italy, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden have advocated creation of a "Euroleft." Gianni Cervetti, a member of the Italian (PCI) leadership, defined the concept as follows:

We see the Euroleft as a composite entity comprising, first and foremost, the traditional parties of the working class and democratic movement with all their differences and in all their diversity, as well as other major movements—trade union, cooperative, peace, environmentalist, and women's—together with the youth associations and cultural organizations.[83]

The French party seems headed in a different direction, although in an effort to restore unity to the movement, party chairman Georges Marchais announced that he would not run in the May 1988 presidential elections. The party continues to be torn by strife. Disaffected functionaries—including at least one former government minister and several Central Committee members—finally resigned from the party or from offices they held, many of them rallying to an alternative communist presidential candidate, Pierre Juquin. Marchais and Politburo "conservatives" forced Juquin's expulsion from the party in December, at almost the same time that the 26th PCF Congress met to reelect all its Politburo members, accord Marchais a seventh term as general secretary, and endorse his hand-picked choice, Central Committee Secretary Andre Lajoinie, as the party's official presidential standard bearer. The party leadership persistently deflected demands for open debate from self-styled "renovateurs" by emphasizing party unity. *L'Humanité* director and Politburo member Roland Leroy attacked dissidents for failing to observe the rules of democratic centralism.[84]

The Spanish Communist Party (PCE), under the leadership of Gerardo Iglesias, has attempted to heal internal party friction. Despite these efforts, the Spanish communist movement remains one of the most divided in Europe, fragmented into three main parties. Pro-Soviet dissidents led by Ignacio Gallego form a second group, the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (PCPE). The third group, led by Santiago Carrillo, was initially called the Board for Communist Unity, but changed its name to the Workers' Party of Spain-Communist Unity (PTE-UC) in 1987. Although Iglesias declared the party crisis over in September,[85] it was also announced that the major topic for discussion at the PCE's 12th Congress, scheduled for February 1988, would be reunification of all communist groups in Spain.

In Portugal, Alvaro Cunhal has served as general secretary of the communist party (PCP) for almost 27 years. Under its aging leadership, the PCP remains one of the most Stalinist, pro-Soviet movements in Western Europe. It will convene its 12th Congress in March 1988. Parliamentary elections in July 1987 gave the PCP (in

[79]AP, Oct. 31, 1987.
[80]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Nov. 19, 1987.
[81]Joseph C. Harsch, "Fading Socialism," *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 18, 1987.
[82]William Echikson, "West Europe's Communists Running out of Steam," ibid., Oct. 2, 1987.
[83]Quoted in *World Marxist Review*, October 1987.
[84]*L'Humanité* (Paris), Jan. 28, 1987.
[85]*World Marxist Review*, September 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

coalition with "many independent democrats") only 10 percent of the vote, a drop from more than 15 percent two years earlier. Cunhal justified the party's relative isolation from other political parties by explaining that the communists "resolutely defend the interests of workers . . . against capitalist exploitation."[86] Portugal's voters apparently did not agree.

The San Marino party, like other groups on the island, is an extension of its mainland Italian counterpart. It holds one-fourth of the seats in parliament. The Communist Party of Malta (CPM) participated in its first ever general election during May 1987. Out of 236,169 ballots cast, the movement received only 119, and its leader Anthony Vassallo won just 13 votes. Pro-Soviet in orientation, the CPM plays a marginal role in political life, but maintains extensive contacts with other communist parties throughout Europe and with the CPSU.

The Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) in Cyprus is supported primarily by the Greek Cypriot majority, which comprises approximately 80 percent of the island's population; it is proscribed by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Party leadership remains in the hands of Ezekias Papaioannou (79), who has served as general secretary for almost 40 years; the average age of the leadership exceeds 65. Despite this aging leadership, AKEL received 32.5 percent of the vote in the municipal elections of May 1987, gaining mayoral office in nine of the 18 cities on the southern part of the island. AKEL announced at mid-year that it intends to support the independent candidacy of Yeoryios Vasiliou in elections in early 1988.

In Greece, the communist movement remains divided between pro-Soviet and Eurocommunist parties—the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the Greek Left (E.AR). The latter is the more prominent of the two groups that emerged from a split in the KKE-Interior in 1986; it is led by Leonidas Kyrkos. The minority remnant of the KKE-I, under Giannis Banias, forms a third group, with the designation of "KKE-Interior/Renovating Left."

The KKE is headed by Kharilaos Florakis. Its policy views have often paralleled those of Andreas Papandreou's governing Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), although KKE is more vehemently anti-American and openly opposes the presence of US military bases in Greece. In addition, it rejects austerity measures designed to strengthen the economy. KKE is plagued by a generational gap between the leadership and younger members. Declarations at its 12th Congress in May called for compromise and cooperation among "democratic and progressive forces" of the Left.

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) continued to decline, membership having dropped by 50 percent since 1980. Its influence is exercised primarily through the trade union movement, but this too is diminishing. Party leader Gordon McLennan argues that "Marx's classical working class . . . is a declining minority. If Britain's communist party is to survive . . . it must adapt and seek support among a broader range of interest groups."[87]

The communist parties of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg played marginal roles in the political affairs of their respective countries. In anticipation of December 1987 national elections, the Belgian Communist Party (PCB) sought to broaden its base of support by declaring that regional economic differences would require varying approaches in Flanders, Brussels, and Wallonia, but within the framework of a federalized party structure. These efforts did not produce measurable election successes, and the PCB's poor performance at the polls foreshadowed continued stagnation for 1988.

Jørgen Jensen, chairman of the Communist Party of Denmark (DKP) died on the eve of the 28th DKP Congress in April 1987; his successor is 32-year-old Ole Sohn. The party received less than 1 percent of the vote in September parliamentary elections; it has not been represented in parliament since 1979, when its vote fell below the 2 percent minimum required for proportional representation. In Luxembourg, the movement remains under control of the Urbany family which founded it. René Urbany (60) continues to follow a strongly pro-Soviet line.

In Iceland, the communist-dominated People's Alliance (AB), which has participated in coalition governments on a regular basis, suffered its second straight setback in national elections in April 1987, despite a strong showing in the previous year's local balloting. The AB lost 4 percent of the vote and two of its seats in an expanded parliament. The party chairman resigned and was replaced by Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, a political scientist at the University of Iceland.

The Communist Party of Norway (NKP) competes for popular support with several other leftist groups, especially the Socialist Left Party (SV). The NKP chairman endorses the SV idea of a united front for all left-wing parties in the country as well as joint election lists. Yet the NKP remains one of the weakest communist organizations in Western Europe, with no representation

[86] *Avante!* (Lisbon), Aug. 20, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: West Europe* (Washington, DC), Aug. 24, 1987, pp. K/1–3.

[87] BBC, *Central Talks and Features*, "British Communists: a Dying Species?" CARIS Talk, No. 4/87, Jan. 6, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in parliament and few prospects for increasing its political support. The party remains staunchly pro-Soviet and Stalinist. At its 19th Congress in April 1987, the NKP adopted a new program which reaffirmed adherence to Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism," at a time when many of its West European counterparts were seeking to de-emphasize ideology and broaden their electoral base by endorsing the "Euroleft" concept.

The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) suffers from factional strife, which, according to chairman Arvo Aalto, has alienated 150,000 supporters and 20,000 party members. In March 1987 national elections, the SKP saw its share of the vote decline 4.6 percent and its parliamentary representation drop to 11. The Stalinist faction has adopted the name Finnish Communist Party-Unity (SKP-Y) and held its first congress in June. This faction picked up the bulk of the SKP votes, but won only 4 seats. Neither of the two parties' leaders was elected to parliament.

At the SKP-Y congress, differences developed over who should be supported in the 1988 presidential election and whether the party should stop claiming to be the legitimate SKP. Taisto Sinisalo was elected chairman and proposed Jouko Kajanoja, secretary general, as presidential candidate. The 21st SKP Congress was held the following week, with Aalto reelected chairman. Twenty of the 50 members of the Central Committee (CC) were newcomers; the average age of the CC is 43, and it includes 22 women. The SKP's new program is regarded as Eurocommunist or Euroleft in nature, both in its description of Finnish socialism and in its dissociation from the CPSU.[88] Despite efforts by both factions to improve their popular image, they remain outside the mainstream of political life.

The Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) and Switzerland's Party of Labor (PdA) occupy roles of negligible importance. The KPÖ, which is not represented in the Austrian parliament, is pro-Soviet and adapts its domestic and foreign policy positions to those of the CPSU. Throughout 1987, party chairman Franz Muhri extolled the virtues of *glasnost'* and condemned Austria's coalition government as pro-capitalist. The PdA received less than one percent of the vote in 1987 national elections and failed to elect any deputies. Also a pro-Soviet movement, it has long lacked significant support among younger voters. At a 13th Congress, the PdA sought to rejuvenate its leadership by electing Jean Spielmann (43) general secretary. Almost two-fifths of the members in the new Central Committee are under 40, another one-fourth, between 40 and 50.

The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin (SEW) never has had any representation in the city's parliament. It is dependent financially on the communists in East Germany and mirrors their positions.

The [West] German Communist Party (DKP) also has never been represented in parliament, and received only 0.5 percent of the vote in the January 1987 national elections. The party's loyalty to the East German SED and the CPSU reduces its electoral appeal—both DKP leader Herbert Mies and SED chief Erich Honecker were awarded a Lenin Peace Prize for 1987 in Moscow. The policies of Gorbachev are causing problems for the DKP. According to party author Erasmus Schöfer, the party rank and file—long restless over the "lack of possibilities for intra-party influence and participation" —have embraced Gorbachev's call for *glasnost'*.[89] Yet both the DKP and the SED are seeking to control, if not dampen the enthusiasm caused by the "strong impulses" coming from Moscow. Mies cautioned that in a capitalist country like West Germany, "there can be no imitation of the Soviet approach" and that one must not "reduce the splendid history of the Soviet Union . . . to economic and moral problems . . . ."[90]

[88] *Uusi Suomi* (Helsinki), Feb. 12, 1987, discussed the draft program.
[89] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Sept. 7, 1987.
[90] *Unsere Zeit* (East Berlin), May 20, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist Fronts in 1987

Wallace Spaulding

THE YEAR 1987 stands out as one in which the Soviet Union seems to have become less concerned with concealing its domination of the activities of the international front organizations—groups formed to unite communists with persons of other political persuasions for the purpose of lending support and thereby strength and respectability to Soviet foreign policy initiatives. The fronts themselves fall along a spectrum that varies by the degree of communist affiliation (for a listing of the fronts and their top leaders, see Table 1). They range from such organizations as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), a plurality of whose affiliates are outright communist organizations, to the World Peace Council (WPC), whose leadership organs have a fairly good balance among communists, socialists, "revolutionary democrats," and "independents," to the basically noncommunist Christian Peace Conference (CPC). Moscow's main objectives in activities involving the fronts seemed to be to maintain tighter control, save money in front operations, and exercise more direct influence. This was evidenced not only in concrete terms by the personnel active at front meetings and the sites chosen for such gatherings, but also by the way that international front themes shifted during the year in consonance with changing Soviet priorities.

Organization and control. As pointed out in an earlier article,[1] the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union exercises control over the fronts through the Soviet national affiliate of each respective front. It usually relies on a representative of the Soviet body at a given front's international headquarters—most often a member of the secretariat, but occasionally a vice president. Front undertakings are also coordinated at periodic joint meetings of front leaderships, the last such meeting being hosted by the WFTU in Prague in September 1987.[2] Then, too, there is extensive overlapping in the membership of the leading bodies of the individual fronts, particularly between the leadership of the WPC—the largest and most important of the fronts—and that of other fronts.

Finally, there is the coordination provided by the Soviet-controlled theoretical journal of the international communist movement, *World Marxist Review,* through its Problems of Peace and Democratic Movements Commission.[3] For example, the July 1987 issue of *WMR* notes a Prague seminar (no date given) held by this commission on "Developments of the Peace Movement in the 1980's and the Communists," as well as a May 1987 symposium sponsored by *WMR,* also in Prague, on "The October Revolution and the Main Problems of Our Age." The latter was attended by representatives of the WPC, the WFTU, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), and the International Union of Students (IUS)—groups previously judged by the author to be the six most important international communist fronts[4]—as well as by delegations from 51 communist and four "revolutionary-democratic" parties.

Wallace Spaulding, a Colonel in the USAR (ret.), is a Washington-based observer of international communist affairs. The present article is a slightly revised version of Col. Spaulding's contribution to the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1987, forthcoming from Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, CA.

---

[1]Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1986," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1987, pp. 57–68; and idem, "International Communist Organizations," in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1987 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1987, pp. 403–09.

[2]*CPC Information* (Prague), Sept. 30, 1987.

[3]Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1982, pp. 57–62.

[4]Wallace Spaulding, "International Communist Organizations," in Richard F. Staar, *1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs,* Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1984, pp. 427–31.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Major International Communist Front Organizations

Organization (President; secretary-general)	Year founded	Headquarters	Claimed membership	Affiliates	Countries
Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (Murad Ghalib; Nuri Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn)	1957	Cairo	No data	87	No data
Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace (ABCP) (Kharkhuu Gaadan; G. Lubsan Tseren)	1970	Ulaanbaatar	No data	15	12
Berlin Conference of European Catholics (BCEC) (Vacant; not applicable)	1964	East Berlin	No data	No data	45
Christian Peace Conference (CPC) (Karoly Toth; Lubomir Mirejovsky)	1958	Prague	No data	No data	Ca. 80
International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) (Joe Nordmann; Amar Bentoumi)	1946	Brussels	25,000	No data	Ca. 80
International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR) (Arialdo Banfi; Alix Lhote)	1951	Vienna	5,000,000	68	29
International Institute for Peace (IIP) (Georg Fuchs; not applicable)	1957	Vienna	No data	No data	No data
International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) (Kaarle Nordenstreng; Jiri Kubka)	1946	Prague	Ca. 250,000[1]	No data	120+
International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT) (Sakari Kuru; Gennadij Codr)	1946	Prague	No data	No data	No data
International Union of Students (IUS) (Josef Scala; Georgios Michaelides)	1946	Prague	10,000,000	122	112
Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) (Susumu Ozaki; Rene Anillo Capote)	1966	Havana	No data	No data	No data
Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) (Freda Brown; Mirjam Vire-Tuominen)	1945	East Berlin	200,000,000	142[2]	124[2]
World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) (Walid Masri; Vilmos Cserveny)	1945	Budapest	150,000,000	Ca. 270	123
World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) (Jean-Marie Legay; Stan Davison)	1946	London	740,000	Ca. 46	70+
World Federation of Teachers' Union (FISE) (Lesturuge Ariyawansa; Gerard Montant)	1946	East Berlin	26,000,000[3]	124	79[3]
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Sandor Gaspar; Ibrahim Zakariya)	1945	Prague	Ca. 214,000,000	92	81
World Peace Council (WPC) (Romesh Chandra; Johannes Pakaslahti)	1950	Helsinki	No data	No data	143

[1]CTK, Prague, Jan. 29, 1987.
[2]*Women of the Whole World* (East Berlin), No. 3, 1987, p. 14.
[3]*Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Nov. 27, 1987.

The year 1987 witnessed an unusually large number of *WMR* articles by front leaders (including the IUS president, the secretaries general of the WPC and of the International Organization of Journalists [IOJ], and by vice presidents of the WIDF, WFTU, and AAPSO). One may assume that representatives of the journal also participated in the coordinating meetings of the fronts.[5] At the end of 1986, Lumir Hanak was identified as the new Czech "executive secretary" (deputy chief editor) of *WMR*, assisting Soviet Chief Editor Aleksandr Subbotin.[6] The other "executive secretary," the Soviet Sergey Tsukasov, apparently remains in place. The number of parties represented on the journal's editorial council remains at 70. All but one of these, the "vanguard revolutionary-democratic" Yemen Socialist Party, are communist.[7]

The quarterly *Al Nahj* (*The Way*), which appears to be an Arab extension or counterpart of the *WMR*, has become increasingly active. The *WMR* describes *Al Nahj* as "the journal of the communist and workers' parties of the Arab countries."[8] Another authoritative source describes *Al Nahj* as a "theoretical organ." Its editor, Fakhri Karim, is apparently the same person as the

[5]See items cited in fn. 1 above.
[6]*Rudé Právo* (Prague), Dec. 6, 1986.
[7]*World Marxist Review* (Toronto—hereafter, *WMR*), November 1987, p. 2.
[8]Ibid., pp. 1, 162.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

member of the Iraqi Communist Party Central Committee of the same name.[9]

Both *Al Nahj* and *World Marxist Review* sent delegates to the July 1987 congress of the (communist) Party of Progress and Socialism in Morocco and also co-sponsored a symposium in Nicosia sometime in mid-year entitled "Religion Is for God, the Homeland Is for All." The *WMR* also participated in a conference sponsored by *Al Nahj* in Damascus on September 30–October 1 entitled "The October Revolution and the Renewal of the World."[10] Neither journal, of course, can be considered a front inasmuch as each is officially communist.

Techniques. Moscow's increasingly open control of front activities was evident in the frequent use of the Soviet capital as a meeting site. Use of Moscow as a venue facilitated the exercise of Soviet control, minimized the need to spend precious hard currency, and afforded an excuse for exploiting the dynamic and attractive Mikhail Gorbachev at front functions.

The gatherings in 1987 would, for the most part, have had to have been planned in 1986 or even earlier.[11] Indeed, the unusually open direction exercised by Yuriy Zhukov at the April 1986 meeting of the WPC meeting and by Viktor Afanas'yev at the IOJ's October 1986 Congress suggests a philosophical change—within a year of Gorbachev's accession to power—that stressed efficiency of front management at the expense of any semblance of front independence.[12]

During the year there was also a relative lack of concern on the part of the international fronts and their Soviet and Cuban affiliates with how closely they were identified with other conferences that were designed to attract not only front members but also other, less committed persons. This was evidenced by the holding of such gatherings back-to-back with official meetings of the respective fronts, a practice the fronts seemed to have been abandoning in 1986, when the WPC and WFTU, in different ways, went to great lengths to separate themselves from major "non-official meetings."[13]

By contrast, in June 1987, the World Congress of Women (WCW) held in Moscow was followed immediately there by the 9th WIDF Congress. The WIDF president served as the WCW president; the WIDF secretary general, as the WCW secretary; and the Soviet Women's Committee president (soon to become a WIDF vice president), as the WCW vice president.[14] In February, Moscow was the site of the first meeting of the International Preparatory Committee of the WFDY/IUS 1989 World Youth Festival; in March, it hosted the IOJ Presidium Bureau meeting and the 6th Congress of the Soviet Union of Journalists; and in October, it hosted the 10th Congress of the WFTU's Trade Union International of Chemical, Oil, and Allied Workers.

International front leaders also flocked to Moscow during the year for meetings of Soviet national affiliates of the fronts. WFTU Secretary General Ibrahim Zakariya led a delegation of that organization to the 18th Congress of the (Soviet) All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions in February, and it is assumed that at least the bulk of the WFTU's 92 affiliates were among the reported 188 foreign trade unions represented at that meeting.[15] The president and secretary general of the IOJ were present at the 6th Congress of the Soviet Union of Journalists in March, and it is assumed that the majority of the remaining IOJ top leadership was also there, since a meeting of that organization's Presidium Bureau was scheduled to follow immediately.[16] An incomplete listing of the foreign delegations to the (Soviet) Komsomol's 20th Congress in April shows that roughly two-thirds of the youth organizations represented on the WFDY Bureau had sent delegates to the congress, grounds for suspecting that members of the WFDY top leadership were also present.[17] Finally, the president and secretary general of AAPSO attended the Soviet Afro-Asian Committee's meeting on "The Great October in the Affairs of Restructuring" held in September-October, and the "prominent social and political figures from the countries of Asia, Africa, and the Near East" stated to have attended may well have included a number of AAPSO vice presidents.[18]

Havana was second only to Moscow as an important site for meetings of the fronts during 1987. It hosted the second most important front meeting of the year, the 15th IUS Congress, held just before the wider-ranging Havana world student conference entitled "Learning to

[9] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), July 30, 1987; and *l'Express* (Rome), June 13, 1982.

[10] *Al Bayane* (Casablanca), July 19, 1987; *WMR*, August 1987, pp. 81–82; and ibid., November 1987, p. 162.

[11] For example, Moscow had clearly been selected as the site for the June 1987 World Congress of Women, the largest front meeting of the year, and for its attendant 9th Congress of the Women's International Democratic Federation by the time of the March 1986 WIDF Bureau meeting. See ADN, East Berlin, Mar. 23, 1986.

[12] See US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, Washington, DC, 1987, pp. 1–2; and *The Democratic Journalist* (Prague), January 1987, p. 14.

[13] See items cited in fn. 1 above.

[14] *The Women of the Whole World* (East Berlin), No. 3, 1987, p. 3.

[15] *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Mar. 13, 1987.

[16] *IOJ Newsletter* (Prague), No. 7, 1987.

[17] *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 16–17, 1987; and *WFDY News* (Budapest), No. 11-12, 1986, for a listing of the affiliations of Bureau members.

[18] *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, Oct. 1, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Work Together for a Better Future" in November. Another back-to-back combination in the Cuban capital was the April meeting of Youth Organizations of Latin America and the Caribbean and the 5th Congress of the Communist Youth of Cuba, which immediately preceded it. May saw two more international front meetings in Havana: the 33rd Congress of the International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT) and the annual conference of the Christian Peace Conference (CPC) in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Back-to-back meetings involving international front activity were also held in other cities. These included the IUS Executive Committee meeting and the IUS/UNESCO International Student Round Table on "The Role of the University in the Development of Society" in Addis Ababa in January; the "Education for Peace" conference and the FISE Administrative Committee meeting in Athens in May; the 13th Mongolian Trade Union Congress and the "Peace, Development, and Hope of Working People in Asia and the Pacific" conference in Ulaanbaatar in May; the meeting of Latin American WPC affiliates in Guayaquil and the Latin American Human Rights seminar in nearby Quito in May; and the Asia-Pacific Student Peace meeting and the IUS-ESCAP student seminar at Ulaanbaatar in June.

During the year, Moscow and its fronts were active in other sectors somewhat outside the scope of the traditional fronts and their affiliates. Three cases, all re-runs of successful earlier attempts, might be cited. First, by early 1987, a "Copenhagen Framework for Peace and Disarmament" had apparently been set up as a follow-up to the October 1986 World Congress Devoted to the International Year of Peace, even though the Danish press had gone to great lengths to point out the latter meeting's Soviet and WPC connections.[19] This Copenhagen Framework parallels the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, which had been set up to continue the work of the 1973 Moscow World Congress of Peace Forces and which has been involved in organizing the wide-ranging "Vienna Dialogues" held every few years.

Second, a meeting of nearly 1,000 important "personalities" under the slogan of "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Humanity" was held in February 1987. It had even less connection with any known front, but it was held in Moscow, was addressed by Gorbachev, and did have the top CPC leadership participate in its subdivision dealing with religious "personalities."[20] The parallel here was with the July-August 1985 meeting in Havana of over 1,000 "personalities" outside the normal front framework to discuss the Latin American foreign debt, a gathering addressed by Fidel Castro.[21]

Finally, a group of Soviet and American lawyers, outside the IADL framework, met in New York in August to form an International Organization of Lawyers Against Nuclear War.[22] This group evokes the parallel International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), which was started in 1980 by a core of Soviet and American doctors and which looks more and more like a Soviet-oriented front. In 1987, the IPPNW received extensive and favorable publicity in the WPC's journal in connection with its May-June meeting in Moscow, and the IUS's publication implied an indirect IPPNW connection with the IUS by virtue of their joint connection with the International Federation of Medical Students' Associations.[23]

The WPC, the other fronts, and less obviously pro-Soviet organizations devised a new approach during 1987 in the form of a "Global Peace Wave." This involved a wide variety of coordinated activities in some 50 countries—"demonstrations, rallies, peace relays, ship cruises, pickets and collection of signatures under various appeals . . . church bell ringing, human chains and peace concerts, radio and TV programs, and demonstrations by children and youth"—all scheduled to occur at 12 noon (local time) on October 24, 1987.[24]

Themes. Just as some of the techniques used by the fronts during 1987 showed more than the normal connection with the Soviets, so did many of the propaganda themes. An example was the slogan "Toward the Year 2000 Without Nuclear Weapons," which was the theme of the 10th Congress of the International Federation of Resistance Movements (FIR) in May and the June World Congress of Women. It had been put forth by Gorbachev in a speech delivered on January 15, 1986, and was endorsed as the slogan for the Women's Congress by the time of the March 1986 WIDF Bureau meeting in East Berlin.[25]

[19]*Foreign Report* (London), Feb. 5, 1987; also items cited in fn. 1 above.

[20]*CPC Information* (Prague), Mar. 10, 1987; and US Department of State, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

[21]Wallace Spaulding, "International Communist Organizations," in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1986 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1986, pp. 396–403.

[22]TASS, Moscow, Sept. 1, 1987.

[23]*New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 5, 1987, pp. 10–11, and No. 6, 1987, pp. 6–9; *World Student News* (Prague), November 1987, p. 26; and *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1986/87*, Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1987, entry BB1970.

[24]*Peace Courier* (Helsinki), No. 11, 1987.

[25]For a text, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 15, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Jan. 16, 1986, pp. AA/1–9; on the WIDF meeting, see ADN, East Berlin, Mar. 23, 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Conferences Held In or Dealing with Asia in 1987

Conference (apparent sponsor)	Site	Date
First Southeast Asian Student Forum (IUS/League of Filipino Students)	Manila	March
Conference: "Peace, Development, and Hope of Working People in Asia and the Pacific" (apparent spin-off of Congress of WFTU-affiliated Mongolian *Trade Union Federation*)	Ulaanbaatar	May
Asia-Pacific Trade Union Seminar on Women (WFTU-affiliated Asian and Pacific Trade Union Coordinating Committee [APTUCC] and Vietnamese Federation of Labor)	Haiphong	May
Conference: "Trade Union Education in Asia" (WFTU-affiliated [Soviet] All-Union *Central Council of Trade Unions* [AUCCTU])	Tashkent	June
Asia-Pacific Student Meeting and IUS/ESCAP Students' Seminar	Ulaanbaatar	June
Asia-Pacific Trade Union Seminar on Young Workers (WFTU/UNESCO)	Hanoi	July
Second Conference of the Trade Unions of the Asian and Pacific Countries (APTUCC)	Manila	August
International Conference on Denuclearization, Peace, and Anti-Imperialist Solidarity in the Asian and Pacific Region (AAPSO)	Pyongyang	September
Asia-Pacific Trade Union Seminar on Social Security (AUCCTU)	Alma Ata	Sept.-Oct.
Joint Youth Action for a Peaceful Indian Ocean and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Asia-Pacific (WFDY/All-India Youth Federation/All-India Students' Federation)	Bombay	October
WPC Presidential Bureau meeting (focused on Asia-Pacific region)	Aukland	October
International Trade Union Conference on Solidarity with the Workers and People of [South] Korea (WFTU)	Prague	November

Subsidiary themes prominent in 1986 and carried over into early 1987 were the demands for cessation of nuclear testing and of SDI research. These two were, of course, specifically directed against the United States, but when Gorbachev dropped the SDI ban as a condition for negotiating the removal of Euromissiles with the US,[26] support for these negotiations replaced opposition tonuclear-testing and SDI as the main propaganda line in this category. This change could be seen as early as the mid-March "Vienna Dialogue," sponsored by the WPC-related International Liaison Forum.[27] When an October agreement to hold a Soviet-US summit meeting was concluded, it almost immediately became the number one emphasis of the WFTU's concurrent General Council meeting in Bucharest.[28] Incidentally, Gorbachev's November 30 admission that the USSR, too, was engaged in SDI research might further put that subject "on the back burner."[29]

As for geographic coverage, 1987 saw a somewhat greater emphasis on the Far East and Southwest Pacific than on any other Third World areas. This emphasis seems to date back to Gorbachev's July 28, 1986, Vladivostok speech, a talk generally interpreted as inaugurating a new Soviet emphasis on the area. The speech was cited as the source of guidelines for the "first Consultative Meeting of representatives of the communist and revolutionary-democratic parties of Asia and the Pacific region," held in Ulaanbaatar in July 1987.[30] A further Soviet connection was indicated by the fact that the new first deputy chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Committee, the presumed Southeast Asian specialist Vladimir Tolstikov, had stated at that organization's June plenum that more attention must be given to Asia (at the apparent expense of Africa and the Middle East).[31]

A listing of major front gatherings devoted to Asia during 1987 is provided in Table 2. At least half of this activity was in the trade union field. It was therefore fitting that the capstone to all this activity in the Far East should have come with the announcement in the January 4, 1988, *Bangkok Post* that a group of "veteran labor leaders" affiliated with the "Revolutionary Council" would invite the WFTU to set up a regional center in Bangkok and that four Thai labor unions had agreed to apply for WFTU membership. (Prior to this announcement, there had been no Thai affiliation nor any other official WFTU activity in this conservative country.)

Latin America was the only near rival to Asia as a

[26]Statement of February 28, 1987, in *Pravda* (Moscow), Mar. 1, 1987.
[27]*Peace Courier*, No. 4, 1987, p. 5.
[28]*Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 13, 1987.
[29]See Gorbachev's November 30, 1987, interview with NBC television as carried by TASS, Moscow, in English, transcribed in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 1, 1987, pp. 16–17.

[30]*WMR*, September 1987, p. 151; and MONTSAME, Ulaanbaatar, July 7, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Asia* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EAS*), July 10, 1987, p. BB/1.
[31]*Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Moscow), June 1987, p. 25; on Tolstikov's possible responsibilities for Southeast Asia within the CPSU's International Department, see Wallace Spaulding, "Addenda on the International Department," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1984, p. 71.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

focus of front meetings during the year (note the various gatherings in Havana listed above). The WPC-promoted October conference held in Buenos Aires on the subject of the South Atlantic as a "zone of peace" linked South America to western Africa. Otherwise, the few international front meetings that were held in and/or were devoted to Africa and the Middle East appear to have been held either early in the year (the two IUS meetings in Addis Ababa in January, a WIDF/British Assembly of Women meeting on apartheid in London that same month, a WPC/AAPSO conference on the Iran-Iraq conflict in Cairo in February, and a WPC-related conference devoted to Cyprus in Sofia in April) or at the end of the year (a WPC-related conference on nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and Mediterranean in Cairo, and a WFTU-cosponsored meeting on the African debt in Addis Ababa, both in December).

Some themes of front activity could not be linked so directly to immediate Soviet inspiration. An example was the emphasis on nuclear-free zones. In addition to the area-specific conferences on this subject noted above, the theme was treated in general terms by the WFTU-related Dublin Committee in May and by the IADL in June. Otherwise, most of these additional emphases centered on Third World economics, in particular the New International Economic Order. The NIEO is aimed at redressing the imbalance in wealth between the developed capitalist countries and the underdeveloped countries and also focuses on such subsidiary themes as the misdeeds of transnational corporations and the injustice of the debt burden borne by Third World countries. These issues were addressed in resolutions coming out of the October WFTU General Council meeting and also became the major emphases of the 15th IUS Congress in Havana. The debt issue was treated at trade union conferences involving the WFTU in Campinas (São Paolo) in May and in Addis Ababa in December; an anti-transnational corporation theme was prominent in a Dublin Committee meeting in June. Front propaganda links these economic issues with the peace and disarmament motif, arguing that a reduction in arms expenditures would make it possible for more aid to be given to the Third World.[32]

The Moscow World Congress of Women also considered the development issue, the meeting's subtitle being "For Peace, Equality, and Development." However, a reading of the materials generated by that meeting gives the impression that the theme of development definitely came third after peace and equality.[33] On the other hand, trade union rights seemed to rank behind peace and development as emphases at the WFTU General Council meeting,[34] although in November, the WFTU did appear to play the major role in establishing in Prague an International Center for the Defense of Trade Union Rights.[35] The possible equivalent theme with respect to students—"education a right and not a privilege"—apparently received even less relative attention at the two Havana student conferences noted above.[36]

Personnel. A number of changes in front personnel were recorded during the year. Huang Jang Yop (North Korea) and Abdallah Hurani ("Palestine") were newly noted as WPC vice presidents during 1987. Huang replaced another North Korean, whereas Hurani returned to fill a position that he himself had occupied until 1983 and which had been vacant in the interim.[37] In an unexplained move, the number of Palestinians on the WPC Presidential Committee was increased from two to six during the year, an expansion of representation in no way matched by any other delegation.[38] Jesus Reyes became the WPC's new Cuban secretary, and a West German secretary was added in the person of Tobias Thomas.[39]

In the WFTU, Miroslav Zavadil (Czechoslovakia) was elected a new vice president, and Marion Navarro (Chile) became a secretary.[40] No replacement has yet been identified for Ernest Boatswain (Australia's WFTU vice president, who apparently resigned without any public explanation).[41] New WIDF vice presidents elected at that front's June congress included Zoja Pukhova (USSR), Nirupama Rath (India), and Fatima Aoufi (Algeria).[42] Also identified in 1987 for the first time as WIDF secretaries were Prima Loomba and Irena Karska (countries unknown).[43] Burkhard Herrmann and Gaston Grisoni (countries unknown) were newly noted as IUS secretaries.[44] Murad Ghalib (Egypt) became the president of AAPSO; he had been nominated in Decem-

[32] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 13, 1987; *Pax et libertas* (Geneva), September 1987, p. 15; and *World Trade Union Movement* (Prague), October 1987, p. 4.

[33] *Women of the Whole World*, No. 3, 1987, p. 3; *Pax et libertas*, September 1987, pp. 15–16; and *World Trade Union Movement*, October 1987, p. 3.

[34] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 13, 1987.

[35] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1987.

[36] *Granma* (Havana), Nov. 20, 1987; and *Granma Weekly* (Havana), Nov. 29, 1987.

[37] *New Perspectives*, No. 3, 1983, p. 2, and No. 6, 1987, p. 2.

[38] Ibid., No. 6, 1986, p. 2, and No. 6, 1987, p. 2.

[39] Ibid., No. 6, 1987, pp. 1–2; *Peace Courier*, No. 11, 1987.

[40] *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, Nov. 13, 1987.

[41] *Foreign Report*, Nov. 26, 1987.

[42] *Women of the Whole World*, No. 3, 1987, p. 2.

[43] World Congress of Women, *Preliminary List of Participants*, n.d., p. 186.

[44] *World Student News*, No. 4, 1987, p. 22, and No. 6, 1987, p. 25.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ber 1986 to replace the deceased Abd-al-Rahman Sharqawi (Egypt).[45] Newly identified AAPSO vice presidents included Abdallah Hurani ("Palestine", also a WPC vice president), Mahmud Abd-al-Fattah (Western Sahara), Pascual Luvualu (Angola), Yohannes Gebre Selassie (Ethiopia), Dr. Victor Agadzi (Ghana), Vladimir Tolstikov (USSR), Hamid Mohtat (Afghanistan), K. M. Shepande (Zambia), Ali Amir Muhammad (Tanzania), Vasudev Acharya (India), and Abu al-Shamt (Syria).[46]

In addition, Leonard Wells (UK) is the new deputy secretary general of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW); Albino Ribeiro Cardoso (Portugal) is a new IOJ vice president; Vladimir Artemov (USSR) and Herbert Geerhardt (GDR) were newly noted as secretaries of the IOJ and FISE respectively, and Gerard Montant (France) became the new secretary general of FISE.[47] Saskari Kiuru (Finland) became president of the OIRT, and the chairmanship of the Berlin Conference of European Catholics became vacant upon the death of Otto Hartmut Fuchs (GDR).[48]

Finally, the 10th FIR Congress resulted in the publication of a complete list of new officers. Among them were the following members of the Presidential Board: Arialdo Banfi (Italy); vice presidents Marcos Ana (Spain), Vladimir Bonev (Bulgaria), Jean Brack (Belgium), Otto Funke (GDR), Marton Ispanovits (Hungary), Jozef Kaminski (Poland), Helge Kierfulff (Denmark), Spyros Kotsakis (Greece), Aleksey Maressiyev (USSR), Frantisek Miseje (Czechoslovakia), Andrei Neagu (Romania), Joseph Rossaint (FRG), Ludwig Soswinski (Austria), Mario . Venanzi (Italy), and Robert Vollet (France). The new Secretariat included Secretary General Alix Lhote (France), Deputy Secretary General Zygmunt Bieszczanin (Poland), and secretaries Kurt-Julius Goldstein (GDR), Ilia Kremer (USSR), and Isacco Nahoum (Italy).[49]

[45] *Al Ahram* (Cairo), Dec. 20, 1987.

[46] *14th AAPSO Council Session, Moscow, 14–17 May 1986*, n.p, n.d., pp. 225–26; KCNA in English, Pyongyang, Sept. 25, 1987, transcribed in *FBIS-EAS*, Sept. 29, 1987, p. 2.

[47] *Scientific World* (London), No. 3, 1987; *Democratic Journalist* (Prague), No. 9, 1987, p. 2; CTK, Prague, July 24, 1987, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC), July 27, 1987, p. BB/1; and *Flashes from the Trade Unions*, July 10, 1987.

[48] *IOJ Newsletter*, No. 11, 1987; and *CPC Information*, Apr. 21, 1987.

[49] Unie Resistance Service d'Information, *Xe Congres Statutaire de la FIR* (10th Statutory Congress of the FIR), n.d., pp. 52, 59.

Corrections

A number of items in the November-December 1987 issue of *Problems of Communism* require correction:

- On pp. 10 and 11, the photos were furnished by Eastfoto.
- On p. 18, fn. 2, the title of the referenced article should be "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority."
- On p. 19, in some copies, the photo was reversed; also, the person shown with Tatyana Zaslavskaya in the picture is an unidentified moderator of the October 26, 1987, press conference, and not Abel Aganbegyan.
- On p. 36 and in the photo caption on p. 37, the first name of cinematographer Klimov should be Elem.
- On p. 43, fn. 51, it is incorrectly stated that Vladimir Nabokov's *Luzhin's Defense* had not been published in the Soviet Union. In fact, it appeared in issue No. 12 (December), 1986, of *Moskva*.
- On p. 44, fn. 60, the first name of the philosopher Bulgakov is Sergey.
- On p. 69, author Natalie Gross's affiliation was improperly stated. She is Professor of Political-Military Studies at the US Army Russian Institute, and during 1987 was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Soviet Army Studies Office of the Command and General Staff College and Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last three) issues of *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURRENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $9.00 each; outside the US, $11.25 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $4.25 each; outside the US $5.31 each. A 25 percent discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services, ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

Bell & Howell Micro Photo Div.
Old Mansfield Road
Wooster, OH 44691

J. S. Canner & Co.
49-65 Lansdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Infordata International, Inc.
175 East Delaware Place
Chicago, IL 60611

Inst. for Scientific Information
3501 Market St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Microforms International Mktg. Co.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

John T. Zubal, Inc.
2969 West 25th Street
Cleveland, OH 44113

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED